The statement that "Although the [RFC4307] specifies that the AES-CTR encryption algorithm feature SHOULD be supported by IKEv2, no existing document specifies how IKEv2 can support the feature" is not completely correct. RFC 5282 specifies how to use AES in the Galois Counter Mode (GCM) and Counter and CBC-MAC (CCM) modes of operation.

Neither this draft nor RFC 4307 provides any rationale for why or when AES-CTR should be used. If it is considered useful because CTR can be pipelined or implemented in parallel, then the considerations of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-esp-ah-algo-update-00#section-3 would apply. What value is there is promoting the use of AES-CTR when better technical alternatives exist and are on standards track? If the sole motivation for this standard is to correct the inconsistency between RFC 4307 and RFC 3686, then the draft should include a statement to that effect, and mention the IKEv2 transforms that have all of the advantages of AES-CTR already exist.

The draft is not very clear on how AES-CTR is supposed to be implemented. What is the counter format and what is the increment function? If the intent is to copy RFC 3686 then this needs to be made more explicit.

David

On Mar 3, 2010, at 9:51 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote:

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

Title : Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IKEv2
        Author(s)       : S. Shen, Y. Mao, S. murthy
        Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2-05.txt
        Pages           : 10
        Date            : 2010-3-2
        
This document describes the usage of Advanced Encryption Standard
 Counter Mode (AES-CTR), with an explicit initialization vector, by
 IKEv2 for encrypting the IKEv2 exchanges that follow the IKE_SA_INIT
 exchange.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2-05.txt

Based on Pasi's AD review, the authors significantly shortened the document. It seems prudent to have the WG review the new, shorter version. In particular, it would be good for developers to look at the new short document and see if it is complete enough to implement from.

This review cycle will end in a week, but please do the review early in case problems are found.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
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