Richard Clayton wrote in
<0MG+VuB$taynf...@highwayman.com>:
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...
|it was solely for incoming mail (but will include email sent from one
|user of the platform to another)
But, please. One thing.
For one, do you have numbers from say ten years ago?
Google already drives this monstrous darn= thing, for example.
I think the IETF should turn back two things, one is to not care
and foster those whose desire is to sell more bandwidth (and the
more expensive so the smaller the customer gets).
But the real thing is in my opinion that improving DKIM should not
mutilate the SMTP protocol. It is not necessary to do so.
I hope the DKIM iteration will finally work off all the mess, and
then you have SMTP plus it as an accompanying cryptographic
authentifier for *it*, not the other way around.
For example, some SMTP servers have always sent email per
receiver, deeming it a security improvement i guess. Fine. But
it should not be imposed by an accompanying helper if the base
protocol can do much better (for some sense of "better").
Wildly guessing, imagine there will be an IETF draft that
implements VERP as a SMTP extension, which could be easily done:
it just turns {MAIL FROM,RCPT TO+} into {(MAIL FROM,RCPT TO+)+},
ie, one could use multiple MAIL FROM (with some constraints, say).
Suddenly you could implement mailing lists, work group emails,
non-personalized info posts etc with decreased processing costs.
The digitalization has just begun. Why constrain the SMTP
protocol through an improved DKIM for no actual reason?
--steffen
|
|Der Kragenbaer, The moon bear,
|der holt sich munter he cheerfully and one by one
|einen nach dem anderen runter wa.ks himself off
|(By Robert Gernhardt)
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