I agree. This is like saying SSL has an issue because it doesn't stop keyloggers.
Not an oauth issue. sent from my android phone On Sep 6, 2011 8:14 PM, "Eran Hammer-Lahav" <e...@hueniverse.com> wrote: > You are one making the argument that no one should be installing apps. > > There is no known way to stop users from installing malware and viruses other than not letting them install anything off a whitelist. The problem you are describing has nothing to do with OAuth, its a fundamental problem with running untrusted code on your devices. Once you do that, yes, OAuth can be exploited but that's true for every authentication scheme when one side is compromised. > > My point, which you seems to miss, is that the same argument can be made against any other protocol. TLS offers your certain protections but they are all gone if you install a bad native app – following your logic people should not use TLS in apps either. > > I do not consider this an issue. > > EHL > > From: Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com<mailto:m...@mtcc.com>> > Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2011 11:58:11 -0700 > To: Eran Hammer-lahav <e...@hueniverse.com<mailto:e...@hueniverse.com>> > Cc: "igor.faynb...@alcatel-lucent.com<mailto: igor.faynb...@alcatel-lucent.com>" <igor.faynb...@alcatel-lucent.com<mailto: igor.faynb...@alcatel-lucent.com>>, "oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>" <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] problem statement > > Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: > I'm dismissive of this being an OAuth problem. > > Which brings us back to my original problem: what is the problem it's trying to solve? > What are the assumptions it makes? What is its applicability? None of those are addressed > very well if at all in the drafts. I'm sure that I'm not the only one who would be very > surprised to hear that using oauth on a phone app is a bad idea. > > Put it this way: your favorite example of a photo printing service needing access to flickr. > It's ok if you do that from a browser, but not if the photo printer makes an app. How many users, > exactly, are going to know that they shouldn't do the second one? > > I think that's an oauth problem because oauth makes it *seem* like you're protected from > the third party, whereas if the app itself asked for your login credentials there would > be far less confusion. So in that sense, oauth is making things worse, not better. > > Mike > > EHL > On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:35, "Michael Thomas" <m...@mtcc.com<mailto: m...@mtcc.com>> wrote: > Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: > Don't install crap on you device or computer. OAuth is the least of your concern if you install bad software. > > If there was a solution to this we would not need an antivirus. > How exactly does an end user know what is "crap" or not? Or are you just dismissive of apps in > general? I don't think that apple and google are going to close up shop because it breaks oauth's > trust model. > > Mike > > EHL > > On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:23, "Michael Thomas" <m...@mtcc.com<mailto: m...@mtcc.com>> wrote: > > Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: > I agree. If you are going to install a native app, you better trust it not to do bad things. Grabbing your password is the least interesting thing such an app can abuse. I don't see any need to change the v2 draft. > How, exactly, is the user supposed to protect themselves against rogue apps? > It sounds like the solution is to tell them to never use oauth in an app at all. > > Is oauth only intended to be used on standalone trustable web browsers? I don't recall > seeing that anywhere. > > Mike > > EHL > > On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:10, "Igor Faynberg" < igor.faynb...@alcatel-lucent.com<mailto:igor.faynb...@alcatel-lucent.com>> wrote: > > Mike, > > You've got the problem statement right: allowing the user to authorize > resource access to another party without divulging user's credentials is > the objective of OAuth. You are also right in that the attack you have > described defies the whole purpose of OAuth. I do not think though that > it is related to OAuth per se. > > To this end, the security work led by Torsten has thoroughly analyzed > the protocol and specified protection against multiple protocol > attacks. From what you described, it appears to me that the attack you > mention is not related to the protocol but rather to the user's > environment. There is no possible protection from key loggers that a > protocol can implement. I could be mistaken; in any case, it looks like > the problem rests with the implementation of WebView. > > If I am wrong, I would appreciate a detailed description of what happened. > > Igor > > On 9/6/2011 1:40 PM, Michael Thomas wrote: > Hi all, > > Barry suggested that I might subscribe and explain what I sent him. > > My basic problem is that in neither the protocol nor the threats drafts, > I can't seem to find what problem is actually trying to be solved with > oauth, and what assumptions you're making about various elements. > > Here's what I did. I've written an app, and I wanted re-integrate the > ability to send tweets after they deprecated Basic. So the app has a > webView (android, iphone...) which it obviously completely controls. > With oauth, the webview UA will ultimately redirect off to Twitter's > site to collect the user's credentials and grant my app's backend an > access token (sorry if I get terminology screwed up, i'm just coming > up to speed). > > What occurs to me is that webview affords exactly zero protection from > my client (ie, the app) from getting the user's twitter credentials. All > I have to do is set up a keypress handler on that webview and in a few > minutes of hacking I have a key logger. etc. > > So what I can't tell is whether this is a "problem" or not, because I > don't know what problem you're trying to solve. If the object of oauth > isn't to keep user/server credentials out of the hands of a third party, > then what is it trying to solve? Is there an expectation that the > UA is trusted by the user/server? What happens when that's not the case? > > Regardless of whether I'm misunderstanding, it would sure be nice to have > both the problem and your assumptions laid out, hopefully with some > prominence > so you don't get these sort of dumb questions. > > Mike > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > >
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