On Feb 4, 2010, at 5:42 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Crist Clark <crist.cl...@globalstar.com> > wrote: > >>> this seems like much more work that matt blaze's work that said: >> "Just >>> send more than 10mbps toward what you want to sneak around... the >>> LEA's pipe is saturated so nothing of use gets to them" >> >> The Cross/XForce/IBM talk appears more to be about unauthorized >> access to communications via LI rather than evading them, >> >> "...there is a risk that [LI tools] could be hijacked by third >> parties and used to perform surveillance without authorization." >> >> Of course, this has already happened, > > right... plus the management (for cisco) is via snmp(v3), from > (mostly) windows servers as the mediation devices (sad)... and the > traffic is simply tunneled from device -> mediation -> lea .... not > necessarily IPSEC'd from mediation -> LEA, and udp-encapped from > device -> mediation server. > >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_case_2004-2005 > > yea, good times... that's really just re-use of the normal LEA hooks > in all telco phone switch gear though... not 'calea features' in > particular.
There's a difference? CALEA is just the US goverment profile of the generic international concept of lawful intercept. I recommend http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/jul07/5280 (linked to from the Wikipedia article) as a very good reference on what is and isn't known. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
