On 11/18/26 9:12 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
> This patch is a proposal on its own: nothing before it needs it, so it
> can be discussed, or left out, apart from the rest.
> 
> aes256-cbc does not authenticate what it decrypts, and a file or a
> transfer longer than one call cannot be sealed with a single AES-GCM
> invocation without buffering all of it, nor decrypted without
> releasing plaintext before its tag is checked.
> 
> Add aes256-gcm-stream: the STREAM construction (Hoang, Reyhanitabar,
> Rogaway, Vizar) over AES-256-GCM. A message is split into segments
> of up to 64 KiB, each sealed with its own tag under a subkey derived
> with HKDF-SHA256 from the key and a 16-byte salt drawn at
> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN; the nonce carries the segment's position and a
> last-segment flag, and the counter lives in the kernel, so segments
> can be neither reordered nor dropped from the end unnoticed. The
> segments go through a new ioctl, KEYCRYPT_IOC_SEGMENT, and
> KEYCRYPT_IOC_FINAL reports a stream whose last segment never came.
> A tee or hsm backend draws the salt and keeps the counter in its
> secure side; the sw and optee backends implement it.

Please use Cobblestone-128 or Cobblestone-256 instead.
https://c2sp.org/chunked-encryption has the spec, and you can check
against the implementation in pyca/cryptography or (for Cobblestone-128)
the Go package filippo.io/cobblestone.  This assumes your CPU has AES
and GCM instructions; if not, you should see about using one that does
or work with a cryptographer to standardize an alternative that doesn't
need them.

Nonstandard constructions like this one are to be avoided.
-- 
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)

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