On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:49 PM, Steven Bellovin <s...@cs.columbia.edu> wrote: > > On Feb 4, 2010, at 5:42 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > >> On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Crist Clark <crist.cl...@globalstar.com> >> wrote: >> >>>> this seems like much more work that matt blaze's work that said: >>> "Just >>>> send more than 10mbps toward what you want to sneak around... the >>>> LEA's pipe is saturated so nothing of use gets to them" >>> >>> The Cross/XForce/IBM talk appears more to be about unauthorized >>> access to communications via LI rather than evading them, >>> >>> "...there is a risk that [LI tools] could be hijacked by third >>> parties and used to perform surveillance without authorization." >>> >>> Of course, this has already happened, >> >> right... plus the management (for cisco) is via snmp(v3), from >> (mostly) windows servers as the mediation devices (sad)... and the >> traffic is simply tunneled from device -> mediation -> lea .... not >> necessarily IPSEC'd from mediation -> LEA, and udp-encapped from >> device -> mediation server. >> >>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_case_2004-2005 >> >> yea, good times... that's really just re-use of the normal LEA hooks >> in all telco phone switch gear though... not 'calea features' in >> particular. > > There's a difference? CALEA is just the US goverment profile of the generic > international concept of lawful intercept.
hrm, I always equate 'calea' with 'ip intercept', because I (thankfully) never had to see a phone switch (dms type thingy). You are, I believe, correct in that CALEA was first 'telephone' intercept implemented in phone-switch-thingies in ~94?? and was later applied (may 2007ish?) to IP things as well. -Chris
