On 1/14/20 12:54 PM, Jakub Jelinek wrote:
On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 12:36:11PM +0100, Martin Liška wrote:
The missing sanitizer reports about violations of function signatures
for indirect calls, like:

$ cat sanitize-function.cpp
#include <inttypes.h>

void f() {}
void (*fnpointer) (int);

void save () {
   fnpointer = reinterpret_cast<void (*)(int)>(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(f));
}

int main(void) {
   save ();
   fnpointer (32);
}

_Z4savev:                               # @_Z4savev
        .cfi_startproc
        .long   846595819               # 0x327606eb
        .long   .L__unnamed_2-_Z4savev
# %bb.0:                                # %entry
        ...
seems to be what they emit on x86_64.  Now, wonder what they do on other
targets

Other targets are not supported :P

, and how does it play with all the other options that add stuff
to the start of functions, e.g. -fcf-protection=full (where it needs to
really start with endbr64 instruction)

Using the options one will get:

_Z4savev:                               # @_Z4savev
        .cfi_startproc
        .long   846595819               # 0x327606eb
        .long   .L__unnamed_2-_Z4savev
# %bb.0:
        endbr64

So endbr64 is placed after the RTTI record.

, or the various options for
patcheable function entries, -mfentry, profiling and the like.

These work similarly, then follow the RTTI record:

_Z4savev:                               # @_Z4savev
        .cfi_startproc
        .long   846595819               # 0x327606eb
        .long   .L__unnamed_2-_Z4savev
# %bb.0:
        callq   __fentry__

Martin


        Jakub


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