On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 07:25:09PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > On 11/18/26 9:12 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote: > > This patch is a proposal on its own: nothing before it needs it, so it > > can be discussed, or left out, apart from the rest.
If there is no one who needs this, this is literally throwing a dice with Claude. > > > > aes256-cbc does not authenticate what it decrypts, and a file or a > > transfer longer than one call cannot be sealed with a single AES-GCM > > invocation without buffering all of it, nor decrypted without > > releasing plaintext before its tag is checked. > > > > Add aes256-gcm-stream: the STREAM construction (Hoang, Reyhanitabar, > > Rogaway, Vizar) over AES-256-GCM. A message is split into segments > > of up to 64 KiB, each sealed with its own tag under a subkey derived > > with HKDF-SHA256 from the key and a 16-byte salt drawn at > > KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN; the nonce carries the segment's position and a > > last-segment flag, and the counter lives in the kernel, so segments > > can be neither reordered nor dropped from the end unnoticed. The > > segments go through a new ioctl, KEYCRYPT_IOC_SEGMENT, and > > KEYCRYPT_IOC_FINAL reports a stream whose last segment never came. > > A tee or hsm backend draws the salt and keeps the counter in its > > secure side; the sw and optee backends implement it. > > Please use Cobblestone-128 or Cobblestone-256 instead. > https://c2sp.org/chunked-encryption has the spec, and you can check > against the implementation in pyca/cryptography or (for Cobblestone-128) > the Go package filippo.io/cobblestone. This assumes your CPU has AES > and GCM instructions; if not, you should see about using one that does > or work with a cryptographer to standardize an alternative that doesn't > need them. > > Nonstandard constructions like this one are to be avoided. The wider problem in crypto without a use case there is nothing to protect. > -- > Sincerely, > Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers) Br, Jarkko
