On Thu, 1 May 2025 at 09:51, Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerho...@fau.de> wrote:
>
> JITs can set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() if they want the verifier to
> skip analysis/patching for the respective vulnerability. For v4, this
> will reduce the number of barriers the verifier inserts. For v1, it
> allows more programs to be accepted.
>
> The primary motivation for this is to not regress unpriv BPF's
> performance on ARM64 in a future commit where BPF_NOSPEC is also used
> against Spectre v1.
>
> This has the user-visible change that v1-induced rejections on
> non-vulnerable PowerPC CPUs are avoided.
>
> For now, this does not change the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC. It is still a
> v4-only barrier and must not be implemented if bypass_spec_v4 is always
> true for the arch. Changing it to a v1 AND v4-barrier is done in a
> future commit.
>
> As an alternative to bypass_spec_v1/v4, one could introduce NOSPEC_V1
> AND NOSPEC_V4 instructions and allow backends to skip their lowering as
> suggested by commit f5e81d111750 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction
> for mitigating Spectre v4"). Adding bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() was
> found to be preferable for the following reason:
>
> * bypass_spec_v1/v4 benefits non-vulnerable CPUs: Always performing the
> same analysis (not taking into account whether the current CPU is
> vulnerable), needlessly restricts users of CPUs that are not
> vulnerable. The only use case for this would be portability-testing,
> but this can later be added easily when needed by allowing users to
> force bypass_spec_v1/v4 to false.
>
> * Portability is still acceptable: Directly disabling the analysis
> instead of skipping the lowering of BPF_NOSPEC(_V1/V4) might allow
> programs on non-vulnerable CPUs to be accepted while the program will
> be rejected on vulnerable CPUs. With the fallback to speculation
> barriers for Spectre v1 implemented in a future commit, this will only
> affect programs that do variable stack-accesses or are very complex.
>
> For PowerPC, the SEC_FTR checking in bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4() is based
> on the check that was previously located in the BPF_NOSPEC case.
>
> For LoongArch, it would likely be safe to set both
> bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1() and _v4() according to
> commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
> barrier opcode"). This is omitted here as I am unable to do any testing
> for LoongArch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerho...@fau.de>
> Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.her...@rub.de>
> Cc: Maximilian Ott <o...@cs.fau.de>
> Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.step...@fau.de>
> ---
I think this and the next patch should have acks from arm and powerpc experts.
