Eric said: "Whenever a given range of phenomenon start to get scienced, we rapidly find out that we need to nail down the vocabulary beyond the flexibility usually allowed in lay conversations about a topic ... But in a physics conversation we would take out the casual usages and limit ourselves to the latter; momentum would be a property of mass at velocity, which stays constant unless acted upon by a force."
We need to nail down the metaphors: momentum, mass, velocity, constant, force, not to mention, particle, wave, string, quantum, atom. et. al. davew On Thu, May 14, 2020, at 10:57 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > Jon, > "Decide" is a weird way to put it. > > Whenever a given range of phenomenon start to get scienced, we rapidly find > out that we need to nail down the vocabulary beyond the flexibility usually > allowed in lay conversations about a topic. We can, for example, allow "He's > got momentum" to mean all sorts of things in a lay conversation. We might > talk about broad social phenomenon such as how "Bernie has momentum in the > polls" or "M. Night Shyamalan's career lost momentum after a string of flops, > but he seems to be getting some of that momentum back now", or about general > laziness such as "I'm not going to do the gardening my wife keeps asking > about, because momentum", *and *we also could mean that there is a movement > that will not alter without the application of force such as "He's not going > to stop before he hits that wall, too much momentum." But in a physics > conversation we would take out the casual usages and limit ourselves to the > latter; momentum would be a property of mass at velocity, which stays > constant unless acted upon by a force. Hell, Merrium-Webster even offers > "momentum" a definition of "force or speed of movement", where in that > physics conversation "force" and "speed" are clearly distinguished concepts, > that are definitely *not *momentum. > > Similarly, if we want to talk seriously about psychology, we need to nail > down some vocabulary that will allow us to talk/think rigorously about the > phenomenon in question. We need some terminology by which to refer to the > distinction between the movements of the dead duck (or rock) thrown out the > window and the movements of the live duck thrown out a window. And, as we > already covered, that distinction isn't *just *a matter of falling, because > we want to put Nick's post-defenestration flailing in the same broad category > as the more elegant movements of the live duck. > > Note that, if you aren't interested in *that *distinction that is a different > issue. Lot's of people aren't interested in any particular specialized > science, and that is entirely unrelated to whether the science needs a > specialized vocabulary to operate effectively. And while science frequently > go through phases of emphasizing vocabulary that refers to processes that are > not easy to observe, those can't be the terms that define the domain of the > science. What are the observable phenomenon that lead us to ask questions > about psychology? What are the methods by which those observations are made? > Until we answer those types of questions, it is dramatically premature to > start speculating about what hidden-unobservables might be at play. And, > there is every reason to believe that our interest starts with behavior. "Why > did he do that?" "Why am I acting this way?" When we wonder "Why is he angry > at me?", the start of that question is a witnessed (or reported) action. > > Could other phenomenon end up in our bucket at some point? Sure, just like in > any other science. But you can't even figure out where those other things > start, until you know the limits of where the base concepts take you. Though > I think some followers of James J. Gibson's Ecological Psychology, for > example, take his contributions to the field farther than is warranted, he > absolutely showed that basic principles of perceptual systems can get us > much, much farther than previously thought, including providing solutions to > how people act successfully in situations where most believe that advanced > computational thinking is required. We need to nail down the basic concepts, > and then do the same type of push Gibson did to determine their limits. > > In that context, it seems fair to begin using "behavior" in a more technical > sense. Once that is done, we could actually answer your question about the > tree and the falling seeds, but before that, it would just seem like spinning > our wheels. > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist > American University - Adjunct Instructor > <mailto:[email protected]> > > > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 1:07 PM Jon Zingale <[email protected]> wrote: >> Eric, >> I have some concern that once we *decide* the dead duck was not behaving, >> that we would avoid the dropped coin. I get that we wouldn't want to >> apply the verb *flailing* to the coin except perhaps in a moment of poetry. >> This is the season to witness cottonwood drifts, though. Better might >> be the helicopter like motions of maple seedpods. These adaptations, >> which carry the future of the species, are shaped so that they behave >> meaningfully when coupled with their environment. Would you hesitate >> to call the motions of the cottonwood seedpod, in its environment, behavior? >> Is it too early in this conversation, or even inappropriate to ask whose >> behavior it would be? >> >> Frank, >> Thank you for mentioning covariant tensors, I enjoyed walking >> around my neighborhood thinking of them and of a response to you. >> While it seems to me that a coffee cup is less abstract than a covariant >> tensor, the latter isn't free of material or phenomenal foundation. If I >> witness a grade schooler attempting to *pushforward* what I know to be >> a covariant tensor, then I know that they are not likely thinking about a >> covariant tensor, even if they wished that they were. If on the other hand, >> they were clear on *pullingback* whatever it is they believed acted like a >> covariant tensor, then I would likely believe they had a covariant tensor >> in mind. Where the coffee cup, arguably is *just* a thing. A covariant >> tensor is a thing which obeys strict rules of behavior. For example, while >> I could use a coffee cup as a hammer, I am not convinced that I could >> use a covariant tensor as a hammer. It may be the case that to resolve a >> covariant tensor with an fMRI, we would need to witness one thinking of >> a covariant tensor through time. >> >> Glen, >> Maybe we could also use the term *bracketed* for those things which >> we wish to keep outside of the Bekenstein bound. Like yourself, I am >> not really a stickler for what terms we use. I would and have claimed >> that *this is how the inductor behaves in this circuit* while explaining >> to family or friends how one of my synthesizers works. What I would >> like to glean in the context of this conversation is whether or not this >> attribution to the inductor is a metaphor. 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