On 2/4/2025 5:24 PM, Wei Chuang wrote:
On Tue, Feb 4, 2025 at 4:28 PM Dave Crocker <dcroc...@bbiw.net> wrote:
On 2/4/2025 4:20 PM, John Levine wrote:
It appears that Dave Crocker<dcroc...@bbiw.net> <mailto:dcroc...@bbiw.net>
said:
If your above statement is true, then why is it necessary to do the
reversal?
So you can tell if the earlier signatures in the chain were real.
A DKIM signature is self-validating.
Unless its hashes are broken.
Sorry. I think this got circular.
The starting point was that a later handling agent, like a mailing list,
does signing and taking responsibility for the message. And the
question, then, is how any of the earlier signatures matter.
Again, I was asking based on your comment that that later signature is
taking responsibility.
Why doesn't one handler's taking responsibility eliminate the need to
worry about the predecessors.
That's what ARC did, a chain of signatures with no way to tell whether
anything
but the most recent one actually matched the contents of the messages. We
tried
that and its acceptance has been underwhelming.
There are many possible reasons for that. Is there data that
points to a specific adoption and use problem that the current one
solves? If so, it would be helpful to see it. If not, then this
sounds like a guess, within a very complicated problem and
solution space.
Anyhow, I took Wei at his comment. As he stated it, the utility
of the preceding signatures is not at all clear.
My first response was to directly answer your questions in the most
straightforward way. Moreover each receiver will use this attribution
information differently, and I just answered as how I see it. Sorry
if it was not clear.
Differently. Yes. But the output from that signature validation has a
single meaning. What is the nature of its utility? That's a constant,
not subject to differential interpretation.
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net
bluesky: @dcrocker.bsky.social
mast: @dcrocker@mastodon.social
_______________________________________________
Ietf-dkim mailing list -- ietf-dkim@ietf.org
To unsubscribe send an email to ietf-dkim-le...@ietf.org
