An important point to note, that many OAuth1 implementations in the wild screw up, is that you still need TLS between the client and the Authorization Server to protect the token and secret in transit, even if you don't use TLS during the client's calls to the protected resource. Since OAuth2 core mandates TLS at the Token Endpoint explicitly for all token types, that's much more clear to understand (in my opinion) in implementation.
In case the above is unclear, what I'm trying to say is this: putting a signed token like MAC into the OAuth2 framework will give us the capability of OAuth1 in a clearer, more secure (in the wild) structure. I think it's vitally important that we have this functionality, and while I understand the need for clear use cases, I don't understand the feet-dragging. -- Justin On Nov 27, 2012, at 12:32 PM, William Mills wrote: I don't see in that document a significant use case for a signed token, which is use over clear text channels. Bearer tokens have similar security properties to HTTP cookies (minus for the moment the XSRF problem). Signed token types can be used over plain text channels without the concern about re-use of the token by a 3rd party. Replay protection is still needed but that's not in scope for the token mechanism itself. It's always been this simple use case that has been my focus for MAC. Flickr uses OAuth 1.0a today over HTTP and will for many years to come, we won't be able to go completely SSL due to the installed base of clients. Given the dynamic I see in the mobile development community I don't see us getting all mobile apps into SSL only anytime soon. MAC and OAuth 1.0 solve the token security problem for the last hop to the phone/wi-fi device without SSL for the bulk of the application traffic. -bill ________________________________ From: "Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)" <hannes.tschofe...@nsn.com<mailto:hannes.tschofe...@nsn.com>> To: ext Sergey Beryozkin <sberyoz...@gmail.com<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>>; Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net<mailto:hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>> Cc: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2012 4:33 AM Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What needs to be done to complete MAC Hi Sergey, I believe we would make faster progress on security topics if could focus on listing security requirements we have and what threats we want to mitigate. The reason why we have not finished this topic is simply because everyone was just talking about specific (but incomplete) solutions. You are unfortunately falling in the same trap as well. If you really care about the topic then have a look at the mentioned document and tell us whether the requirements are complete. Reading through the document you will notice that there a few more considerations to pay attention to than just the few listed below. Ciao Hannes > -----Original Message----- > From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org> > [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>] On Behalf > Of ext Sergey Beryozkin > Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:23 PM > To: Hannes Tschofenig > Cc: <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What needs to be done to complete MAC > > Hi Hannes > On 26/11/12 19:01, Hannes Tschofenig wrote: > > Hi Sergey, > > > > as Phil said it would be helpful for us to receive reviews of this > document: > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-oauth-security-00 > > > > The document lists requirements and threats. > > > Let me offer two possibly naive reasons why using MAC may help, one of > them is related to the security, another to the ease of HOK support on > the client > > 1. The most safe way to return MAC token to the client is to use a > two-way TLS due to the mac key also returned to the client. Two-Way TLS > offers a stronger support for getting the client authenticated along the > way too > > 2. Assuming HOK confirmation matters at all (and I believe it does), > IMHO it is much simpler for a basic client implementation to apply a MAC > signature algo and thus work with the OAuth2 servers expecting HOK > confirmations > > One more reason is more about facilitating the further migration to 2.0 > which I tried to outline in my response to Phil Hunt > > Thanks, Sergey > > > > > Ciao > > Hannes > > > > On Nov 26, 2012, at 8:28 PM, Phil Hunt wrote: > > > >> If we want to get this done we have to get agreements on the > requirements for HOK. Several meetings ago (quebec) the group indicated > that mac wasn't appropriate to anyone's needs. > >> > >> Some would argue that OAuth1 users arguably have less security than > the simpler bearer token /tls model in OAuth2. This just shows the real > issue of demonstrated need has not been properly defined and understood. > >> > >> More dialog on use cases is very helpful to moving HOK/MAC/etc > forward. > >> > >> Phil > >> > >> On 2012-11-26, at 10:15, Sergey > >> Beryozkin<sberyoz...@gmail.com<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>> > wrote: > >> > >>> Hi > >>> > >>> What needs to be done to complete the MAC token spec ? Without > having it signed off it will be difficult to get people working with > OAuth 1.0 convinced to move to 2.0. > >>> I'm seeing another user request for getting OAuth 1.0 support > extended further because the user expects it is more secure, and I guess > because it is proven to work for people, and I guess because many OAuth > 1.0 users feel that should stay from OAuth 2.0 because of some bad press. > >>> > >>> Without MAC being completed the division will continue, with even > more misleading anti-OAuth2 posts appearing (though I guess some of the > better posts point to some level of complexity in 2.0). > >>> > >>> Is it a matter of a security expert validating the text, fixing few > typos, and basically signing it off ? > >>> > >>> If someone is interested then I can provide the info offline on how > it MAC supported in our framework to get things tested easily and such... > >>> > >>> Cheers, Sergey > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> OAuth mailing list > >>> OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > >> _______________________________________________ > >> OAuth mailing list > >> OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
_______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
