Re: RPKI unknown for superprefixes of existing ROA ?

[Owen DeLong via NANOG]

Look again, Tom. This is an attack vector using a LESS specific route. The /22 gets discarded, but a covering /0-/21 would not.  Owen On Oct 22, 2023, at 10:06, Tom Beecher <beec...@beecher.cc> wrote:  And is it your belief that this addresses the described attack vector? AFAICT, it does not. Quoting myself :  WITH the assertion that all routers in the routing domain are RPKI enabled, and discarding RPKI INVALIDs.  In the mixed RPKI / non-RPKI environment of today's internet, no it doesn't. This does not mean that RPKI is deficient, or the AS 0 ROA doesn't work as intended, as was stated.   On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 12:57 PM William Herrin <b...@herrin.us> wrote: On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 9:38 AM Tom Beecher <beec...@beecher.cc> wrote: >> He's saying that someone could come along and advertise 0.0.0.0/1 and >> 128.0.0.0/1 and by doing so they'd hijack every unrouted address block >> regardless of the block's ROA. >> >> RPKI is unable to address this attack vector. > > > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6483 > > Section 4 >> >> >> A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS 0 ROA) is an attestation by the >> holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more >> specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context. And is it your belief that this addresses the described attack vector? AFAICT, it does not. Regards, Bill Herrin -- William Herrin b...@herrin.us https://bill.herrin.us/