*Nick:* for me, and perhaps for Eric, there is no “place” or “process” that intercedes between the physiology and the behavior.
*Russ:* Most people would say that they are thinking about something as they do arithmetic -- perhaps visualizing the numbers being operated upon and related numbers. What to you say about such statements? And I want to frame that question this way. We all observe the world. (I assume you accept that statement in some form or other.) When making the sort of self-report I'm talking about, I would classify that as observing oneself. So again, what do you say when someone, e.g., me, says that when I count down "in my head" from 100, I think about, i.e., visualize 100; then visualize 93; then visualize 87; etc. Of course more happens to get me from 100 to 93 and then to 87. But just talking about the visualization part, what do you say about my self report? *Nick:* If you had the figure in front of you, what you do? You would rotate it in your hands. *Russ:* If the figure were in front of me and I rotate it, I also look at and observe it. Rotating it with my eyes closed or in the dark of while looking somewhere else doesn't do much for me. So what does seeing/observing it add to the rotating? And if you follow your reasoning to its limit, what for you is seeing/observing without rotating? On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 12:47 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: > Russ, > > > > I don't think the mathematical analogy is relevant. It doesn't seem to me > to apply to remembering a face. > > > > Oh, I think the mathematical analogy works FINE for mental imagery. Let’s > talk about “mental rotations” experiments. Is this three dimensional > figure the same as this other one? If you had the figure in front of you, > what you do? You would rotate it in your hands. Or if you had it only as > a two dimensional illustration, you would trace the movements of parts out > with your fingers. I don’t think that it’s blatantly absurd to assert > that “mental rotations” are the limit of such explorations where all > behavior stops. > > > > n > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ > Abbott > *Sent:* Saturday, February 27, 2016 12:49 PM > > > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) > > > > P.S. Frank, Thanks for the support. > > > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 11:48 AM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > I don't think the mathematical analogy is relevant. It doesn't seem to me > to apply to remembering a face. > > > > Nick said about someone doing arithmetic silently: Her face goes blank, > for a few seconds, and then she gives us an answer. What we have is the > question, the answer, and the moment of blankness. > > > > I still want to know what you say is going on during the moment of silence > -- and especially how you talk about the "visions" in her mind that > accompany the arithmetic work she is doing. Do you deny there are "visions > of some sort" as she works out the answer? What's going on in your mind as > you count backwards (silently)? How do you talk about that stuff? > > > > BTY I don't deny that physical activity is taking place. There are > certainly neurons firing, blood flowing, ATP being converted to ADP with > the released energy being used for something, etc. > > > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 11:29 AM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote: > > Frank, > > > > Will you look at my last post to russ and comment (on line, if possible) > on the plausibility of my mathematical interpretation? > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank > Wimberly > *Sent:* Saturday, February 27, 2016 12:25 PM > > > *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) > > > > Russ, > > > > In 1967 I took a course in cognitive processes at Carnegie Mellon. One > aspect of that course could be called “what’s wrong with behaviorism?” At > one point it was said, “When behaviorists talk about ‘sub-vocal speech’ you > have won the argument.” > > > > The “hard problem” is hard. > > > > Nick and I have been arguing (in a friendly way) about these issues for > years. There’s the “rabbit hole”. > > > > In my opinion and for what it’s worth. > > > > Frank > > > > > > Frank C. Wimberly > > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz > > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > > > wimber...@gmail.com wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu > > Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com > <friam-boun...@redfish.com>] *On Behalf Of *Eric Charles > *Sent:* Saturday, February 27, 2016 11:58 AM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) > > > > *"I meant counting silently"* > > Whatever the relationship is between counting very loudly and counting in > a whisper, I would posit the same as the relationship between counting in a > whisper and counting with no discernible physical motion. > > Instructing a child in how to "count in your head" is a process of > instructing a child in how to count without their mouth-flap moving so > much. After you are done with the instructions you have a child who does > whatever they did before, but without their mouth-flap moving so much. > > Theories of learning are, of course, quite interesting in their own right, > but no other magic required. > > I presume at this point you are going to assert that I have still not > answered your question, because by "counting silently" you mean more than > simply "counting silently." I certainly have not, with my answer above, > solved the "hard problem." All I could say, once again, is that I don't > think there is a hard problem to be solved. > > > > (P.S. Sorry to all if I am being any odder than usual in my answers. I am > preparing a talk on these topics for next week, and so I am in > "professional stickler" mode as a result.) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu > > > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > I meant counting silently and without and discernable physical motion. > Same things for visualizing. > > > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 9:26 AM Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > > *"What about counting backwards from100 by 7's: 100, 93, 86, ... How do > you describe those sorts of activities in your terms?"* > > I describe it just like that. "Counting backwards from 100 by 7's." To > confirm this, I asked my daughter to do that, and she did. Her mouth opened > and closed, her throat vibrated, and I heard numbers just as you described. > I thought the description was apt. > > *"what about...visualizing someone's face?" * > > Well, that is going to be a bit trickier, and various answers have been > offered that would avoid your posited problem. > > I would point out, first, that we all, at least occasionally "see" that > someone is doing this. You are around someone you are very familiar with, > something happens, they get a particular contemplative look, and we see > that they are remembering someone from their past. "You're thinking about > her again, aren't you. I can tell." "Yes, how did you know?" "I've known > you long enough. Like I said, I can tell." > > Second, I would say (following the work of François Tonneau) that the best > way to describe such events is as a continued response to a thing that is > not currently present. Just as we no longer think there is any particular > mystery about how people behaving towards objects at a spatial distance, we > need not posit any particular mystery about how people behave towards > objects at a temporal distance. > > The brain is certainly a crucial part in such processes, but so is the > rest of the body and the surrounding environment. A brain in a vat may > present a mystery, but the same questions could be asked about a stomach in > a vat. > https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/fixing-psychology/201412/deep-thoughts-the-stomach-in-jar-problem > > The "hard problem" is a conceptual confusion, not a real problem to be > solved. > > > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu > > > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 2:02 AM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Rather than wanting, which is somewhat nebulous, what about doing > arithmetic or visualizing someone's face? What about counting backwards > from100 by 7's: 100, 93, 86, ... How do you describe those sorts of > activities in your terms? > > > > > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 9:42 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote: > > Hi, Russ, > > > > Ok, so now we are out of the Weeds of Pragmatism thread, I am, FWIW, free > to speak me own “mind” – i.e., give you the basis to make accurate > predictions of my behavior in this sort of situation in the future. > > > > I think the short answer is that largely Eric and I don’t. And when we > do, we think we are talking about behavior patterns. Some of those > behavior patterns may be meta meta ……. Etc. and have to be experienced over > long reaches of time before they can be recognized. Although I perhaps > know too little math to use this metaphor, I like to think of mental states > such as “wanting” as analogous to as derivatives of functions – > measurements we speak of occurring as an instant, but actually ways of > describing events longer in duration that can only be known by multiple > measurements collected over time. So when in ordinary language we speak of > wanting “a hot fudge sundae”, we speak as if we are talking about an > instantaneous state in some internal space called the mind, when we > actually characterizing information concerning our behavior with respect to > ice-cream, nuts, whipped cream, and chocolate sauce that would constitute > evidence for a directedness towards those things as an end. > > > > You probably know too much math to get much pleasure out of my use of that > metaphor. John will no doubt correct me. > > > > NIck > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ > Abbott > *Sent:* Friday, February 26, 2016 7:50 PM > > > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) > > > > What I still don't understand (and would like to understand) is how Eric > and Nick talk about mental activities. For example if I ask you to add 15 > and 43, what do you say you are doing? If I ask you to think about what the > other looks like, does some image come to mind? What do you say is > happening as you hold that image in your mind? > > > > In none of my posts have I put a position forward. (Nevertheless you have > often replied as if I have.) My first post asked how you describe intimacy > -- or if that term means anything at all to you. This is similar. I want to > know how you describe the sorts of mental activities that we (and even you > presumably) find familiar. > > > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 4:35 PM Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Russ... well... there we are. > > I know the supposed "hard problem" of which you speak, but I think it is a > rabbit hole full of confusion, not an actual problem to be solved. The > posited mystery simply does not exist. We might as well be discussing a > philosopher's stone or the universal solvent. No amount of technological > innovation, or details about the activities of cells in a particular part > of our body, will solve a problem that doesn't exist. > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 11:10 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Sorry, No. Most of it was not satisfying. > > > > You originally said that the science of mind was doing reasonably well. > When I asked what you meant you talked about how shallow psychology is. > > > > I said I expected there to be technology that lets me experience what you > are experiencing. You replied that if I believed something (which I didn't > claim) then I wouldn't need such technology. That wasn't the point. > > > > I guess we agreed that good work is being done on computer vision. I said > that we will increasingly be able to link brain activity to subjective > experience. I didn't say anything about a Cartesian theater. You raised the > notion of a Cartesian theater to knock it down and then talked about grass. > > > > The "hard" problem you must know refers to Chalmers. > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 12:51 PM Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Russ, > > I mulled over replying a few times, but wasn't sure what to say. However, > by restating your genuine interest in my response, I now feel like a jack > ass for not responding earilier, so here it goes. Some of these answers > might not be at all satisfying, but I will do my best so long as you accept > the caveat that I am uncertain if some of it will really answer your > questions. > > > > "When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably well" > what are you referring to?" > > In the original context, I am referring to what people saw when looking > around in the late 1800s. In fact, I think there is very good working being > done in psychology today, but what I consider "good work" is a very small, > and marginalized, corner of the modern field. Most stuff that passes as > "important" psychology research today is either barking up the wrong tree > entirely, or is so mundane as to be uninteresting. Mainstream psychology is > driven much more by the ability to make clever press releases than by a > critical view to advancing the field. > > Compare the recent big-press items in physics to the recent big-press > items in psychology, and it makes you want to weep for our field. The > biggest news item in Psychology right now is a multi-year study showing > that people "feel less in control" of their actions when following the > orders by another person, in comparison to a group that chose the same > actions without being ordered to do them. Seriously. (Yes, seriously.) > > > "I wouldn't be surprised if we develop technology that lets me experience > what you are experiencing via neural sensor and communication systems." > > I think we do not have a sensible way to talk about the brain's role in > psychological processes at this time (I've published a few papers about > this), and that when such a language is worked out it will violate most our > folk-psychology intuitions. If you believe that empathy a thing people > sometimes do, then, I submit, you yourself do not believe we need the > posited device to experience what another is experiencing. > > > > "We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I > expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own > visual experiences." > > > > Well... sure... but that is not qualitatively different than the advances > made in vision research over the past hundred years. We know a lot about > how vision works. Generally speaking, computer vision does not work like > human vision, because, as with all evolved processes, humans are not the > most computationally efficient things in the world. But, there *are *people > working to build inefficient and non-elegant computer vision systems for > the purposes of testing hypotheses regarding human vision. Good stuff. > > > > "I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem > of consciousness. More likely we will be able to say more and more > accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking > at what their brain is doing." > > This is probably the difficult part of your comment to respond to. I > simply don't believe there is a "hard problem." To the extent that I even > understand what you are talking about there, I think the brain is one part > of a much larger system that we would need to examine. That is not to say > that examining the brain adds nothing, but to say that an exclusive focus > on the brain misrepresents the phenomena of interest. > > To elaborate a bit: Traditional philosophy has addressed been largely > oriented towards "internalizing" psychological processes. The Cartesian > claim (an extension of the Platonic claim) was that we only experience the > world that plays out in the theater of our ghost-souls. "Why do I > experience the grass as green?" you ask. "Because the greenness is present > in the theater of your soul," is the answer. This, of course, doesn't solve > anything. Saying that we only experience the world that plays out in the > theater of brains has *almost *all of the same problems, and should be > rejected. At the least, it adds nothing. > > The approach that I would advocate for could be described as > "externalizing" psychological processes. "Why do I experience the grass as > green?" you ask. "Because there is some identifiable property of the grass > that you are responding to, and that property, out there, is what you mean > by the word 'green'," would be my answer. That property could be quite > complex to specify (it is certainly MUCH more complicated than a narrow > range of wave lengths), but whatever that property is, that is thing you > are asking about when you ask about "green". If you want to know if someone > is experiencing the same thing you are when they talk about "green" then we > see if the parameters for their response match the parameters for your > response. That is, we act if they are experiencing, quite literally, the > same *things*. It is challenging problem, but it is a straightforward and > tractable scientific problem, and it renders the philosophers so-called > "hard problem" moot. > > Was any of that satisfying? > > Best, > > Eric > > > > > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote: > > Russ, > > > > Partly exhaustion, I think. > > > > Once we all agree that there is no *in-principle reason* that I cannot > ultimately tap your subjective mind, then we all know what we are and we > are just dickering about the price. > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ > Abbott > *Sent:* Wednesday, February 24, 2016 10:15 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) > > > > Nick, Eric, > > > > I'm disappointed that neither of you responded to my reply (below) to > Eric's message. Perhaps it got lost in the weeks. > > > > -- Russ > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:56 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Eric, When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably > well" what are you referring to? I thought your position was that mind was > not a useful concept. I suppose that what you mean by mind is something > that can be investigated by looking at behavior. But what is that sort of > mind? Wouldn't it be better to call it something else so that people like > me don't get confused? So to get back to my original question and to help > me understand what you are saying, what are the recent advances in the > science of mind I should be thinking of in this regard? > > > > Also, I'm not convinced that subjective experience is forever beyond the > reach of scientific investigation. I wouldn't be surprised if we develop > technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing via neural > sensor and communication systems. And if I can experience what you are > experiencing we will presumably be able to record it and parse it. > > > > We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I > expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own > visual experiences. This is not to say that the formal structure will be a > subjective experience for the computer. But it is to say that it will give > us some leverage for investigating subjective experience. Similarly open > brain surgery has helped us understand how the brain is connected to > subjective experience. > > > > Just as we now know a lot about how natural language works even though no > science can speak or fully understand natural language, I expect that we > will develop similar theories about how subjective experience works. > > > > I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem > of consciousness." More likely we will be able to say more and more > accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking > at what their brain is doing. We now have ways to allow people to act in > the world by thinking about what they want. These are fairly superficial > mappings of brain signals to physical actuators. But it's pretty impressive > nonetheless. More advances along these and related lines will make > subjective experience less of a mystery and more just another feature of > the world. > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:09 PM Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Russ said: "*Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are > to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. > thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and > quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is > fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way > so that it's easier to do science.*" > > Exactly! Let me try another tact. > > 1) We could imagine (with various levels of clarity) any number of worlds > in which things worked differently from each other. > > 2) "Doing science" is largely a process of trying to figure out which of > those worlds we live in, by searching for the best way to divide up > empirical evidence, so that it is reliable and can be agreed up. (Peirce > was particularly fascinated with the advances made in 18th century > chemistry.) Scientists search for more and more stable ways to view the > world, i.e., ways which stand up to more and more empirical scrutiny. > (Early attempts at the periodic table, though imperfect, serve as an > excellent example of this, leading to countless confirmatory experiments, > including the correct prediction of the properties of yet-to-be-isolated > elements.) > > 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be > true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out > there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield > stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. > > > > 4) Many important big-name people have declared that a science of > psychology is impossible, because the stuff under discussion in that > context simply cannot be investigated empirically. Kant, is a prime > example. Those big-names declared that another person's mind was not the > type of thing that you could examine empirically, because the province of > the soul did not yield itself to earthly poking and prodding. If those > big-names are correct, and minds cannot be investigated, *by their very > nature*, we would expect efforts in that direction to fail-to-produce the > convergence-of-ideas characteristic of successful science. > > 5) We can imagine a world in which those big-names are correct. We can > imagine a world in which many types of things can be investigated > empirically, but *not* minds, and in which all attempts to produce a > science of the mind would fail pathetically. > > 6) The above view has had a virtual strangle hold on Western thinking for > centuries. However, in the late 1800's a few serious scholars started > thinking that "science of psychology" might be given a go, to see how it > went. They were widely dismissed, not allowed to hold their heads high in > either scientific circles or philosophical ones. > > 7) And that's where we find ourselves. *If* a science of psychology is > possible, then *de facto* the subject matter of psychology is some swath > of empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of > investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process > takes its course. We might not live in such a world, but we won't know > without trying it. A science of ether winds never worked out. The attempted > science of medieval humours was a bust. A science of studying > bumps-on-people's-heads has been roundly rejected. All sorts of attempted > sciences have not worked out over the years. But the science of the mind > seems to be doing reasonably well. Either that progress is an illusion, and > empirical-psychologists will soon go the way of the phrenologists, or that > progress is evidence that the big-names who thought of "mind" as inherently > uninvestigatable were wrong on a very fundamental level. > > If you are to study a romantic partner's mind in order to become intimate > with her, then her mind must be something that can be studied. If I am to > study your feeling of intimacy, then your feeling-of-intimacy must be > something that can be studied. And so on, and so forth. Whatever methods > and categories that leads us two, such is the stuff of the science of > psychology, whether it matches any of our preconceptions, or not. > > Best, > > Eric > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:13 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role -- > except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you want. > > > > *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space > metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be > yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the > more we are of one mind. <==nst]* > > > > That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my > sense) on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating > in the same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is > required (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective > experiences of one's) experiences. > > > > *[NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you > entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using > the same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, > feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the > amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time > than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I > am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater > familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. > <==nst]* > > > > What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective experience? > I think of inferring something as having to do with thinking about it. More > generally what does it mean to think about something in your framework? > I'll agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. So it's > behavior in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem to be > talking about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about something? > > > > I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about things > without having what I would call subjective experience. > > > > *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head > (or a steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind > things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. > <==nst]* > > > > I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about > subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I > agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. > > > > By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are to > do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. > thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and > quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is > fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way > so that it's easier to do science. > > > > *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of > the Vital > <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> > . > Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary > condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf > Peirce). <==nst]* > > > > I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. The > upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue with > that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality with > not having subjective experience. What is intentionality without > subjectivity? (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have > "goal-directed" software even though the software and the computer that > runs it has no subjective experience.) > > > > I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we are > using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not really > to attribute those processes to computers or software. > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote: > > See Larding below: > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ > Abbott > *Sent:* Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM > > > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy > > > > Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to > defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. > In response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the > following. > > > > -------------- > > > > Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world > from where you stand. > > > > I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean > distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close > you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. > > *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space > metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be > yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the > more we are of one mind. <==nst] * > > > > Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior toward > you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. > *[NST==>You > will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the > notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of > equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and > thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time > we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do > around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, > thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity > with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst] * > > > > *If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me > clearer and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, > in some ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded > that I was nuts, and we let it go at that. * > > > > I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" > What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say > that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time > must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if > the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions > in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) > > *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head > (or a steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind > things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. > <==nst] * > > > > -------------- > > > > You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your > paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, > if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the > second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by > a self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be > "the same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that > you also don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be > intentionality without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what > does "projected" mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? > > *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of > the Vital > <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> > . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary > condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf > Peirce). <==nst] * > > > > > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is > meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: > > 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly > > This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do > with non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with > "delicate" attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could > easily be intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering > to many of the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every > tiny preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate > by way of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the > interface isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of > whatever specific details are appropriate to those robots. > > Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, it's > still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can become > intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are > pre-adapted for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be > inter-subjectivity, but a kind of similarity of type. And that might be > mostly or entirely genetic rather than ontogenic. > > And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the > irrelevance of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ > different understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if > we believe the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) > > > On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: > > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! > > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that > you see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we > are being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. > > > > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in Hollywood: > cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a person, it is > like sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the person sees. > In a sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the pain of loosing > someone. > > -- > ⇔ glen > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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