I am strongly against creating a 2.1 spec until we have at least a year of
deployment experience with the contents we're adding to 2.0, so as not to
fragment the OAuth marketplace.
I think we should:
1. Continue working on new security mitigations in new drafts (such as
mix-up-mitigation, etc.) that add features to use with 2.0
2. Continue working on PoP specs (such as pop-key-distribution, etc.) that add
features to use with 2.0
3. Continue working on other new specs (such as discovery,
resource-indicators, etc.) that add features to use with 2.0
4. Learn from deployment experience with all of them
5. Iterate if the deployment experience tells us that we need to
Only after we believe we have all the features right and we know that they work
together well should we consider creating a 2.1. If we rush to a 2.1 and get
it wrong, we'll lose developers' trust and we'll never get it back.
-- Mike
-----Original Message-----
From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Samuel Erdtman
Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 12:48 PM
To: Anthony Nadalin <tony...@microsoft.com>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1
+1 on a 2.1 version
-1 on defining scopes more precisely in 2.1
Sent from my iPhone
> On 7 apr. 2016, at 14:46, Anthony Nadalin <tony...@microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> I don't belive that scopes should be defined more precisely as this
> opaqueness was a design feature, I'm not seeing the reason why scopes need to
> be defined, as these are application specific.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Torsten
> Lodderstedt
> Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 5:32 AM
> To: George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com>
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1
>
> Hi all,
>
> as I already said in the meeting: I would very much prefer to have an
> extension/update of RFC 6819 covering all "new" threats, including:
> - mix up
> - code injection aka copy and paste
> - open redirector at AS and client
> - potential other threats in the context of "dynamic" OAuth
>
> I also assume mitigations for (at least some of) the threats need to go into
> an update of RFC 6749 as normative text. To give an example: if we agree on
> using the state parameter at the token endpoint to mitigate code injection,
> this MUST be part of the core spec (request description and security
> consoderations). Otherwise, noone will even consider it.
>
> We should also use the opportunity to improve/enhance the text of the spec.
> In the course of the last years, we have learned a lot about ambiquities of
> the text and how different implementations utilize OAuth.
>
> I think time is right to define scopes more precisely. As the discussions in
> the last days proved again (at least for me), scope is not sufficiently
> defined to come up with interoperable implementations. Additionally, there
> seems to be a need to represent resource server locations (to not say
> identities :-)) in this context.
>
> To bundle all changes in a version 2.1 would also make communication into the
> market much easier.
>
> best regards,
> Torsten.
>
>> Am 06.04.2016 um 16:05 schrieb George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com>:
>>
>> I'd definitely prefer a single solution document to many little ones that
>> have to be combined to actually build a secure solution. It's already
>> getting complex with the additional specs that have been added.
>>
>> Additionally, I'm not against working on OAuth 2.1.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> George
>>
>>> On 4/6/16 2:06 PM, Phil Hunt (IDM) wrote:
>>>
>>> Existing implementations are for the large part ok and do not need these
>>> mitigations.
>>>
>>> Only the new use cases we have been discussing (configure on the fly and
>>> multi-as, etc) really need mitigation.
>>>
>>> The updated by approach seems like a good way to address the new cases.
>>>
>>> Phil
>>>
>>>> On Apr 6, 2016, at 14:35, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> today we discussed the OAuth Authorization Server Mixup draft. We
>>>> were wondering what types of threats the document should find solutions
>>>> for.
>>>>
>>>> We discussed various document handling approaches including
>>>> * OAuth Mix-Up and Cut-and-Paste attacks documented in separate
>>>> solution documents
>>>> * combined solution document covering the OAuth Mix-Up and the
>>>> Cut-and-Paste attacks.
>>>>
>>>> Barry pointed out that these documents could update the OAuth base
>>>> specification.
>>>>
>>>> As a more radical change it was also suggested to revise RFC 6749
>>>> "OAuth
>>>> 2.0 Authorization Framework" and RFC 6819 "OAuth 2.0 Threat Model
>>>> and Security Considerations".
>>>>
>>>> Opening up the OAuth base specification obviously raises various
>>>> other questions about cleaning up parts that go far beyond the AS
>>>> mix-up and the cut-and-paste attacks. Other specifications, such as
>>>> the Open Redirector, could be folded into such a new specification.
>>>>
>>>> Derek and I would appreciate your input on this topic before we
>>>> make a decision since it has significant impact on our work.
>>>>
>>>> Ciao
>>>> Hannes & Derek
>>>>
>>>>
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