On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can
> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256
> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that
> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation.

I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective,
this encourages very poor practices.  AES-GCM even allows userspace
to extract the secret authentication key.

AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined
with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC.  Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday
bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless
the key is ephemeral.

AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either.  If you allow encrypting
with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API
to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce.  Nonce reuse leaks the
authentication key and allows forgeries.  Using random nonces isn't
good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case,
and the API can't enforce that limit.

For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices.
They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them
at random for each encryption without any problems.

- XAES-256-GCM
- XChaCha20-Poly1305
- AEGIS-256

AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally
leaking if two plaintexts are equal.  This happens whenever there is
a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions.
-- 
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)

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