>> the worry in the ripe region and elsewhere is what i call the 'virginia >> court attack', also called the 'dutch court attack'. some rights holder >> claims their movie is being hosted in your datacenter and they get the >> RIR to jerk the attestation to your ownership of the prefix or your ROA. > > If a Dutch court would order the RIPE NCC to remove a certificate or ROA from > the system, the effect would be that there no longer is an RPKI statement > about a BGP route announcement. The result is that the announcement will have > the RPKI status *UNKNOWN*. It will be like the organization never used RPKI > to make the statement in the first place. > > Thus, removing a certificate or ROA *does NOT* result in an RPKI INVALID > route announcement; the result is RPKI UNKNOWN. > > The only way a court order could make a route announcement get the RPKI > status *INVALID* would be to: > 1: Remove the original, legitimate ROA > 2: Tamper with the Registry, inject a false ROA authorizing another AS to > make the announcement look like a hijack
How does this interact with the presence of certificates for supernets, though? That is, suppose an ISP creates a legitimate ROA for 12.0.0.0/8, after ensuring that all of its customers have legitimate ROAs for the various subnets of 12.0.0.0/8. Now, suppose one of these customers has its legitimate ROA revoked by a court order. Would the legitimate announcement of that subnet (originated by the customer's ASN) still result in UNKNOWN status, or would it look like a sub-prefix hijack because the announcement has a different ASN than the matching 12.0.0.0/8 prefix? -- Jen
