Hi Robin,
On 05/11/2016 11:31 AM, Robin Murphy wrote:
> On 11/05/16 09:38, Eric Auger wrote:
>> Hi Robin, Alex,
>> On 05/10/2016 07:24 PM, Robin Murphy wrote:
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> On 10/05/16 17:10, Eric Auger wrote:
>>>> Hi Alex,
>>>> On 05/10/2016 12:49 AM, Alex Williamson wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, 4 May 2016 11:54:16 +0000
>>>>> Eric Auger <eric.au...@linaro.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On x86 IRQ remapping is abstracted by the IOMMU. On ARM this is
>>>>>> abstracted
>>>>>> by the msi controller. vfio_safe_irq_domain allows to check whether
>>>>>> interrupts are "safe" for a given device. They are if the device does
>>>>>> not use MSI
>>>>>
>>>>> Are we sure we're not opening a security hole here? An MSI is
>>>>> simply a
>>>>> DMA write, so really whether or not a device uses MSI is irrelevant.
>>>>> If it can generate a DMA to the MSI doorbell then we need to be
>>>>> protected and I think we pretty much need to assume that devices are
>>>>> DMA capable. Do the MSI domain checks cover this?
>>>> Let me try to rephrase: we check the device is not attached to an MSI
>>>> controller (I think this is the semantic of dev_get_msi_domain(dev)).
>>>>
>>>> If it is not, we don't have to care about MSI isolation: there will be
>>>> no IOMMU binding between the device and any MSI doorbell. If it is we
>>>> check the msi domain is backed by an MSI controller able to perform MSI
>>>> isolation.
>>>>
>>>> So effectively "usage of MSIs" is improper - since it is decided after
>>>> the group attachment anyway - and the commit message should rather
>>>> state "if the device is linked to an MSI controller" (dt msi-parent
>>>> notion I think).
>>>
>>> Hmm, I think Alex has a point here - on a GICv2m I can happily fire
>>> arbitrary MSIs from _a shell_ (using /dev/mem), and the CPUs definitely
>>> aren't in an MSI domain, so I don't think it's valid to assume that a
>>> device using only wired interrupts, therefore with no connection to any
>>> MSI controller, isn't still capable of maliciously spewing DMA all over
>>> any and every doorbell region in the system.
>>
>> Sorry but I still don't get the point. For the device to reach the
>> doorbell there must be an IOMMU mapping.
>
> Only when the doorbell is _downstream_ of IOMMU translation.
Yes but that's the root hypothesis with VFIO assignment, right?
Except if the no-iommu option is explicitly set by the userspace, there
must be an IOMMU downstream to the device that protects all the DMA
transactions.
>
>> - if the device is not attached to an MSI domain, there won't be any
>> doorbell iommu mapping built by this series, so no risk, right?
>>
>> The device will be allowed to reach only memory iommu mapped by
>> userspace with VFIO DMA MAP standard API. Of course if the userspace can
>> mmap all the host PA that's a more general issue, right?
>>
>> - If the device is attached to an MSI domain (msi-parent link), 2 cases:
>> 1) the MSI controller advertises MSI isolation (ITS cases), no risk
>> 2) the MSI controller does not advertise MSI isolation (GICv2m), there
>> is a security hole.
>> a) by default we reject the device attachment
>> b) if the userspace overrides the safe interrupt option he accepts
>> the security hole
>>
>> What am I missing?
>
> The x86-with-interrupt-remapping-disabled case. Currently, without
> unsafe_interrupts, everything is rejected - with this patch, we'll still
> reject anything with an MSI domain, but e.g. legacy PCI devices using
> INTx would be free to scribble all over the un-translated interrupt
> region willy-nilly.
Assuming we have an IOMMU, either we have translated transactions or
faults? So if legacy PCI devices try to write into a doorbell, there
must be faults because there is no IOMMU mapping for doorbells?
Best Regards
Eric
That's the subtle, but significant, change in
> behaviour.
>
> Robin.
>
>> Best Regards
>>
>> Eric
>>>
>>> Robin.
>>>
>>>> Does it sound better?
>>>>
>>>> Regards
>>>>
>>>> Eric
>>>>>
>>>>>> or if the device uses MSI and the msi-parent controller
>>>>>> supports IRQ remapping.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then we check at group level if all devices have safe interrupts: if
>>>>>> not,
>>>>>> we only allow the group to be attached if allow_unsafe_interrupts is
>>>>>> set.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At this point ARM sMMU still advertises IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP. This is
>>>>>> changed in next patch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Eric Auger <eric.au...@linaro.org>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> v3 -> v4:
>>>>>> - rename vfio_msi_parent_irq_remapping_capable into
>>>>>> vfio_safe_irq_domain
>>>>>> and irq_remapping into safe_irq_domains
>>>>>>
>>>>>> v2 -> v3:
>>>>>> - protect vfio_msi_parent_irq_remapping_capable with
>>>>>> CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c | 44
>>>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>> 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>>> b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>>> index 4d3a6f1..2fc8197 100644
>>>>>> --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
>>>>>> @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
>>>>>> #include <linux/vfio.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/msi-iommu.h>
>>>>>> +#include <linux/irqdomain.h>
>>>>>> +#include <linux/msi.h>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> #define DRIVER_VERSION "0.2"
>>>>>> #define DRIVER_AUTHOR "Alex Williamson
>>>>>> <alex.william...@redhat.com>"
>>>>>> @@ -777,6 +779,33 @@ static int vfio_bus_type(struct device *dev,
>>>>>> void *data)
>>>>>> return 0;
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>
>>>>>> +/**
>>>>>> + * vfio_safe_irq_domain: returns whether the irq domain
>>>>>> + * the device is attached to is safe with respect to MSI isolation.
>>>>>> + * If the irq domain is not an MSI domain, we return it is safe.
>>>>>> + *
>>>>>> + * @dev: device handle
>>>>>> + * @data: unused
>>>>>> + * returns 0 if the irq domain is safe, -1 if not.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> +static int vfio_safe_irq_domain(struct device *dev, void *data)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
>>>>>> + struct irq_domain *domain;
>>>>>> + struct msi_domain_info *info;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + domain = dev_get_msi_domain(dev);
>>>>>> + if (!domain)
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + info = msi_get_domain_info(domain);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (!(info->flags & MSI_FLAG_IRQ_REMAPPING))
>>>>>> + return -1;
>>>>>> +#endif
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> static int vfio_iommu_replay(struct vfio_iommu *iommu,
>>>>>> struct vfio_domain *domain)
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> @@ -870,7 +899,7 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>> struct vfio_group *group, *g;
>>>>>> struct vfio_domain *domain, *d;
>>>>>> struct bus_type *bus = NULL;
>>>>>> - int ret;
>>>>>> + int ret, safe_irq_domains;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> mutex_lock(&iommu->lock);
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @@ -893,6 +922,13 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> group->iommu_group = iommu_group;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * Determine if all the devices of the group have a safe irq
>>>>>> domain
>>>>>> + * with respect to MSI isolation
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + safe_irq_domains = !iommu_group_for_each_dev(iommu_group, &bus,
>>>>>> + vfio_safe_irq_domain);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> /* Determine bus_type in order to allocate a domain */
>>>>>> ret = iommu_group_for_each_dev(iommu_group, &bus,
>>>>>> vfio_bus_type);
>>>>>> if (ret)
>>>>>> @@ -920,8 +956,12 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_attach_group(void
>>>>>> *iommu_data,
>>>>>> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&domain->group_list);
>>>>>> list_add(&group->next, &domain->group_list);
>>>>>>
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * to advertise safe interrupts either the IOMMU or the MSI
>>>>>> controllers
>>>>>> + * must support IRQ remapping/interrupt translation
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> if (!allow_unsafe_interrupts &&
>>>>>> - !iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP)) {
>>>>>> + (!iommu_capable(bus, IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP) &&
>>>>>> !safe_irq_domains)) {
>>>>>> pr_warn("%s: No interrupt remapping support. Use the
>>>>>> module param \"allow_unsafe_interrupts\" to enable VFIO IOMMU
>>>>>> support on this platform\n",
>>>>>> __func__);
>>>>>> ret = -EPERM;
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
