On 28 Apr 2012, at 21:28, Phil Regnauld wrote: > Rubens Kuhl (rubensk) writes: >>> In case you feel a BGP announcement should not be "RPKI Invalid" but >>> something else, you do what's described on slide 15-17: >>> >>> https://ripe64.ripe.net/presentations/77-RIPE64-Plenery-RPKI.pdf >> >> The same currently happens with DNSSEC, doing what Comcast calls >> "negative trust anchors": >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-livingood-negative-trust-anchors-01 > > Yes, NTAs was the comparison that came to my mind as well. Or even > in classic DNS, overriding with stubs. You will get bitten by a bogus/ > flawed ROA, but you'll have to the chance to mitigate it. Any kind of > centralized mechanism like this is subject to these risks, no matter > what the distribution mechanism is.
Now that we have cleared up the fact that any RPKI statement can be overridden, I want to address another tenacious misunderstanding in relation to what Randy said: On 28 Apr 2012, at 15:58, Randy Bush wrote: > the worry in the ripe region and elsewhere is what i call the 'virginia > court attack', also called the 'dutch court attack'. some rights holder > claims their movie is being hosted in your datacenter and they get the > RIR to jerk the attestation to your ownership of the prefix or your ROA. If a Dutch court would order the RIPE NCC to remove a certificate or ROA from the system, the effect would be that there no longer is an RPKI statement about a BGP route announcement. The result is that the announcement will have the RPKI status *UNKNOWN*. It will be like the organization never used RPKI to make the statement in the first place. Thus, removing a certificate or ROA *does NOT* result in an RPKI INVALID route announcement; the result is RPKI UNKNOWN. The only way a court order could make a route announcement get the RPKI status *INVALID* would be to: 1: Remove the original, legitimate ROA 2: Tamper with the Registry, inject a false ROA authorizing another AS to make the announcement look like a hijack All in all, for an RPKI-specific court order to be effective in taking a network offline, the RIR would have to tamper with the registry, inject false data and try to make sure it's not detected so nobody applies a local override. -Alex
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