On Sun Feb 16, 2025 at 4:51 AM CET, G. Branden Robinson wrote: > At 2025-02-16T04:37:46+0100, onf wrote: > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOvAbjfJ0x0 > > > > Take note that (IIRC) the conclusion of research surrounding the > > Prisoner's Dilemma has been that the best strategy is to reciprocate, > > but also sometimes forgive. > > Yes. The conclusion of the video, IIRC, is that the "tit-for-two-tats" > strategy is more effective than simpler ones. This is where each of > unique partner gets one free initial defection, because that might have > been mistaked. But if they defect twice (in a row?), the evolutionarily > stable strategy (to perhaps abuse Maynard Smith's term) is to defect > forever more. > > As I think you're suggesting, at a larger scale, or involving > games/scenarios more complex than iterated prisoner's dilemma, > occasionally something similar to a debt jubilee may be warranted.
I heard that they eventually modified the game by introducing the possibility that, from time to time (at random), your collaboration appears to the other player as defection (and vice versa) to model real world misunderstandings. Once they did that, the most successful strategy became a modification of tit-for-tat that interpretted defection as collaboration every now and then (I believe it was also at random), so that the players don't get stuck in a tit-for-tat loop due to a misunderstanding. > I note with interest that a lot of people who otherwise find forms of > social and state organization practiced in the Old Testament of the > Bible seem conspicuously to omit this practice of regularly zeroing out > debts after (at most) every forty-nine years, or upon accession of a new > monarch. > > Surely this oversight has nothing to do with the ownership of most > consumer debt in by those occupying the commanding heights of our > economies. Hm, that's really interesting. Do you happen to have any sources to back this up? ~ onf
