I don't see in that document a significant use case for a signed token, which
is use over clear text channels. Bearer tokens have similar security
properties to HTTP cookies (minus for the moment the XSRF problem). Signed
token types can be used over plain text channels without the concern about
re-use of the token by a 3rd party. Replay protection is still needed but
that's not in scope for the token mechanism itself.
It's always been this simple use case that has been my focus for MAC.
Flickr uses OAuth 1.0a today over HTTP and will for many years to come, we
won't be able to go completely SSL due to the installed base of clients. Given
the dynamic I see in the mobile development community I don't see us getting
all mobile apps into SSL only anytime soon. MAC and OAuth 1.0 solve the token
security problem for the last hop to the phone/wi-fi device without SSL for the
bulk of the application traffic.
-bill
From: "Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)"<hannes.tschofe...@nsn.com>
To: ext Sergey Beryozkin<sberyoz...@gmail.com>; Hannes
Tschofenig<hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2012 4:33 AM
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What needs to be done to complete MAC
Hi Sergey,
I believe we would make faster progress on security topics if could
focus on listing security requirements we have and what threats we want
to mitigate. The reason why we have not finished this topic is simply
because everyone was just talking about specific (but incomplete)
solutions. You are unfortunately falling in the same trap as well.
If you really care about the topic then have a look at the mentioned
document and tell us whether the requirements are complete.
Reading through the document you will notice that there a few more
considerations to pay attention to than just the few listed below.
Ciao
Hannes
-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf
Of ext Sergey Beryozkin
Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:23 PM
To: Hannes Tschofenig
Cc:<oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What needs to be done to complete MAC
Hi Hannes
On 26/11/12 19:01, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
Hi Sergey,
as Phil said it would be helpful for us to receive reviews of this
document:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-oauth-security-00
The document lists requirements and threats.
Let me offer two possibly naive reasons why using MAC may help, one of
them is related to the security, another to the ease of HOK support on
the client
1. The most safe way to return MAC token to the client is to use a
two-way TLS due to the mac key also returned to the client. Two-Way
TLS
offers a stronger support for getting the client authenticated along
the
way too
2. Assuming HOK confirmation matters at all (and I believe it does),
IMHO it is much simpler for a basic client implementation to apply a
MAC
signature algo and thus work with the OAuth2 servers expecting HOK
confirmations
One more reason is more about facilitating the further migration to
2.0
which I tried to outline in my response to Phil Hunt
Thanks, Sergey
Ciao
Hannes
On Nov 26, 2012, at 8:28 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
If we want to get this done we have to get agreements on the
requirements for HOK. Several meetings ago (quebec) the group
indicated
that mac wasn't appropriate to anyone's needs.
Some would argue that OAuth1 users arguably have less security than
the simpler bearer token /tls model in OAuth2. This just shows the
real
issue of demonstrated need has not been properly defined and
understood.
More dialog on use cases is very helpful to moving HOK/MAC/etc
forward.
Phil
On 2012-11-26, at 10:15, Sergey Beryozkin<sberyoz...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Hi
What needs to be done to complete the MAC token spec ? Without
having it signed off it will be difficult to get people working with
OAuth 1.0 convinced to move to 2.0.
I'm seeing another user request for getting OAuth 1.0 support
extended further because the user expects it is more secure, and I
guess
because it is proven to work for people, and I guess because many
OAuth
1.0 users feel that should stay from OAuth 2.0 because of some bad
press.
Without MAC being completed the division will continue, with even
more misleading anti-OAuth2 posts appearing (though I guess some of
the
better posts point to some level of complexity in 2.0).
Is it a matter of a security expert validating the text, fixing
few
typos, and basically signing it off ?
If someone is interested then I can provide the info offline on
how
it MAC supported in our framework to get things tested easily and
such...
Cheers, Sergey
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