<soapbox>
I think the routing system would be in a much happier [less bad] place
if only had a minor amount of the energy and resources that USG (and
RIRs) have been put towards RPKI and BGPSEC (i.e., IETF SIDR work) would
have been redirected to lower hanging fruit and better recognizing /
leveraging existent systems and operational practices (e.g., more IRR
usage, training, tools, and better hygiene, perhaps expressly validated
from resource certification from either RPKI or in-addr.arpa, etc).
Given that many of the same derived "policies" there could also be
employed for inter-domain datapath anti-spoofing (BCP38-ish
inter-domain) and that all the existing machinery and practices already
deployed could more easily accommodate this in the near term, it seems
only natural to me.
As for the visionaries playing the long game, they've made progress,
but surely the only way to get there is with more incremental "putty"
and small practical steps to fill the gaps at this point.
</soapbox>
I for one would like to see ARIN (as well as other RIRs and the
adjacent community) invest more pragmatically in this area, particularly
given the governance climate and other externalities at play these days.
Alas,
-danny
