> On 10 Nov 2022, at 08:43, Jaco Kroon <j...@uls.co.za> wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> On 2022/11/10 06:13, John Helmert III wrote:
>>>>  - Drop synopsis and description fields. These fields contain the same
>>>>    information and will be superceded by the existing impact field.
>>> Well, I'm not saying "no" but it feels a bit weird reading a GLSA that
>>> doesn't say a word what the problem is but specifies impact.
>> You're right, but with 19 CVEs (for example), is anyone really
>> interested in hearing about the problem that caused each of the 19
>> issues? In the current format we've resorted to writing descriptions
>> like...
> Actually yes!  Also a way to check whether my specific configuration is 
> vulnerable for this specific CVE, something like "If you're setting foo=bar 
> in /etc/pkg.conf your system is vulnerable, if you've got foo=phew you're 
> most likely fine".  Obviously we could rely a bit more on package maintainers 
> (myself included) to provide these.
> 
> I don't think I've seen a single "workaround" and usually the text here just 
> says "No known workaround", where the reality is that for something like 
> asterisk just not using the affected module is good enough.  So workaround:  
> "Don't use chan_sip, use chan_pjsip instead" would be perfectly fine here.
> 

I can't promise anything but if we've got fewer (IMO) useless/noisy fields, we 
can try put a bit more effort into these.

But it's a good idea to actually explicitly ask maintainers for suggestions in 
security bugs!

> One could thus also link GLSA issues to specific USE flags, taking asterisk 
> again, let's say the problem is with the http web server having a buffer 
> overflow in the http basic authenticator, then if that embedded server isn't 
> even compiled in, how can the package be vulnerable?  So here vulnerable 
> would be something like <net-misc/asterisk-16.X.Y:16[http], 
> <net-misc/asterisk-18.A.B[http], which then also indicates the "fixed" 
> versions, as has been pointed out "affected" and "not affected" are inverses.
> 

The problem with this is, there's a high cost associated with getting it wrong. 
A "workaround" is accepted to have some level of fuzziness (we always try to be 
accurate, but it's not the same as saying something is absolutely not 
vulnerable with USE=-foo).

But I guess if a library totally isn't used then we can be sure sometimes. Not 
sure now! I welcome more thoughts on this.

> A mechanism to QUERY which installed packages are affected by known GLSA's 
> would also be tremendously helpful.
> 
>> 
>> Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in $PACKAGE. Please
>> review the CVE identifiers referenced below for details.
>> 
>> ... simply because it's infeasible (and in my opinion, not really
>> necessary) for us to enumerate the issues in this way. Also, I note
>> that the section being called "impact" doesn't preclude us from
>> incorporating text that we would currently put in the "description" or
>> "synopsis" fields.
> 
> Of course giving the full details in the GLSA is a pain in the backside, is 
> there a way to retrieve this information automatically from the CVE database? 
>  In other words, just get the blurp from there and include it here.  It won't 
> give full details, but at least it will give some extra details not currently 
> available.  Effectively we choose to ignore certain GLSAs if we consider 
> their impact to be low.

1. I really welcome your input here, as we're trying to figure out what people 
actually want from GLSAs vs what is just noise for both them & us.

2. I think this should be possible, but is it substantially more valuable than 
doing the reference links like we do now? What if there's absolutely tonnes 
like 20+?

> 
> It would also help a great deal to automate that if the CVE scores and the 
> "inputs" into that could be made available, eg, CVE score 7.0, remote=yes/no, 
> .... (And I'm fairly certain importing this from the CVE database should be 
> possible).
> 

Yeah, we've talked about this before as well.

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