On 29 Apr 2012, at 22:03, David Conrad wrote: > Alex, > > On Apr 29, 2012, at 8:16 AM, Alex Band wrote: >> All in all, for an RPKI-specific court order to be effective in taking a >> network offline, the RIR would have to tamper with the registry, inject >> false data and try to make sure it's not detected so nobody applies a local >> override. > > I suspect the court order would simply say something like 'RIPE-NCC must, > upon pain of contempt of court, take sufficient steps to invalidate the > allocations made to customer X' and leave it up to you all to figure out how > to do it. I doubt they'd care all that much about implementation details. Are > you saying it is not possible for RIPE-NCC staff to do this? I also doubt the > court would care too much about 'local override' as the "Tyranny of Defaults" > would be sufficient for their needs (and they could probably sanction the > folks in the Netherlands who they discovered did the override). > > As Randy points out, this is not unique to SIDR-defined RPKI. It is > applicable to any top-down hierarchical authorization mechanism. Security > has (non-monetary) costs.
Thanks David, I know that a court order doesn't have to specific. I just want to make people aware that in the case of RPKI, things are not as clear cut as "Revoked ROA = Offline network". It depends on many factors and I just want to offer a little perspective of what's involved. -Alex (P.S. I'm going on holiday for a week without internet access, so I won't be able to follow up on this thread for a while)
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