Eric and Nick, Two more references for MacCormac
[MacCormac 76] MacCormac, Earl R., Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion, Durham, N. Car.: Duke University Press, 1976. [MacCormac 83] MacCormac, Earl R., "Scientific metaphors as necessary conceptual limitations of science," in The Limits of Lawfulness, Nicholas Rescher, ed., Pitssburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for the Philosophy of Science. On Wed, Jan 15, 2020, at 1:07 PM, Prof David West wrote: > Dear Eric and Nick, > > That you found value in my comments is pleasing and I thank you for your > equally thoughtful response. > > I would be very interested in continuing the conversation (perhaps offline > from FRIAM?) and seeing your insights into evolutionary theory. > > In furtherance of that objective, a couple of comments. > > 1) I have a near lifelong interest in metaphors and modeling. Metaphor and > model was central to my Ph.D. dissertation - which is when I first > encountered MacCormac (MacCormac,Earl R., A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor, > Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1985). I have had many pleasant conversations > with Nick on this topic at Friam. > > 2) Many of the comments I made originally will be resolved by understanding > each other's interpretations of words and phrases. > > 3) I have a deeply viscerally negative reaction tot he concept and word of > Truth/truth and that antipathy is at the foundation of my "objections" to the > explanation-description-explanation stack. > > Clearly, some kind of starting point is required; from which a theory can be > developed. What seems, to me, to be necessary is an > explanation-model-metaphor sufficiently "stable" that the energies of > investigation can be focused on intended and unintended consequences with > little effect on the "foundation." (I keep having mental visions of waves > eating away at the cliffs and houses sliding into the ocean versus waves > crashing against rocks and leaving the structures above intact.) > > I think that a means for establishing some kind of "stable" starting point is > your actual objective, not some kind of "truthy" foundation. > > The metaphor of a 'stable foundation' inspires the idea that stability is > relative and proportional to both the structure to be erected on that > foundation, and the context in which the foundation must be established. Long > ago when I was an expediter for a housing company, we built the foundation > for a two-story home in 3-5 days (most of which was concrete drying and > curing). To build a 100 story office tower requires a more elaborate and > stable foundation that might take a few months to establish. Just up the > street from my office, they are building a small three story building and > have been working on the foundation (cofferdams, pilings, piers, etc.) for > nine-months now. > > I am increasingly curious about the theory you intend to erect on the > metaphor/model you will establish. > > 4) My ignorance of the details of evolution and Darwin has created the > perception that evolutionary explanations are focused on discrete species. > The broken-wing behavior of the killdeer evolves/is-selected-for in a kind of > "isolation," as a response to pressures on the killdeer alone. > > Hence my question about the gullibility of the fox and notions of > co-evolution. > > Is it possible to develop a theory of evolution at the complex-system (e.g. > killdeer, fox, and slected aspects of their shared ecological niche) level? A > complex system begins at some kind of equilibrium, is disturbed by change in > any of its elements, and seeks a new equilibrium. > > Comparison of the relative duration of a given equilibrium state and/or the > degree to which it could accommodate discrete disruptions and still "recover" > its initial equilibrium (or close approximation in the sense of a strange > attractor) and other measures might be used to establish "fitness." > > Bottom line, I will enjoy participating in any discussion — hopefully for > mutual benefit — but even on a selfish personal learning basis. > > davew > > > > On Mon, Jan 13, 2020, at 6:11 AM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote: >> Dear Eric and David, >> >> David’s reading of that work is by far the most perceptive and profound >> critique I have ever received of our metaphors and models theory, and I a >> profoundly grateful for it. I was also profoundly grateful for Eric’s >> ”defense”. I hope this correspondence helps eric and I to “unblock” and >> finish the book. >> >> Thanks, Dave. Sorry I went silent over the holidays. I found I could respond >> impulsively to stuff, but could not possibly have managed such a response as >> Eric provided. >> >> Hope now that the light is coming back Amsterdam is perhaps not quite so >> gloomy. >> >> All the best, >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> Nicholas Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology >> Clark University >> thompnicks...@gmail.com >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Eric Charles >> *Sent:* Sunday, January 12, 2020 8:41 PM >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> >> *Subject:* [FRIAM] description - explanation - metaphor - model - and reply >> >> >> [Eric] A much belated larded reply to David's generous comment regarding >> the description-explanation issue..... >> [David] Lacking the wit tore- weave the argument that has unraveled into >> several threads and posts; an attempt to begin afresh from one of the points >> of origin - the Introduction to a book by Nick and Eric. >> >> First a common ascription: " A description is understood as a simple >> statement of a fact, whereas an explanation is an interpretation. A >> description simply says what happened, whereas an explanation says why it >> happened." >> [Eric] Yes, and, of course, that is asserted baldly. >> >> [David] Followed by an argument that description and explanation are pretty >> close to the same thing: all descriptions explain; all explanations >> describe, and both are in some sense, interpretations. >> [Eric] Yes, which is basically the assertion that, if you look closer, the >> presumed distinction doesn’t work. That sets up the need to either assert >> that there is no difference, or that there is a different difference. >> >> [David] Then a discussion that leads right back to the same distinction: >> "Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and audience take to be true >> for the purpose of seeking further explanations. Conversely, explanations >> are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be unverified under >> the present circumstances." >> [Eric] Well… hopefully that is NOT the same distinction. We are now claiming >> that it is a matter of what the speaker takes for granted. That makes it >> something about the person-in-relation-to-the-statement, not a quality of >> the statement-relative-to-the-world. >> >> [David] There is, however, a (in my mind) subtle error here, in that the >> assertion just quoted uses the word "true" as if it was the same thing as >> "assumed for the purposes of argument" — the conclusion of the argument >> about differences — which it is not. Similarly, "unverified" is not the same >> as "contested absent further information;." >> [Eric] Hmmmmm… well… I think there is a difference between “true” and >> “assumed for the purposes of argument”, but I’m not sure I think there is a >> difference between the later and “taken to be true for certain purposes in >> the conversation”. Maybe there needs to be a bit of wordsmithing there, but >> I’m not sure there is an error beyond that. >> >> [David] I presume that this error? was intentional, as they need >> descriptions and, later, models to have this "truthiness" quality. >> [Eric] We need “description” to have the quality of something currently >> assumed accurate. However that gets phrased. >> >> [David] The discussion of explanations as models with 'basic" and "surplus" >> implications (surplus being divided into "intended" and "unintended") >> parallels and, except for vocabulary, duplicates McCormac's discussion of >> the evolution of metaphor from epiphor to either "lexical term" or "dead >> metaphor." [Unlike Glen, I have no difficulty with metaphor as a kind of >> philosopher's stone for sense-making in science.] >> [Eric] We will have to look into that! >> >> [David] The discussion of levels of explanations is where the need for >> "truthy" descriptions comes back into play. Somewhere in our hierarchy of >> models is the need for a "true" purely descriptive model. Even within any >> given model there is a need to accept the "Basic Meaning" as being "true" >> and purely descriptive, so we can go about researching and verifying (or >> not) the intended "surplus meanings." >> [Eric] Well…. Yes and No… there is never a “true, purely descriptive model” >> except that it functions as such within a larger discourse. We need to have >> assumptions to move forward, but we don’t need to act like they aren’t >> assumptions. (As we go about doing science, some people will quickly come to >> treat those claims as non-assumptions, but others will keep track of the >> assumptions. You can do science either way, but you need to act as >> *something* is true, or you can never do anything. ) >> >> [David] Although it is evident how and why they need "truth" in order to >> proceed with their discussion and argument, I am unwilling to grant it. For >> me, both explanations and descriptions are "interpretations" with no >> qualitative differentiation. >> [Eric] They are functional different, and identical objects can performing >> both functions. (At least that is our claim.) “The pencil fell” could be a >> description or it could be an explanation. It is descriptive in “Why did the >> pencil fall? The pencil fell, because the cat swatted it.” If you could say, >> “I think you’re initial premise is wrong, the pencil didn’t fall”, then you >> would be challenging the description. The same phrase is explanatory in “Why >> is the pencil on the floor? The pencil is on the floor, because the pencil >> fell.” If could say, “I don’t think that’s how it got that way, nothing >> fell, Jill picked the pencil up and put it on the ground” then you would be >> challenging the explanation. >> >> [David] Their goal is to be "scientific" and so "truthy" models must remain >> and become fundamental to the evaluation of explanations. Evaluation is >> taken to be a two step process, with each step having three aspects. >> [Eric] I’m not sure exactly how to unpack that. We will be, eventually, >> trying to explain what is happening when people do science, but more broadly >> the basic claim is about what it means to engage in describing and explain >> anything, under any circumstances. >> >> [David] Specify the explanation: >> 1. find the foundational (root of the theory) "true" description. >> 2. expose the model - i.e. the metaphor. >> 3. expose the intended surplus implications such that research can begin to >> verify/disprove them. >> [Eric] Hmmmm…. I think I would want to phrase these as: >> 1. Given any explanation, something is assumed to be true for the purposes >> of explanation, it helps to know what that is. >> 2. Given anything claimed to be an explanation, scrutiny will either unravel >> it into nothingness, or will find a model/metaphor being employed. >> 3. If it is a model/metaphor, continuing the scrutiny will reveal some >> potential implications of the metaphor to be intended, and other potential >> implications unintended. >> >> [David] Evaluate the explanation >> 1. discard the explanation if there are no surplus implications exposed for >> investigation. >> 2. confirm the basic implications >> 3. prove some number of the intended surplus implications to be "true." >> [Eric] Hmmm…. I think I would want to phrase these as: >> 1. If the scrutiny reveals the so-called explanation to be nothing but word >> salad, move on. >> 2. It never hurts to check the proposed description, i.e., to check that the >> thing you are trying to explain is real. >> 3. *If* you want to test the veracity of the explanation, *then* you do so >> by investigating the stuff that you don’t know to be true, but which the >> explainer intended to be true, expressed in the act of offering that >> explanation. And, like… if you don’t care if the explanation is correct… >> then don’t… That is the only coherent approach to verifying an explanation. >> >> [David] Nice and tidy - except it does not / cannot work this way. Just >> like the "scientific method" in general, this construct can serve, at best, >> as an after the fact rationalization of a course of investigation. >> [Eric] Well… we would hope that it would segregate the variety of efforts >> into things that made progress and things that end in a confused muddle. We >> would certainly never claim that everything everyone does is coherent. >> >> [David] Absent a "true" description at its root, a theory becomes a Jenga >> tower of speculation. >> [Eric] YES! Now we’re talking! And, there is NEVER a firm foundation of >> “true description”, never ever. No arguments from authority are allowed. >> There are only descriptions assumed true, which (due to their place in a >> description-explanation hierarchy) have held up under various levels of >> scrutiny. There are many things that we know enough about to be dumbfounded >> if they were overturned, but none we know so well as to be sure they might >> not, at some later time, be found to be a special case of some larger >> phenomenon. (Newtonian Physics is likely the most notable example of a >> seemingly unassailable and foundational system being found to be a special >> case.) >> >> [David] "Confirmation" of basic implications is too often a "political" >> exercise — so too any "proving" of surplus implications as "true" — witness >> the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Physics. (Or, in the case of >> 'proving" things, the fact that string theory and many other quantum >> theories generate no testable intentional surplus implications.) >> [Eric] Sure, but that’s a separate issue, which I think is compatible with >> our argument. Forcing agreement via political means is a distinct process >> from the process of confirming the implications of a hypothesis. And if you >> have something you call a theory, but it has no testable implications, then >> you are back to the word-salad game. (Your theory might have implications >> not-yet-testable due to our limited ability to manipulate the world in a >> particular way, and still fit with what we are saying, but if it has no >> implications testable under any circumstances, then it is word salad.) >> >> [David] It is far too easy to move inconvenient (i.e. unprovable) "intended >> surplus implications to the "unintended' category — witness Artificial >> Intelligence and the mind-is-computer-is-mind model/metaphor. >> [Eric] YES! And that is a major source of intellectual slippage. That is one >> of the many things that has gone wrong regarding how people think about >> evolution, which is where we are headed. >> >> [David] The "unintended" surplus implications might, more often than not, >> be more important than the "intended" ones — witness epigenetics. >> [Eric] Well… an unintended implication is a part of the metaphor that was >> not intended by whoever offered the metaphor. “My love is like a rose” does >> not intend that she wilts quickly if not kept in water. If I understand what >> you are getting at (and I might not), then epigenetics isn’t unintended >> implication, it is not even part of the metaphor. The discovery that there >> are crucial factors not remotely connected to the central metaphor of a >> field should trigger the search for new metaphor, with the prior metaphor >> either being rejected altogether, or being understood as a special/limiting >> case. >> >> [David] Reliance on models, even structured models like those proposed, >> eliminates "context" because all models are, if not abstractions, >> simplifications; focusing only on what is deemed 'relevant." >> [Eric] Yes indeed! >> >> [David] This last point makes me want to read the rest of Eric's and Nick's >> book, because I suspect I would find agreement with the last point of my >> argument. I surmise this from the all to brief mention that: "we will find >> that the problem Darwin’s theory does suffer from is that it is wrong. >> Yes…Wrong! Darwinian Theory is wrong in a much more limited sense – >> empirical evidence shows that a comprehensive explanation for adaptation >> will require the inclusion of other explanatory principles, to complement >> the explanatory power of natural selection. " >> >> Which brings me to a concluding question: can 'broken-wing' behavior convey >> an evolutionary advantage to the Killdeer absent a mechanism the maintains >> the gullibility of the Fox? It would seem to me that Foxes whose behavior >> ignored the Killdeer feint would be better fed (eggs and nestlings) than >> those that were fooled and therefore obtain an evolutionary advantage that >> would, eventually make the Killdeer seek an alternative strategy. >> [Eric] It would be surprising to find ‘broken-wing’ behavior being >> maintained in the long run without Fox gullibility. If all species started >> exhibiting what is now Killdeer-specific deceptive behavior, such behavior >> would actually become a reliable signal that communicated to the Fox that it >> should keep searching where it is searching. We may presume a Darwinian >> story in which foxes that respond to broken-wing behavior still get to eat a >> bird more often, on average, than those foxes which do not. >> >> [David] An off-hand BTW — I much prefer postmodern methods of >> deconstruction as a methodology; not to find "Truth" which does not exist, >> IMO, but simply to keep the investigation lively and honest. >> [Eric] Fair enough! You’ll just have to keep reading to find out if you like >> it better or worse when we are done ;- ) >> >> [Eric] By that way, as I indicated before, this is an extremely thoughtful >> evaluation of that chapter, and I greatly appreciated it. Any further >> discussion would be very, very welcome, and if you were really interested, >> I’m sure we could get you some of the other in-progress chapters. >> >> >> ----------- >> >> >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist >> >> American University - Adjunct Instructor >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 24, 2019 at 7:26 AM Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm> wrote: >>> >>> Lacking the wit tore- weave the argument that has unraveled into several >>> threads and posts; an attempt to begin afresh from one of the points of >>> origin - the Introduction to a book by Nick and Eric. >>> >>> First a common ascription: " A description is understood as a simple >>> statement of a fact, whereas an explanation is an interpretation. A >>> description simply says what happened, whereas an explanation says why it >>> happened." >>> >>> Followed by an argument that description and explanation are pretty close >>> to the same thing: all descriptions explain; all explanations describe, and >>> both are in some sense, interpretations. >>> >>> Then a discussion that leads right back to the same distinction: >>> "Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and audience take to be >>> true for the purpose of seeking further explanations. Conversely, >>> explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be >>> unverified under the present circumstances." >>> >>> There is, however, a (in my mind) subtle error here, in that the assertion >>> just quoted uses the word "true" as if it was the same thing as "assumed >>> for the purposes of argument" — the conclusion of the argument about >>> differences — which it is not. Similarly, "unverified" is not the same as >>> "contested absent further information;." >>> >>> I presume that this error? was intentional, as they need descriptions and, >>> later, models to have this "truthiness" quality. >>> >>> The discussion of explanations as models with 'basic" and "surplus" >>> implications (surplus being divided into "intended" and "unintended") >>> parallels and, except for vocabulary, duplicates McCormac's discussion of >>> the evolution of metaphor from epiphor to either "lexical term" or "dead >>> metaphor." [Unlike Glen, I have no difficulty with metaphor as a kind of >>> philosopher's stone for sense-making in science.] >>> >>> The discussion of levels of explanations is where the need for "truthy" >>> descriptions comes back into play. Somewhere in our hierarchy of models is >>> the need for a "true" purely descriptive model. Even within any given model >>> there is a need to accept the "Basic Meaning" as being "true" and purely >>> descriptive, so we can go about researching and verifying (or not) the >>> intended "surplus meanings." >>> >>> Although it is evident how and why they need "truth" in order to proceed >>> with their discussion and argument, I am unwilling to grant it. For me, >>> both explanations and descriptions are "interpretations" with no >>> qualitative differentiation. >>> >>> Their goal is to be "scientific" and so "truthy" models must remain and >>> become fundamental to the evaluation of explanations. Evaluation is taken >>> to be a two step process, with each step having three aspects. >>> >>> Specify the explanation: >>> 1. find the foundational (root of the theory) "true" description. >>> 2. expose the model - i.e. the metaphor. >>> 3. expose the intended surplus implications such that research can begin >>> to verify/disprove them. >>> Evaluate the explanation >>> 1. discard the explanation if there are no surplus implications exposed >>> for investigation. >>> 2. confirm the basic implications >>> 3. prove some number of the intended surplus implications to be "true." >>> >>> Nice and tidy - except it does not / cannot work this way. Just like the >>> "scientific method" in general, this construct can serve, at best, as an >>> after the fact rationalization of a course of investigation. >>> >>> Absent a "true" description at its root, a theory becomes a Jenga tower of >>> speculation. >>> >>> "Confirmation" of basic implications is too often a "political" exercise — >>> so too any "proving" of surplus implications as "true" — witness the >>> Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Physics. (Or, in the case of 'proving" >>> things, the fact that string theory and many other quantum theories >>> generate no testable intentional surplus implications.) >>> >>> It is far too easy to move inconvenient (i.e. unprovable) "intended surplus >>> implications to the "unintended' category — witness Artificial Intelligence >>> and the mind-is-computer-is-mind model/metaphor. >>> >>> The "unintended" surplus implications might, more often than not, be more >>> important than the "intended" ones — witness epigenetics. >>> >>> Reliance on models, even structured models like those proposed, eliminates >>> "context" because all models are, if not abstractions, simplifications; >>> focusing only on what is deemed 'relevant." >>> >>> This last point makes me want to read the rest of Eric's and Nick's book, >>> because I suspect I would find agreement with the last point of my >>> argument. I surmise this from the all to brief mention that: "we will find >>> that the problem Darwin’s theory does suffer from is that it is wrong. >>> Yes…Wrong! Darwinian Theory is wrong in a much more limited sense – >>> empirical evidence shows that a comprehensive explanation for adaptation >>> will require the inclusion of other explanatory principles, to complement >>> the explanatory power of natural selection. " >>> >>> Which brings me to a concluding question: can 'broken-wing' behavior convey >>> an evolutionary advantage to the Killdeer absent a mechanism the maintains >>> the gullibility of the Fox? It would seem to me that Foxes whose behavior >>> ignored the Killdeer feint would be better fed (eggs and nestlings) than >>> those that were fooled and therefore obtain an evolutionary advantage that >>> would, eventually make the Killdeer seek an alternative strategy. >>> >>> An off-hand BTW — I much prefer postmodern methods of deconstruction as a >>> methodology; not to find "Truth" which does not exist, IMO, but simply to >>> keep the investigation lively and honest. >>> >>> davew >>> >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >>> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
