[marxmail] Total Corruption And Inefficiency. How Was The HTS Blitzkrieg In Syria Possible?

abraham Weizfeld PhD via groups.io Thu, 05 Dec 2024 09:57:06 -0800

DDM – Excellent article critical of both sides while oppose the Libyianization 
of Syria.

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Total Corruption And Inefficiency. How Was The HTS Blitzkrieg In Syria Possible?

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The collapse of the front near Aleppo has revealed the chronic problems of the
Syrian Arab Republic and its military. The crisis can only be resolved with
serious reform, under Russian supervision.

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The intensification of the fighting in Syria came as a great surprise to
outside observers. In five days, the front line, which was stabilized in 2020,
has changed position by more than a hundred kilometers, with the terrorists
having captured more than 8,000 square kilometers. We are witnessing the
collapse of the front line and the inability of the Syrian Arab Army to quickly
restore the status quo. The civil war that has been raging in the country since
2011 has entered a new phase. It is too early to talk about its end, with
President Bashar al-Assad having lost his grip on events. The current situation
could lead to an even greater internationalization of the conflict than before.

The Turkish-backed fighters have demonstrated time and again that, despite the
trappings of Islam, they see their own co-religionists as their main enemy.

“Why is it that those who are once again dragging the Syrian people into
bloodshed, pathetically claiming the banner of Islam, have never condemned the
actual genocide against the poor Palestinian people? This speaks volumes. If
they could gather so much strength and resources, why did they not go to war
against Israel, but again directed their efforts to killing Muslims?” said Apti
Alaudinov, commander of the Akhmat volunteer formation.

On November 27, terrorist groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham began a major
offensive, from Idlib province toward Aleppo. The attackers were supported by
fighters from the Syrian National Army, which holds the northern part of Aleppo
governorate. The defenses of the Syrian government troops collapsed during the
first hours of the offensive. Within two days, the retreat turned into an
uncontrolled flight. Resistance to the fighters was sporadic, and an
information vacuum exacerbated the situation. Officials could only claim that
the enemy was spreading fakes, while in reality the situation was under the
control of the army command. The HTS successes proved the opposite.

By noon on November 29, there were no top officers left in the city of Aleppo,
Syria’s largest population center before the war began. The command of the 30th
Division of the Republican Guard had fled, as had senior military intelligence
and officers of Air Force Intelligence Directorate. The remaining SAA fighters
were left to fend for themselves. Some deserted to the rear, others put up
heroic resistance without any chance of success. By the end of the day, the
officers began destroying personal documents, setting fire to houses, and
leaving Aleppo. By 17:00 there was no longer any central command of the
garrison.

During the evening and night, the city came under the control of Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham. The HTS groups allowed some Syrian Arab Army soldiers to leave Aleppo
and agreed to temporary neutrality with Kurdish units. By November 30, the
fighters controlled the entire city except for Sheikh Maqsud and Ashrafiyah,
which are densely populated by Kurds.

Now Aleppo has fallen, the HTS units have moved south towards the city of Hama.
The SAA units left their positions in the Southern Idlib area without any
serious resistance. In the afternoon of November 30, HTS maneuvering groups
entered Hama without encountering any resistance. By nightfall, however, they
were forced to leave the city as SAA reinforcements arrived. Units from the
25th Division and the 4th Division helped stabilize the situation, and the
Syrian forces tried to launch a counteroffensive, having partial success.
Currently, the fighting is taking place 10 kilometers north and northeast of
Hama, and the operational crisis has not yet been resolved.

>From December 1 to 3, Kurdish units left the outskirts of Aleppo, as agreed
>with the Syrian National Army. However, some Kurds are still trapped in the
>Sheikh Maqsud and Ashrafiya neighborhoods inside the city, from which they
>will have to negotiate with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to be granted a safe
>corridor. On December 3, Tahrir al-Sham captured Halfaya, Taibat al-Imam and
>Maardes north of Hama. The main task for the SAA remains to stabilize the
>front line north of Hama, suppress any unrest in the rear, attract large-scale
>foreign military aid, and create the conditions for a transition to a
>counteroffensive with decisive objectives.

However, it is impossible to accomplish these tasks without critically
examining the fundamental reasons for the failure. The militant offensive
exposed fatal wounds in the Syrian Arab Republic’s state and military
apparatus. Information about the impending offensive had been reaching Damascus
through the Russian Defense Ministry since the end of August 2024. The
accumulation of ammunition in warehouses and the arrival of new recruits were
recorded. Attempts at tactical offensives began in late September. The network
of HTS agents in the rear of the Syrian Armed Forces became more active, but
the SAA command and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were de-facto
inactive.

Damascus did nothing to equip fortifications in Aleppo province. Troop density
was low, and there were no continuous minefields or reserve positions. There
was a lack of reinforcement units in the front line. The positions of 2012-2016
were not used, being in a state of abandonment. The army was retreating into
the void.

The most acute problem of the SAA was and is the lack of personnel in the
units. Active units lack about 40% of fighters, sometimes up to 60%. As a
result, there are full-blooded divisions on paper, but not in reality. The
reinforcements reflect an even deeper problem – the widespread corruption of
the Syrian army’s officer corps.

The motivation of SAA soldiers and officers is extremely low, whilst material
support is at a very low level. This has led to numerous acts of extortion by
the military against the local population. The authority of the authorities has
been seriously undermined by outright extortion by the military. The M5 highway
between Aleppo and Damascus has been illegally taxed, as in the Middle Ages; it
has become impossible to pass without paying a bribe. Thus, undertaking
military service has become a business. The situation has been exacerbated by
ethno-religious differences between the local population and the troops. The
Syrian Arab Army is half Alawite, and among the officers, there are even more
Alawites, which is anathema to the Sunni majority. With an average salary of
20-30 dollars, Alawites in Syria receive significantly more.

The central government has relied mostly on the Alawite population. The
formation of troops on a narrow sectarian basis has been intended to prevent
possible rebellions. It is also related to the purging of the most professional
commanders who had proved themselves in battles before the 2020 ceasefire. The
most combat-ready units have been disbanded or reassigned. Ineffective
socio-economic policies based on mundane corruption have resulted in a standard
of living in the SAR that is inferior even to such poor neighboring countries
as Lebanon and Iraq. The degradation of the economy and social infrastructure
is in many cases greater than in areas controlled by the Kurds and Hayat Tahrir
al-Sham.

The Syrian Arab Army is completely unprepared for the methods of modern
warfare. The experience of the special military operation in Ukraine has passed
them by, although the Syrian commanders could have gone directly to the
Russians to learn the lessons of the violent conflict in Eastern Europe. They
could have sent their representatives to the Ukrainian front and trained them
directly in the field of combat operations, but nothing was done.

Unlike the Syrian troops, the HTS fighters have closely interacted with the
Ukrainian security services. As a result, we see the extensive and effective
use of FPV drones, resulting in the HTS groups having a significant advantage
in aerial reconnaissance. The acute shortage of reconnaissance equipment held
by the Syrian government forces has not been eliminated for 4 years. Only 2
Russian Zala reconnaissance drones were operating in the direction of Aleppo,
and they could only fly 2 km beyond the line of contact, as Turkish electronic
warfare systems did not allow them to operate further.

Finally, information security was not established at all, given that methods of
communicating with the population are now extremely outdated. While the
militants flood the Internet space with their content, the Syrian press is in a
vacuum, resulting in inadequate responses to threats. The fact that the Syrian
army retained control over Hama had to be confirmed by ordinary SAA soldiers,
who recorded videos and posted them on social media to prevent panic.

All these issues could be solved by Russia’s direct involvement in Syria’s
internal affairs. As a country that has provided enormous assistance, the
Russian Federation is responsible for stability in the region, through
recruiting the armed forces, including officers, punishing corruption and lack
of discipline, and building fortifications. All of this must be done under the
direct supervision of the Russian command. Moscow must also create an effective
state apparatus, or the Syrian state will share the fate of Libya and Yemen.
Given the ethnic and religious diversity of Syria, the consequences would be
disastrous.

[marxmail] Total Corruption And Inefficiency. How Was The HTS Blitzkrieg In Syria Possible?

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