Take 3 simple ones.   

1.  Intermediaries can audit traffic flowing thru them.  Netflows work for all 
integrity protected traffic as if it were cleartext.

2.  Intermediaries can effectively perform QOS markings on packets.  
Integrity-only packets get more accurate markings (as if they were cleartext).  

3.  Intermediaries can enforce stateless router ACLs on all integrity traffic.  
This is used in conjunction with end system audits, and intermediary audits, 
etc.   This only increases the security of the overall system.  The alternative 
is that the stateless router ACLs just permits all ESP (null or otherwise).

All of these allow rolling out transport IPSec without compromising the 
functionality of the given intermediaries.   All are in scope for WESP.  

I'm curious what the goal of this line of enquiry is.  I.e. how can we ever be 
done with this thread?
What sort of justification is needed to progress here? 

bs





-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Kent [mailto:k...@bbn.com] 
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2010 3:41 PM
To: Brian Swander
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; Russ Housley
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Traffic visibility - consensus call

At 8:06 PM +0000 1/7/10, Brian Swander wrote:
>I'm going by what my real customers are asking for.
>
>Our real customers are asking for exactly what I'm describing below. 
>I didn't ask them why their stance to intermediaries has changed, if 
>it even has.  That is academic.  The key question here is what do 
>real customers want to deploy, and how can we enable them to do it.
>
>bs

Brian,

I don't know how IPSECME will choose to proceed, but in the WG I 
chair folks expect WG participants to provide technically defensible 
rationales for designs that they advocate. Relaying what customers 
purportedly have requested doesn't  cut it.

Also, the IETF does not assume that "the customer is always right" 
when making protocol design decisions. If we did, and if we made such 
decisions in 1990, we'd be using ATM, CLNP, X.400, and other 
protocols that many big clients said were what they wanted in that 
time frame :-).

Steve

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