On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Crist Clark <crist.cl...@globalstar.com> wrote:
>> this seems like much more work that matt blaze's work that said: > "Just >> send more than 10mbps toward what you want to sneak around... the >> LEA's pipe is saturated so nothing of use gets to them" > > The Cross/XForce/IBM talk appears more to be about unauthorized > access to communications via LI rather than evading them, > > "...there is a risk that [LI tools] could be hijacked by third > parties and used to perform surveillance without authorization." > > Of course, this has already happened, right... plus the management (for cisco) is via snmp(v3), from (mostly) windows servers as the mediation devices (sad)... and the traffic is simply tunneled from device -> mediation -> lea .... not necessarily IPSEC'd from mediation -> LEA, and udp-encapped from device -> mediation server. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_case_2004-2005 yea, good times... that's really just re-use of the normal LEA hooks in all telco phone switch gear though... not 'calea features' in particular. -chris
