I meant counting silently and without and discernable physical motion. Same things for visualizing.
On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 9:26 AM Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > *"What about counting backwards from100 by 7's: 100, 93, 86, ... How do > you describe those sorts of activities in your terms?"* > > I describe it just like that. "Counting backwards from 100 by 7's." To > confirm this, I asked my daughter to do that, and she did. Her mouth opened > and closed, her throat vibrated, and I heard numbers just as you described. > I thought the description was apt. > > *"what about...visualizing someone's face?" * > > Well, that is going to be a bit trickier, and various answers have been > offered that would avoid your posited problem. > > I would point out, first, that we all, at least occasionally "see" that > someone is doing this. You are around someone you are very familiar with, > something happens, they get a particular contemplative look, and we see > that they are remembering someone from their past. "You're thinking about > her again, aren't you. I can tell." "Yes, how did you know?" "I've known > you long enough. Like I said, I can tell." > > Second, I would say (following the work of François Tonneau) that the > best way to describe such events is as a continued response to a thing that > is not currently present. Just as we no longer think there is any > particular mystery about how people behaving towards objects at a spatial > distance, we need not posit any particular mystery about how people behave > towards objects at a temporal distance. > > The brain is certainly a crucial part in such processes, but so is the > rest of the body and the surrounding environment. A brain in a vat may > present a mystery, but the same questions could be asked about a stomach in > a vat. > https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/fixing-psychology/201412/deep-thoughts-the-stomach-in-jar-problem > > The "hard problem" is a conceptual confusion, not a real problem to be > solved. > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 2:02 AM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Rather than wanting, which is somewhat nebulous, what about doing >> arithmetic or visualizing someone's face? What about counting backwards >> from100 by 7's: 100, 93, 86, ... How do you describe those sorts of >> activities in your terms? >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 9:42 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> >> wrote: >> >>> Hi, Russ, >>> >>> >>> >>> Ok, so now we are out of the Weeds of Pragmatism thread, I am, FWIW, >>> free to speak me own “mind” – i.e., give you the basis to make accurate >>> predictions of my behavior in this sort of situation in the future. >>> >>> >>> >>> I think the short answer is that largely Eric and I don’t. And when we >>> do, we think we are talking about behavior patterns. Some of those >>> behavior patterns may be meta meta ……. Etc. and have to be experienced over >>> long reaches of time before they can be recognized. Although I perhaps >>> know too little math to use this metaphor, I like to think of mental states >>> such as “wanting” as analogous to as derivatives of functions – >>> measurements we speak of occurring as an instant, but actually ways of >>> describing events longer in duration that can only be known by multiple >>> measurements collected over time. So when in ordinary language we speak of >>> wanting “a hot fudge sundae”, we speak as if we are talking about an >>> instantaneous state in some internal space called the mind, when we >>> actually characterizing information concerning our behavior with respect to >>> ice-cream, nuts, whipped cream, and chocolate sauce that would constitute >>> evidence for a directedness towards those things as an end. >>> >>> >>> >>> You probably know too much math to get much pleasure out of my use of >>> that metaphor. John will no doubt correct me. >>> >>> >>> >>> NIck >>> >>> >>> >>> Nicholas S. Thompson >>> >>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >>> >>> Clark University >>> >>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >>> Abbott >>> *Sent:* Friday, February 26, 2016 7:50 PM >>> >>> >>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >>> friam@redfish.com> >>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >>> >>> >>> >>> What I still don't understand (and would like to understand) is how Eric >>> and Nick talk about mental activities. For example if I ask you to add 15 >>> and 43, what do you say you are doing? If I ask you to think about what the >>> other looks like, does some image come to mind? What do you say is >>> happening as you hold that image in your mind? >>> >>> >>> >>> In none of my posts have I put a position forward. (Nevertheless you >>> have often replied as if I have.) My first post asked how you describe >>> intimacy -- or if that term means anything at all to you. This is similar. >>> I want to know how you describe the sorts of mental activities that we (and >>> even you presumably) find familiar. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 4:35 PM Eric Charles < >>> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Russ... well... there we are. >>> >>> I know the supposed "hard problem" of which you speak, but I think it is >>> a rabbit hole full of confusion, not an actual problem to be solved. The >>> posited mystery simply does not exist. We might as well be discussing a >>> philosopher's stone or the universal solvent. No amount of technological >>> innovation, or details about the activities of cells in a particular part >>> of our body, will solve a problem that doesn't exist. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------- >>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>> Lab Manager >>> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >>> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >>> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >>> Washington, DC 20016 >>> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >>> email: echar...@american.edu >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 11:10 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Sorry, No. Most of it was not satisfying. >>> >>> >>> >>> You originally said that the science of mind was doing reasonably well. >>> When I asked what you meant you talked about how shallow psychology is. >>> >>> >>> >>> I said I expected there to be technology that lets me experience what >>> you are experiencing. You replied that if I believed something (which I >>> didn't claim) then I wouldn't need such technology. That wasn't the point. >>> >>> >>> >>> I guess we agreed that good work is being done on computer vision. I >>> said that we will increasingly be able to link brain activity to subjective >>> experience. I didn't say anything about a Cartesian theater. You raised the >>> notion of a Cartesian theater to knock it down and then talked about grass. >>> >>> >>> >>> The "hard" problem you must know refers to Chalmers. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 12:51 PM Eric Charles < >>> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Russ, >>> >>> I mulled over replying a few times, but wasn't sure what to say. >>> However, by restating your genuine interest in my response, I now feel like >>> a jack ass for not responding earilier, so here it goes. Some of these >>> answers might not be at all satisfying, but I will do my best so long as >>> you accept the caveat that I am uncertain if some of it will really answer >>> your questions. >>> >>> >>> >>> "When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably >>> well" what are you referring to?" >>> >>> In the original context, I am referring to what people saw when looking >>> around in the late 1800s. In fact, I think there is very good working being >>> done in psychology today, but what I consider "good work" is a very small, >>> and marginalized, corner of the modern field. Most stuff that passes as >>> "important" psychology research today is either barking up the wrong tree >>> entirely, or is so mundane as to be uninteresting. Mainstream psychology is >>> driven much more by the ability to make clever press releases than by a >>> critical view to advancing the field. >>> >>> Compare the recent big-press items in physics to the recent big-press >>> items in psychology, and it makes you want to weep for our field. The >>> biggest news item in Psychology right now is a multi-year study showing >>> that people "feel less in control" of their actions when following the >>> orders by another person, in comparison to a group that chose the same >>> actions without being ordered to do them. Seriously. (Yes, seriously.) >>> >>> >>> "I wouldn't be surprised if we develop technology that lets me >>> experience what you are experiencing via neural sensor and communication >>> systems." >>> >>> I think we do not have a sensible way to talk about the brain's role in >>> psychological processes at this time (I've published a few papers about >>> this), and that when such a language is worked out it will violate most our >>> folk-psychology intuitions. If you believe that empathy a thing people >>> sometimes do, then, I submit, you yourself do not believe we need the >>> posited device to experience what another is experiencing. >>> >>> >>> >>> "We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I >>> expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own >>> visual experiences." >>> >>> >>> >>> Well... sure... but that is not qualitatively different than the >>> advances made in vision research over the past hundred years. We know a lot >>> about how vision works. Generally speaking, computer vision does not work >>> like human vision, because, as with all evolved processes, humans are not >>> the most computationally efficient things in the world. But, there *are >>> *people working to build inefficient and non-elegant computer vision >>> systems for the purposes of testing hypotheses regarding human vision. Good >>> stuff. >>> >>> >>> >>> "I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard >>> problem of consciousness. More likely we will be able to say more and more >>> accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking >>> at what their brain is doing." >>> >>> This is probably the difficult part of your comment to respond to. I >>> simply don't believe there is a "hard problem." To the extent that I even >>> understand what you are talking about there, I think the brain is one part >>> of a much larger system that we would need to examine. That is not to say >>> that examining the brain adds nothing, but to say that an exclusive focus >>> on the brain misrepresents the phenomena of interest. >>> >>> To elaborate a bit: Traditional philosophy has addressed been largely >>> oriented towards "internalizing" psychological processes. The Cartesian >>> claim (an extension of the Platonic claim) was that we only experience the >>> world that plays out in the theater of our ghost-souls. "Why do I >>> experience the grass as green?" you ask. "Because the greenness is present >>> in the theater of your soul," is the answer. This, of course, doesn't solve >>> anything. Saying that we only experience the world that plays out in the >>> theater of brains has *almost *all of the same problems, and should be >>> rejected. At the least, it adds nothing. >>> >>> The approach that I would advocate for could be described as >>> "externalizing" psychological processes. "Why do I experience the grass as >>> green?" you ask. "Because there is some identifiable property of the grass >>> that you are responding to, and that property, out there, is what you mean >>> by the word 'green'," would be my answer. That property could be quite >>> complex to specify (it is certainly MUCH more complicated than a narrow >>> range of wave lengths), but whatever that property is, that is thing you >>> are asking about when you ask about "green". If you want to know if someone >>> is experiencing the same thing you are when they talk about "green" then we >>> see if the parameters for their response match the parameters for your >>> response. That is, we act if they are experiencing, quite literally, the >>> same *things*. It is challenging problem, but it is a straightforward >>> and tractable scientific problem, and it renders the philosophers so-called >>> "hard problem" moot. >>> >>> Was any of that satisfying? >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Eric >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------- >>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>> Lab Manager >>> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >>> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >>> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >>> Washington, DC 20016 >>> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >>> email: echar...@american.edu >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson < >>> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: >>> >>> Russ, >>> >>> >>> >>> Partly exhaustion, I think. >>> >>> >>> >>> Once we all agree that there is no *in-principle reason* that I cannot >>> ultimately tap your subjective mind, then we all know what we are and we >>> are just dickering about the price. >>> >>> >>> >>> Nick >>> >>> >>> >>> Nicholas S. Thompson >>> >>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >>> >>> Clark University >>> >>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >>> Abbott >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 24, 2016 10:15 PM >>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >>> friam@redfish.com> >>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >>> >>> >>> >>> Nick, Eric, >>> >>> >>> >>> I'm disappointed that neither of you responded to my reply (below) to >>> Eric's message. Perhaps it got lost in the weeks. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Russ >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:56 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Eric, When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably >>> well" what are you referring to? I thought your position was that mind was >>> not a useful concept. I suppose that what you mean by mind is something >>> that can be investigated by looking at behavior. But what is that sort of >>> mind? Wouldn't it be better to call it something else so that people like >>> me don't get confused? So to get back to my original question and to help >>> me understand what you are saying, what are the recent advances in the >>> science of mind I should be thinking of in this regard? >>> >>> >>> >>> Also, I'm not convinced that subjective experience is forever beyond the >>> reach of scientific investigation. I wouldn't be surprised if we develop >>> technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing via neural >>> sensor and communication systems. And if I can experience what you are >>> experiencing we will presumably be able to record it and parse it. >>> >>> >>> >>> We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I >>> expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own >>> visual experiences. This is not to say that the formal structure will be a >>> subjective experience for the computer. But it is to say that it will give >>> us some leverage for investigating subjective experience. Similarly open >>> brain surgery has helped us understand how the brain is connected to >>> subjective experience. >>> >>> >>> >>> Just as we now know a lot about how natural language works even though >>> no science can speak or fully understand natural language, I expect that we >>> will develop similar theories about how subjective experience works. >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem >>> of consciousness." More likely we will be able to say more and more >>> accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking >>> at what their brain is doing. We now have ways to allow people to act in >>> the world by thinking about what they want. These are fairly superficial >>> mappings of brain signals to physical actuators. But it's pretty impressive >>> nonetheless. More advances along these and related lines will make >>> subjective experience less of a mystery and more just another feature of >>> the world. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:09 PM Eric Charles < >>> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Russ said: "*Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we >>> are to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, >>> etc. thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >>> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >>> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >>> so that it's easier to do science.*" >>> >>> Exactly! Let me try another tact. >>> >>> 1) We could imagine (with various levels of clarity) any number of >>> worlds in which things worked differently from each other. >>> >>> 2) "Doing science" is largely a process of trying to figure out which of >>> those worlds we live in, by searching for the best way to divide up >>> empirical evidence, so that it is reliable and can be agreed up. (Peirce >>> was particularly fascinated with the advances made in 18th century >>> chemistry.) Scientists search for more and more stable ways to view the >>> world, i.e., ways which stand up to more and more empirical scrutiny. >>> (Early attempts at the periodic table, though imperfect, serve as an >>> excellent example of this, leading to countless confirmatory experiments, >>> including the correct prediction of the properties of yet-to-be-isolated >>> elements.) >>> >>> 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be >>> true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out >>> there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield >>> stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. >>> >>> >>> >>> 4) Many important big-name people have declared that a science of >>> psychology is impossible, because the stuff under discussion in that >>> context simply cannot be investigated empirically. Kant, is a prime >>> example. Those big-names declared that another person's mind was not the >>> type of thing that you could examine empirically, because the province >>> of the soul did not yield itself to earthly poking and prodding. If those >>> big-names are correct, and minds cannot be investigated, *by their very >>> nature*, we would expect efforts in that direction to fail-to-produce >>> the convergence-of-ideas characteristic of successful science. >>> >>> 5) We can imagine a world in which those big-names are correct. We can >>> imagine a world in which many types of things can be investigated >>> empirically, but *not* minds, and in which all attempts to produce a >>> science of the mind would fail pathetically. >>> >>> 6) The above view has had a virtual strangle hold on Western thinking >>> for centuries. However, in the late 1800's a few serious scholars started >>> thinking that "science of psychology" might be given a go, to see how it >>> went. They were widely dismissed, not allowed to hold their heads high in >>> either scientific circles or philosophical ones. >>> >>> 7) And that's where we find ourselves. *If* a science of psychology is >>> possible, then *de facto* the subject matter of psychology is some >>> swath of empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of >>> investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process >>> takes its course. We might not live in such a world, but we won't know >>> without trying it. A science of ether winds never worked out. The attempted >>> science of medieval humours was a bust. A science of studying >>> bumps-on-people's-heads has been roundly rejected. All sorts of attempted >>> sciences have not worked out over the years. But the science of the mind >>> seems to be doing reasonably well. Either that progress is an illusion, and >>> empirical-psychologists will soon go the way of the phrenologists, or that >>> progress is evidence that the big-names who thought of "mind" as inherently >>> uninvestigatable were wrong on a very fundamental level. >>> >>> If you are to study a romantic partner's mind in order to become >>> intimate with her, then her mind must be something that can be studied. If >>> I am to study your feeling of intimacy, then your feeling-of-intimacy must >>> be something that can be studied. And so on, and so forth. Whatever methods >>> and categories that leads us two, such is the stuff of the science of >>> psychology, whether it matches any of our preconceptions, or not. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Eric >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------- >>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>> Lab Manager >>> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >>> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >>> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >>> Washington, DC 20016 >>> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >>> email: echar...@american.edu >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:13 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role >>> -- except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you >>> want. >>> >>> >>> >>> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >>> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >>> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >>> more we are of one mind. <==nst]* >>> >>> >>> >>> That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my >>> sense) on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating >>> in the same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is >>> required (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective >>> experiences of one's) experiences. >>> >>> >>> >>> *[NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you >>> entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using >>> the same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, >>> feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the >>> amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time >>> than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I >>> am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater >>> familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. >>> <==nst]* >>> >>> >>> >>> What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective >>> experience? I think of inferring something as having to do with thinking >>> about it. More generally what does it mean to think about something in your >>> framework? I'll agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. >>> So it's behavior in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem >>> to be talking about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about >>> something? >>> >>> >>> >>> I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about >>> things without having what I would call subjective experience. >>> >>> >>> >>> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >>> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind >>> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >>> <==nst]* >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about >>> subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I >>> agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. >>> >>> >>> >>> By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are >>> to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. >>> thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >>> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >>> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >>> so that it's easier to do science. >>> >>> >>> >>> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark >>> of the Vital >>> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >>> . >>> Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >>> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >>> Peirce). <==nst]* >>> >>> >>> >>> I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. >>> The upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue >>> with that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality >>> with not having subjective experience. What is intentionality without >>> subjectivity? (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have >>> "goal-directed" software even though the software and the computer that >>> runs it has no subjective experience.) >>> >>> >>> >>> I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we >>> are using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not >>> really to attribute those processes to computers or software. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson < >>> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: >>> >>> See Larding below: >>> >>> >>> >>> Nicholas S. Thompson >>> >>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >>> >>> Clark University >>> >>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >>> Abbott >>> *Sent:* Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM >>> >>> >>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >>> friam@redfish.com> >>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy >>> >>> >>> >>> Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to >>> defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. >>> In response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the >>> following. >>> >>> >>> >>> -------------- >>> >>> >>> >>> Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world >>> from where you stand. >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean >>> distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close >>> you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. >>> >>> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >>> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >>> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >>> more we are of one mind. <==nst] * >>> >>> >>> >>> Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior >>> toward you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. >>> *[NST==>You >>> will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the >>> notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of >>> equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and >>> thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time >>> we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do >>> around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, >>> thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity >>> with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst] * >>> >>> >>> >>> *If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me >>> clearer and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, >>> in some ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded >>> that I was nuts, and we let it go at that. * >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" >>> What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say >>> that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time >>> must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if >>> the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions >>> in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) >>> >>> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >>> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind >>> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >>> <==nst] * >>> >>> >>> >>> -------------- >>> >>> >>> >>> You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your >>> paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, >>> if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the >>> second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by >>> a self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be >>> "the same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that >>> you also don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be >>> intentionality without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what >>> does "projected" mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? >>> >>> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark >>> of the Vital >>> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >>> . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >>> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >>> Peirce). <==nst] * >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is >>> meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: >>> >>> 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly >>> >>> This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do >>> with non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with >>> "delicate" attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could >>> easily be intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering >>> to many of the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every >>> tiny preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate >>> by way of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the >>> interface isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of >>> whatever specific details are appropriate to those robots. >>> >>> Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, >>> it's still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can >>> become intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are >>> pre-adapted for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be >>> inter-subjectivity, but a kind of similarity of type. And that might be >>> mostly or entirely genetic rather than ontogenic. >>> >>> And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the >>> irrelevance of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ >>> different understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if >>> we believe the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) >>> >>> >>> On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: >>> > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! >>> > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that >>> you see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we >>> are being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. >>> > >>> > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in >>> Hollywood: cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a >>> person, it is like sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the >>> person sees. In a sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the >>> pain of loosing someone. >>> >>> -- >>> ⇔ glen >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
