> > Basically, I guess, it means that the AS 0 solution shouldn't be used, at > least not usually. >
It's like everything else. Understand what the tools do and what they don't do, and use them appropriately. On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 2:21 PM Amir Herzberg <amir.li...@gmail.com> wrote: > I agree that a good, sensible defense would be to simply announce your > entire address block, e.g., in the example, your entire /22 (with a ROA to > your ASN), and filter the traffic to the unused prefixes. Basically, I > guess, it means that the AS 0 solution shouldn't be used, at least not > usually. I wonder if anyone is using it , in fact. It would be nice to know > if someone has the data handy. > > Thanks! Amir > -- > Amir Herzberg > > Comcast professor of Security Innovations, Computer Science and > Engineering, University of Connecticut > Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/home > `Applied Introduction to Cryptography' textbook and lectures: > https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/cybersecurity > > > > > On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 1:50 PM Tom Beecher <beec...@beecher.cc> wrote: > >> Look again, Tom. This is an attack vector using a LESS specific route. >>> The /22 gets discarded, but a covering /0-/21 would not. >>> >> >> Yes. And reliant on the operator doing something exceptionally not smart >> to begin with. Relying on an AS0 ROA alone and not actually announcing the >> covering prefix as well isn't a good thing to do. >> >> On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 1:39 PM Owen DeLong <o...@delong.com> wrote: >> >>> Look again, Tom. This is an attack vector using a LESS specific route. >>> The /22 gets discarded, but a covering /0-/21 would not. >>> >>> Owen >>> >>> On Oct 22, 2023, at 10:06, Tom Beecher <beec...@beecher.cc> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> And is it your belief that this addresses the described attack vector? >>>> AFAICT, it does not. >>>> >>> >>> Quoting myself : >>> >>> WITH the assertion that all routers in the routing domain are RPKI >>>> enabled, and discarding RPKI INVALIDs. >>>> >>> >>> In the mixed RPKI / non-RPKI environment of today's internet, no it >>> doesn't. This does not mean that RPKI is deficient, or the AS 0 ROA doesn't >>> work as intended, as was stated. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 12:57 PM William Herrin <b...@herrin.us> wrote: >>> >>>> On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 9:38 AM Tom Beecher <beec...@beecher.cc> wrote: >>>> >> He's saying that someone could come along and advertise 0.0.0.0/1 >>>> and >>>> >> 128.0.0.0/1 and by doing so they'd hijack every unrouted address >>>> block >>>> >> regardless of the block's ROA. >>>> >> >>>> >> RPKI is unable to address this attack vector. >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6483 >>>> > >>>> > Section 4 >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS 0 ROA) is an attestation by the >>>> >> holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more >>>> >> specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context. >>>> >>>> And is it your belief that this addresses the described attack vector? >>>> AFAICT, it does not. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Bill Herrin >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> William Herrin >>>> b...@herrin.us >>>> https://bill.herrin.us/ >>>> >>>
