*"I meant counting silently"* Whatever the relationship is between counting very loudly and counting in a whisper, I would posit the same as the relationship between counting in a whisper and counting with no discernible physical motion.
Instructing a child in how to "count in your head" is a process of instructing a child in how to count without their mouth-flap moving so much. After you are done with the instructions you have a child who does whatever they did before, but without their mouth-flap moving so much. Theories of learning are, of course, quite interesting in their own right, but no other magic required. I presume at this point you are going to assert that I have still not answered your question, because by "counting silently" you mean more than simply "counting silently." I certainly have not, with my answer above, solved the "hard problem." All I could say, once again, is that I don't think there is a hard problem to be solved. (P.S. Sorry to all if I am being any odder than usual in my answers. I am preparing a talk on these topics for next week, and so I am in "professional stickler" mode as a result.) ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: > I meant counting silently and without and discernable physical motion. > Same things for visualizing. > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 9:26 AM Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> *"What about counting backwards from100 by 7's: 100, 93, 86, ... How do >> you describe those sorts of activities in your terms?"* >> >> I describe it just like that. "Counting backwards from 100 by 7's." To >> confirm this, I asked my daughter to do that, and she did. Her mouth opened >> and closed, her throat vibrated, and I heard numbers just as you described. >> I thought the description was apt. >> >> *"what about...visualizing someone's face?" * >> >> Well, that is going to be a bit trickier, and various answers have been >> offered that would avoid your posited problem. >> >> I would point out, first, that we all, at least occasionally "see" that >> someone is doing this. You are around someone you are very familiar with, >> something happens, they get a particular contemplative look, and we see >> that they are remembering someone from their past. "You're thinking about >> her again, aren't you. I can tell." "Yes, how did you know?" "I've known >> you long enough. Like I said, I can tell." >> >> Second, I would say (following the work of François Tonneau) that the >> best way to describe such events is as a continued response to a thing that >> is not currently present. Just as we no longer think there is any >> particular mystery about how people behaving towards objects at a spatial >> distance, we need not posit any particular mystery about how people behave >> towards objects at a temporal distance. >> >> The brain is certainly a crucial part in such processes, but so is the >> rest of the body and the surrounding environment. A brain in a vat may >> present a mystery, but the same questions could be asked about a stomach in >> a vat. >> https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/fixing-psychology/201412/deep-thoughts-the-stomach-in-jar-problem >> >> The "hard problem" is a conceptual confusion, not a real problem to be >> solved. >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: echar...@american.edu >> >> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 2:02 AM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Rather than wanting, which is somewhat nebulous, what about doing >>> arithmetic or visualizing someone's face? What about counting backwards >>> from100 by 7's: 100, 93, 86, ... How do you describe those sorts of >>> activities in your terms? >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 9:42 PM Nick Thompson < >>> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi, Russ, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Ok, so now we are out of the Weeds of Pragmatism thread, I am, FWIW, >>>> free to speak me own “mind” – i.e., give you the basis to make accurate >>>> predictions of my behavior in this sort of situation in the future. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I think the short answer is that largely Eric and I don’t. And when >>>> we do, we think we are talking about behavior patterns. Some of those >>>> behavior patterns may be meta meta ……. Etc. and have to be experienced over >>>> long reaches of time before they can be recognized. Although I perhaps >>>> know too little math to use this metaphor, I like to think of mental states >>>> such as “wanting” as analogous to as derivatives of functions – >>>> measurements we speak of occurring as an instant, but actually ways of >>>> describing events longer in duration that can only be known by multiple >>>> measurements collected over time. So when in ordinary language we speak of >>>> wanting “a hot fudge sundae”, we speak as if we are talking about an >>>> instantaneous state in some internal space called the mind, when we >>>> actually characterizing information concerning our behavior with respect to >>>> ice-cream, nuts, whipped cream, and chocolate sauce that would constitute >>>> evidence for a directedness towards those things as an end. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You probably know too much math to get much pleasure out of my use of >>>> that metaphor. John will no doubt correct me. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> NIck >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Nicholas S. Thompson >>>> >>>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >>>> >>>> Clark University >>>> >>>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >>>> Abbott >>>> *Sent:* Friday, February 26, 2016 7:50 PM >>>> >>>> >>>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >>>> friam@redfish.com> >>>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What I still don't understand (and would like to understand) is how >>>> Eric and Nick talk about mental activities. For example if I ask you to add >>>> 15 and 43, what do you say you are doing? If I ask you to think about what >>>> the other looks like, does some image come to mind? What do you say is >>>> happening as you hold that image in your mind? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In none of my posts have I put a position forward. (Nevertheless you >>>> have often replied as if I have.) My first post asked how you describe >>>> intimacy -- or if that term means anything at all to you. This is similar. >>>> I want to know how you describe the sorts of mental activities that we (and >>>> even you presumably) find familiar. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 4:35 PM Eric Charles < >>>> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Russ... well... there we are. >>>> >>>> I know the supposed "hard problem" of which you speak, but I think it >>>> is a rabbit hole full of confusion, not an actual problem to be solved. The >>>> posited mystery simply does not exist. We might as well be discussing a >>>> philosopher's stone or the universal solvent. No amount of technological >>>> innovation, or details about the activities of cells in a particular part >>>> of our body, will solve a problem that doesn't exist. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------- >>>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>>> Lab Manager >>>> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >>>> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >>>> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >>>> Washington, DC 20016 >>>> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >>>> email: echar...@american.edu >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 11:10 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Sorry, No. Most of it was not satisfying. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You originally said that the science of mind was doing reasonably well. >>>> When I asked what you meant you talked about how shallow psychology is. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I said I expected there to be technology that lets me experience what >>>> you are experiencing. You replied that if I believed something (which I >>>> didn't claim) then I wouldn't need such technology. That wasn't the point. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I guess we agreed that good work is being done on computer vision. I >>>> said that we will increasingly be able to link brain activity to subjective >>>> experience. I didn't say anything about a Cartesian theater. You raised the >>>> notion of a Cartesian theater to knock it down and then talked about grass. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The "hard" problem you must know refers to Chalmers. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 12:51 PM Eric Charles < >>>> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Russ, >>>> >>>> I mulled over replying a few times, but wasn't sure what to say. >>>> However, by restating your genuine interest in my response, I now feel like >>>> a jack ass for not responding earilier, so here it goes. Some of these >>>> answers might not be at all satisfying, but I will do my best so long as >>>> you accept the caveat that I am uncertain if some of it will really answer >>>> your questions. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably >>>> well" what are you referring to?" >>>> >>>> In the original context, I am referring to what people saw when looking >>>> around in the late 1800s. In fact, I think there is very good working being >>>> done in psychology today, but what I consider "good work" is a very small, >>>> and marginalized, corner of the modern field. Most stuff that passes as >>>> "important" psychology research today is either barking up the wrong tree >>>> entirely, or is so mundane as to be uninteresting. Mainstream psychology is >>>> driven much more by the ability to make clever press releases than by a >>>> critical view to advancing the field. >>>> >>>> Compare the recent big-press items in physics to the recent big-press >>>> items in psychology, and it makes you want to weep for our field. The >>>> biggest news item in Psychology right now is a multi-year study showing >>>> that people "feel less in control" of their actions when following the >>>> orders by another person, in comparison to a group that chose the same >>>> actions without being ordered to do them. Seriously. (Yes, seriously.) >>>> >>>> >>>> "I wouldn't be surprised if we develop technology that lets me >>>> experience what you are experiencing via neural sensor and communication >>>> systems." >>>> >>>> I think we do not have a sensible way to talk about the brain's role in >>>> psychological processes at this time (I've published a few papers about >>>> this), and that when such a language is worked out it will violate most our >>>> folk-psychology intuitions. If you believe that empathy a thing people >>>> sometimes do, then, I submit, you yourself do not believe we need the >>>> posited device to experience what another is experiencing. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I >>>> expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own >>>> visual experiences." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Well... sure... but that is not qualitatively different than the >>>> advances made in vision research over the past hundred years. We know a lot >>>> about how vision works. Generally speaking, computer vision does not work >>>> like human vision, because, as with all evolved processes, humans are not >>>> the most computationally efficient things in the world. But, there *are >>>> *people working to build inefficient and non-elegant computer vision >>>> systems for the purposes of testing hypotheses regarding human vision. Good >>>> stuff. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard >>>> problem of consciousness. More likely we will be able to say more and more >>>> accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking >>>> at what their brain is doing." >>>> >>>> This is probably the difficult part of your comment to respond to. I >>>> simply don't believe there is a "hard problem." To the extent that I even >>>> understand what you are talking about there, I think the brain is one part >>>> of a much larger system that we would need to examine. That is not to say >>>> that examining the brain adds nothing, but to say that an exclusive focus >>>> on the brain misrepresents the phenomena of interest. >>>> >>>> To elaborate a bit: Traditional philosophy has addressed been largely >>>> oriented towards "internalizing" psychological processes. The Cartesian >>>> claim (an extension of the Platonic claim) was that we only experience the >>>> world that plays out in the theater of our ghost-souls. "Why do I >>>> experience the grass as green?" you ask. "Because the greenness is present >>>> in the theater of your soul," is the answer. This, of course, doesn't solve >>>> anything. Saying that we only experience the world that plays out in the >>>> theater of brains has *almost *all of the same problems, and should be >>>> rejected. At the least, it adds nothing. >>>> >>>> The approach that I would advocate for could be described as >>>> "externalizing" psychological processes. "Why do I experience the grass as >>>> green?" you ask. "Because there is some identifiable property of the grass >>>> that you are responding to, and that property, out there, is what you mean >>>> by the word 'green'," would be my answer. That property could be quite >>>> complex to specify (it is certainly MUCH more complicated than a narrow >>>> range of wave lengths), but whatever that property is, that is thing you >>>> are asking about when you ask about "green". If you want to know if someone >>>> is experiencing the same thing you are when they talk about "green" then we >>>> see if the parameters for their response match the parameters for your >>>> response. That is, we act if they are experiencing, quite literally, the >>>> same *things*. It is challenging problem, but it is a straightforward >>>> and tractable scientific problem, and it renders the philosophers so-called >>>> "hard problem" moot. >>>> >>>> Was any of that satisfying? >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Eric >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------- >>>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>>> Lab Manager >>>> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >>>> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >>>> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >>>> Washington, DC 20016 >>>> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >>>> email: echar...@american.edu >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson < >>>> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: >>>> >>>> Russ, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Partly exhaustion, I think. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Once we all agree that there is no *in-principle reason* that I cannot >>>> ultimately tap your subjective mind, then we all know what we are and we >>>> are just dickering about the price. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Nick >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Nicholas S. Thompson >>>> >>>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >>>> >>>> Clark University >>>> >>>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >>>> Abbott >>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 24, 2016 10:15 PM >>>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >>>> friam@redfish.com> >>>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Nick, Eric, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm disappointed that neither of you responded to my reply (below) to >>>> Eric's message. Perhaps it got lost in the weeks. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- Russ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:56 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Eric, When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing >>>> reasonably well" what are you referring to? I thought your position was >>>> that mind was not a useful concept. I suppose that what you mean by mind is >>>> something that can be investigated by looking at behavior. But what is that >>>> sort of mind? Wouldn't it be better to call it something else so that >>>> people like me don't get confused? So to get back to my original question >>>> and to help me understand what you are saying, what are the recent advances >>>> in the science of mind I should be thinking of in this regard? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Also, I'm not convinced that subjective experience is forever beyond >>>> the reach of scientific investigation. I wouldn't be surprised if we >>>> develop technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing via >>>> neural sensor and communication systems. And if I can experience what you >>>> are experiencing we will presumably be able to record it and parse it. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I >>>> expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own >>>> visual experiences. This is not to say that the formal structure will be a >>>> subjective experience for the computer. But it is to say that it will give >>>> us some leverage for investigating subjective experience. Similarly open >>>> brain surgery has helped us understand how the brain is connected to >>>> subjective experience. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Just as we now know a lot about how natural language works even though >>>> no science can speak or fully understand natural language, I expect that we >>>> will develop similar theories about how subjective experience works. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard >>>> problem of consciousness." More likely we will be able to say more and more >>>> accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking >>>> at what their brain is doing. We now have ways to allow people to act in >>>> the world by thinking about what they want. These are fairly superficial >>>> mappings of brain signals to physical actuators. But it's pretty impressive >>>> nonetheless. More advances along these and related lines will make >>>> subjective experience less of a mystery and more just another feature of >>>> the world. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:09 PM Eric Charles < >>>> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Russ said: "*Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we >>>> are to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, >>>> etc. thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >>>> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >>>> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >>>> so that it's easier to do science.*" >>>> >>>> Exactly! Let me try another tact. >>>> >>>> 1) We could imagine (with various levels of clarity) any number of >>>> worlds in which things worked differently from each other. >>>> >>>> 2) "Doing science" is largely a process of trying to figure out which >>>> of those worlds we live in, by searching for the best way to divide up >>>> empirical evidence, so that it is reliable and can be agreed up. (Peirce >>>> was particularly fascinated with the advances made in 18th century >>>> chemistry.) Scientists search for more and more stable ways to view the >>>> world, i.e., ways which stand up to more and more empirical scrutiny. >>>> (Early attempts at the periodic table, though imperfect, serve as an >>>> excellent example of this, leading to countless confirmatory experiments, >>>> including the correct prediction of the properties of yet-to-be-isolated >>>> elements.) >>>> >>>> 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be >>>> true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out >>>> there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield >>>> stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 4) Many important big-name people have declared that a science of >>>> psychology is impossible, because the stuff under discussion in that >>>> context simply cannot be investigated empirically. Kant, is a prime >>>> example. Those big-names declared that another person's mind was not the >>>> type of thing that you could examine empirically, because the province >>>> of the soul did not yield itself to earthly poking and prodding. If those >>>> big-names are correct, and minds cannot be investigated, *by their >>>> very nature*, we would expect efforts in that direction to >>>> fail-to-produce the convergence-of-ideas characteristic of successful >>>> science. >>>> >>>> 5) We can imagine a world in which those big-names are correct. We can >>>> imagine a world in which many types of things can be investigated >>>> empirically, but *not* minds, and in which all attempts to produce a >>>> science of the mind would fail pathetically. >>>> >>>> 6) The above view has had a virtual strangle hold on Western thinking >>>> for centuries. However, in the late 1800's a few serious scholars started >>>> thinking that "science of psychology" might be given a go, to see how it >>>> went. They were widely dismissed, not allowed to hold their heads high in >>>> either scientific circles or philosophical ones. >>>> >>>> 7) And that's where we find ourselves. *If* a science of psychology is >>>> possible, then *de facto* the subject matter of psychology is some >>>> swath of empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of >>>> investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process >>>> takes its course. We might not live in such a world, but we won't know >>>> without trying it. A science of ether winds never worked out. The attempted >>>> science of medieval humours was a bust. A science of studying >>>> bumps-on-people's-heads has been roundly rejected. All sorts of attempted >>>> sciences have not worked out over the years. But the science of the mind >>>> seems to be doing reasonably well. Either that progress is an illusion, and >>>> empirical-psychologists will soon go the way of the phrenologists, or that >>>> progress is evidence that the big-names who thought of "mind" as inherently >>>> uninvestigatable were wrong on a very fundamental level. >>>> >>>> If you are to study a romantic partner's mind in order to become >>>> intimate with her, then her mind must be something that can be studied. If >>>> I am to study your feeling of intimacy, then your feeling-of-intimacy must >>>> be something that can be studied. And so on, and so forth. Whatever methods >>>> and categories that leads us two, such is the stuff of the science of >>>> psychology, whether it matches any of our preconceptions, or not. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Eric >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------- >>>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>>> Lab Manager >>>> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >>>> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >>>> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >>>> Washington, DC 20016 >>>> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >>>> email: echar...@american.edu >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:13 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role >>>> -- except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you >>>> want. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >>>> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >>>> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >>>> more we are of one mind. <==nst]* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my >>>> sense) on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating >>>> in the same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is >>>> required (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective >>>> experiences of one's) experiences. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *[NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you >>>> entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using >>>> the same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, >>>> feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the >>>> amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time >>>> than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I >>>> am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater >>>> familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. >>>> <==nst]* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective >>>> experience? I think of inferring something as having to do with thinking >>>> about it. More generally what does it mean to think about something in your >>>> framework? I'll agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. >>>> So it's behavior in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem >>>> to be talking about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about >>>> something? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about >>>> things without having what I would call subjective experience. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >>>> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind >>>> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >>>> <==nst]* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about >>>> subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I >>>> agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are >>>> to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. >>>> thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >>>> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >>>> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >>>> so that it's easier to do science. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark >>>> of the Vital >>>> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >>>> . >>>> Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >>>> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >>>> Peirce). <==nst]* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. >>>> The upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue >>>> with that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality >>>> with not having subjective experience. What is intentionality without >>>> subjectivity? (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have >>>> "goal-directed" software even though the software and the computer that >>>> runs it has no subjective experience.) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we >>>> are using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not >>>> really to attribute those processes to computers or software. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson < >>>> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: >>>> >>>> See Larding below: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Nicholas S. Thompson >>>> >>>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >>>> >>>> Clark University >>>> >>>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >>>> Abbott >>>> *Sent:* Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM >>>> >>>> >>>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >>>> friam@redfish.com> >>>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to >>>> defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. >>>> In response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the >>>> following. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -------------- >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world >>>> from where you stand. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean >>>> distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close >>>> you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. >>>> >>>> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >>>> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >>>> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >>>> more we are of one mind. <==nst] * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior >>>> toward you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. >>>> *[NST==>You >>>> will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the >>>> notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of >>>> equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and >>>> thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time >>>> we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do >>>> around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, >>>> thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity >>>> with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst] * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me >>>> clearer and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, >>>> in some ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded >>>> that I was nuts, and we let it go at that. * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" >>>> What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say >>>> that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time >>>> must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if >>>> the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions >>>> in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) >>>> >>>> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >>>> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind >>>> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >>>> <==nst] * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -------------- >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your >>>> paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, >>>> if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the >>>> second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by >>>> a self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be >>>> "the same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that >>>> you also don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be >>>> intentionality without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what >>>> does "projected" mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? >>>> >>>> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark >>>> of the Vital >>>> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >>>> . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >>>> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >>>> Peirce). <==nst] * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is >>>> meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: >>>> >>>> 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly >>>> >>>> This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do >>>> with non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with >>>> "delicate" attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could >>>> easily be intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering >>>> to many of the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every >>>> tiny preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate >>>> by way of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the >>>> interface isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of >>>> whatever specific details are appropriate to those robots. >>>> >>>> Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, >>>> it's still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can >>>> become intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are >>>> pre-adapted for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be >>>> inter-subjectivity, but a kind of similarity of type. And that might be >>>> mostly or entirely genetic rather than ontogenic. >>>> >>>> And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the >>>> irrelevance of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ >>>> different understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if >>>> we believe the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) >>>> >>>> >>>> On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: >>>> > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! >>>> > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that >>>> you see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we >>>> are being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. >>>> > >>>> > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in >>>> Hollywood: cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a >>>> person, it is like sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the >>>> person sees. In a sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the >>>> pain of loosing someone. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ⇔ glen >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> >>>> ============================================================ >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >
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