John Kemp wrote:
On Sep 6, 2011, at 3:49 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:
Except in the desktop web world, I choose from a *tiny* set of browsers:
chrome, firefox, opera, and, uh, ie. To a lesser or greater extent, I don't
expect that the browsers themselves are malicious. Which is a pretty ok
assumption.
It is? I would certainly question it. The WebKit WebView is embeddable in the C/C++
programming languages and APIs are available for that on most platforms - all are open to
the same attacks you mention. How about the plugins you get for your browser from various
places - they could have key loggers too. It's also possible for an app delivered from a
server to present a login form that looks like it is from Twitter, but is actually from
an attacker site. Such attacks are very common indeed, and don't require a key logger.
They do require the user to "trust" the app though, just as the user would need
to trust the key logger he installed.
I didn't say they weren't embeddable elsewhere. I just gave my example. And if
I don't
use plugins, the browser is relatively trustable, especially in comparison to
standalone
apps -- on desktop *or* phone, etc.
With embedded web views, that assumption goes out the window. There are
100's of thousands of apps, all of which can use webviews. I have no way
to know if a given app is evil or not, and *lots* of apps provide facebook
and twitter integration. Not because they're evil, but because that's what's
expected by users. So the use model of oauth in this case is *very* different
than the desktop use case.
I disagree. If anything, because desktop machines tend to be less 'locked-down'
than mobile platforms (app stores for desktops followed app stores for mobile
platforms), they are more widely open to abuse.
I can tell you from experience that Android absolutely doesn't check anything
of this
sort, and it would take extremely deep voodoo for Apple to do the same: they
never see
source.
So the reality is that neither are trustable.
But I'm being told that use cases aren't the problem of oauth. I'd say that
there has all along been a hidden assumption that the browser was
a trusted entity.
The point is simply that if you can subvert the actual platform, then OAuth
problems are the least of your worries (as a user).
People keep saying that to deflect criticism, but I don't buy it. Other
protocols aren't
availing an attacker to user credentials to third party servers by simply
snooping on the
webview key traffic in an otherwise completely normal use pattern.
Have you ever signed on to facebook in an app before?
Mike
- John
Since it isn't always, it should be very explicit in the
protocol, threats, and security considerations of what could happen if it's
not.
Mike, frankly this is why apps do suck but i'm not king of the world
-- Justin
On Tue, 2011-09-06 at 15:28 -0400, Michael Thomas wrote:
Melinda Shore wrote:
On 09/06/2011 11:11 AM, Jill Burrows wrote:
I repeat, it is not an OAuth problem.
If I'm reading Mike correctly (and if I'm not it won't be the
first time I've misunderstood him), he's not really asking for
OAUTH to solve this particular problem but to clarify the
documents and beef up discussions of what is and is not in
scope. He read the document and couldn't figure out whether
or not this particular problem is the business of the working
group.
I'm fairly certain that if somebody were deploying oauth for their servers
that unless the document told me that oauth doesn't provide protection
against third party snooping if it's embedded in any app, most people wouldn't
have a clue that that was a dangerous assumption.
What this says is that oauth only works in one use case, and that only the
user can tell the difference. Given the proliferation of phone apps and
embedded webviews, it seems that the original assumptions of oauth are
no longer up to date.
Mike
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