Hi Hannes
On 27/11/12 18:50, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
Hi Sergey,
On Nov 27, 2012, at 2:45 PM, Sergey Beryozkin wrote:
Hi Hannes
On 27/11/12 12:33, Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) wrote:
Hi Sergey,
I believe we would make faster progress on security topics if could
focus on listing security requirements we have and what threats we want
to mitigate. The reason why we have not finished this topic is simply
because everyone was just talking about specific (but incomplete)
solutions. You are unfortunately falling in the same trap as well.
Quite possible - I was hoping to give some perspective of someone who would
like to see a wider acceptance of 2.0 at the grass root level if you wish where
'grass root' represents simple 2.0 applications.
We are obviously interested in wide acceptance of our specifications.
If you really care about the topic then have a look at the mentioned
document and tell us whether the requirements are complete.
Reading through the document you will notice that there a few more
considerations to pay attention to than just the few listed below.
Believe it or not I did read the document awhile back :-)
Cool. Thanks.
and will definitely read it few times more - it is a must-read. I'm just
concerned that it appears that the possible progress on MAC
needs to be justified by linking it implicitly to the security threats doc. And
I'm not sure it is the best way to follow.
How about a slightly different approach.
Do you agree that supporting HOK is important ? Assuming yes then I guess the
threats doc must be talking about the relevant issues that HOK can help with
addressing.
If we can agree on this then IMHO MAC passes the acceptance criteria because it
offers one way to provide a HOK support. Whether JWT or other token type may
also help with HOK support is entirely different issue and it is down to
specific OAuth2 implementers on which HOK-capable token to support
In Section 4 of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-oauth-security-00 we tried to explain that there are three
approaches to address very common security threats that exist in these three party protocols. All three approach,
namely "confidentiality protection", "sender constraint", and "key confirmation", address
these common threats in their own way. The details vary between the different solution categories. We published the
bearer token specification, which follows the approach described in Section 4.1 ("confidentiality
protection").
The group very early on said that they also wand an alternative, using "key
confirmation". This was actually the reason why we moved the bearer and the MAC
specification out of the main OAuth 2.0 and put them into separate documents.
Consequently, there is no need to convince us that we should be working on a solution
that is different than the bearer token (even I keep explaining folks that bearer tokens
are not cookies and that they have similar properties than the other mechanisms).
We had also figured out that there isn't only a single solution that will make
everyone happy. But we also don't want to standardize everything comes to our
mind: you can see in other areas (e.g., EAP, SASL, TLS ciphersuites, IKEv2
extension, etc.) that the creativity is endless when it comes to authentication
and key exchange protocols.
Major thanks for providing the background info and more thoughts on this
topic...
+1 to the fact it is not realistic to standardize every token type out
there.
To be honest, as I already indicated, I don't mind if MAC stays the
draft, we will support it as it's already in the code and will fix the
things locally at our framework level if the users who will start
experimenting with it report some issues with the way the signature is
calculated and such or will want a support for a body hash which I
believe is optionally supported (?) at the MAC draft level, etc...
I think, with my primitive understanding of the advanced security
issues, that MAC has few useful properties which can help with the
simpler cases. But again, from my point of view, it is more about having
a token type which will be most 'familiar' to 1.0 developers.
May be I'm just repeating myself, sorry :-)
I am hoping that the conference calls (which I had asked folks to indicate
their preference for) will help us to come up with an answer of what the
essential requirements are (and hopefully within a very short timeframe). You
are, btw, welcome to join those calls.
Thanks - will definitely consider once I get a better appreciation of
OAuth2.0
Cheers, Sergey
Ciao
Hannes
PS: We should have probably never used the term HOK since it caused more
confusion than it helped.
Thanks, Sergey
Ciao
Hannes
-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
Of ext Sergey Beryozkin
Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:23 PM
To: Hannes Tschofenig
Cc:<oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What needs to be done to complete MAC
Hi Hannes
On 26/11/12 19:01, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
Hi Sergey,
as Phil said it would be helpful for us to receive reviews of this
document:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-oauth-security-00
The document lists requirements and threats.
Let me offer two possibly naive reasons why using MAC may help, one of
them is related to the security, another to the ease of HOK support on
the client
1. The most safe way to return MAC token to the client is to use a
two-way TLS due to the mac key also returned to the client. Two-Way
TLS
offers a stronger support for getting the client authenticated along
the
way too
2. Assuming HOK confirmation matters at all (and I believe it does),
IMHO it is much simpler for a basic client implementation to apply a
MAC
signature algo and thus work with the OAuth2 servers expecting HOK
confirmations
One more reason is more about facilitating the further migration to
2.0
which I tried to outline in my response to Phil Hunt
Thanks, Sergey
Ciao
Hannes
On Nov 26, 2012, at 8:28 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
If we want to get this done we have to get agreements on the
requirements for HOK. Several meetings ago (quebec) the group
indicated
that mac wasn't appropriate to anyone's needs.
Some would argue that OAuth1 users arguably have less security than
the simpler bearer token /tls model in OAuth2. This just shows the
real
issue of demonstrated need has not been properly defined and
understood.
More dialog on use cases is very helpful to moving HOK/MAC/etc
forward.
Phil
On 2012-11-26, at 10:15, Sergey Beryozkin<sberyoz...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Hi
What needs to be done to complete the MAC token spec ? Without
having it signed off it will be difficult to get people working with
OAuth 1.0 convinced to move to 2.0.
I'm seeing another user request for getting OAuth 1.0 support
extended further because the user expects it is more secure, and I
guess
because it is proven to work for people, and I guess because many
OAuth
1.0 users feel that should stay from OAuth 2.0 because of some bad
press.
Without MAC being completed the division will continue, with even
more misleading anti-OAuth2 posts appearing (though I guess some of
the
better posts point to some level of complexity in 2.0).
Is it a matter of a security expert validating the text, fixing
few
typos, and basically signing it off ?
If someone is interested then I can provide the info offline on
how
it MAC supported in our framework to get things tested easily and
such...
Cheers, Sergey
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