I'm dismissive of this being an OAuth problem. EHL
On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:35, "Michael Thomas" <m...@mtcc.com> wrote: > Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: >> Don't install crap on you device or computer. OAuth is the least of your >> concern if you install bad software. >> >> If there was a solution to this we would not need an antivirus. > > How exactly does an end user know what is "crap" or not? Or are you just > dismissive of apps in > general? I don't think that apple and google are going to close up shop > because it breaks oauth's > trust model. > > Mike > >> >> EHL >> >> On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:23, "Michael Thomas" <m...@mtcc.com> wrote: >> >>> Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: >>>> I agree. If you are going to install a native app, you better trust it not >>>> to do bad things. Grabbing your password is the least interesting thing >>>> such an app can abuse. I don't see any need to change the v2 draft. >>> How, exactly, is the user supposed to protect themselves against rogue apps? >>> It sounds like the solution is to tell them to never use oauth in an app at >>> all. >>> >>> Is oauth only intended to be used on standalone trustable web browsers? I >>> don't recall >>> seeing that anywhere. >>> >>> Mike >>> >>>> EHL >>>> >>>> On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:10, "Igor Faynberg" >>>> <igor.faynb...@alcatel-lucent.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Mike, >>>>> >>>>> You've got the problem statement right: allowing the user to authorize >>>>> resource access to another party without divulging user's credentials is >>>>> the objective of OAuth. You are also right in that the attack you have >>>>> described defies the whole purpose of OAuth. I do not think though that >>>>> it is related to OAuth per se. >>>>> >>>>> To this end, the security work led by Torsten has thoroughly analyzed >>>>> the protocol and specified protection against multiple protocol >>>>> attacks. From what you described, it appears to me that the attack you >>>>> mention is not related to the protocol but rather to the user's >>>>> environment. There is no possible protection from key loggers that a >>>>> protocol can implement. I could be mistaken; in any case, it looks like >>>>> the problem rests with the implementation of WebView. >>>>> >>>>> If I am wrong, I would appreciate a detailed description of what happened. >>>>> >>>>> Igor >>>>> >>>>> On 9/6/2011 1:40 PM, Michael Thomas wrote: >>>>>> Hi all, >>>>>> >>>>>> Barry suggested that I might subscribe and explain what I sent him. >>>>>> >>>>>> My basic problem is that in neither the protocol nor the threats drafts, >>>>>> I can't seem to find what problem is actually trying to be solved with >>>>>> oauth, and what assumptions you're making about various elements. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here's what I did. I've written an app, and I wanted re-integrate the >>>>>> ability to send tweets after they deprecated Basic. So the app has a >>>>>> webView (android, iphone...) which it obviously completely controls. >>>>>> With oauth, the webview UA will ultimately redirect off to Twitter's >>>>>> site to collect the user's credentials and grant my app's backend an >>>>>> access token (sorry if I get terminology screwed up, i'm just coming >>>>>> up to speed). >>>>>> >>>>>> What occurs to me is that webview affords exactly zero protection from >>>>>> my client (ie, the app) from getting the user's twitter credentials. All >>>>>> I have to do is set up a keypress handler on that webview and in a few >>>>>> minutes of hacking I have a key logger. etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> So what I can't tell is whether this is a "problem" or not, because I >>>>>> don't know what problem you're trying to solve. If the object of oauth >>>>>> isn't to keep user/server credentials out of the hands of a third party, >>>>>> then what is it trying to solve? Is there an expectation that the >>>>>> UA is trusted by the user/server? What happens when that's not the case? >>>>>> >>>>>> Regardless of whether I'm misunderstanding, it would sure be nice to have >>>>>> both the problem and your assumptions laid out, hopefully with some >>>>>> prominence >>>>>> so you don't get these sort of dumb questions. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
