On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 4:55:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 Jun 2020, at 03:06, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 2:52:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with >>>>>>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. >>>>>>> Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true >>>>>>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is >>>>>>> shown >>>>>>> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> mathematics iff self-reference. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have >>>>>>> explained a year ago. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional >>>>>>> (modal) variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified >>>>>>> without using more than the two axioms above. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bohr: >>>>>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis) >>>>>>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Everett >>>>>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis) >>>>>>> - Mechanism >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Your servitor: >>>>>>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic) >>>>>>> - Mechanism. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory >>>>>>> is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories >>>>>>> predict everything. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It >>>>>>> is not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from >>>>>>> mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already >>>>>>> be >>>>>>> done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which >>>>>>> summarise a >>>>>>> lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the >>>>>>> machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you >>>>>>> want >>>>>>> to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are >>>>>> possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a >>>>>> possible >>>>>> Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our >>>>>> universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field >>>>>> approximation of GR. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of >>>>> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another, >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is >>>> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to >>>> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all >>>> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in >>>> the >>>> theory of mind (implicitly). >>>> >>> >>> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the >>> physical universe. >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not >>> have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of >>> physical theories, >>> >>> >>> I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition >>> and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when >>> taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing >>> universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the >>> existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so >>> to make any physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into >>> account to make any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work >>> without invoking an ontological primary physical “computation selection” >>> which can be shown incompatible with mechanism. >>> >> >> *I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical >> universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG* >> >> >> No problem. But whatever the physics you are assuming, eventually, if you >> want to get the qualia, you need to explain the physical laws from >> arithmetic (and its internal meta-arithmetic-aka-computer science). >> > > *Maybe you're trying to do too much? If all computations are possible > (Turing complete?), which allows you to compute all possible physical laws, > but you can't determine which laws correspond to our universe, there's no > way to discover anything. AG * > > > > You misinterpret what I said. The laws of physics arise from relative but > global statistics on all computations (which are arithmetical object). >
*What does this mean? AG* > The laws of physics are unique, and entirely determined by the > arithmetical reality of the computations. > *Can't there be a universe where gravity acts as 1/r^3? AG* > > “Our universe” has no meaning. There is just no “universe” at all. The > empirical physical reality is a psychological or theological phenomenon, > and it is the same for (almost) all universal machine (all, but a finite > number of exceptions). > > > > > > With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more >>> tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a >>> confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely >>> many relative “bodies”. >>> >>> where validity means predictability. >>> >>> >>> Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means >>> non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, >>> unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* >>> invalid). >>> >> >> *The physical universe manifests some level of existence, even if it's >> not the ultimate reality, and there's nothing absurd in testing physics >> with reference to this reality. AG * >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> >> >>> Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories, >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical >>> universe. >>> >>> >>> It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either >>> a physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the >>> physical universe comes from. >>> >> >> *One can verify a physical theory without having a theory of the origin >> of the physical universe. Just do some measuring! AG* >> >> >> Absolutely, but to get the qualia, you need to justify the appearance of >> the physical reality without invoking it. >> > > *Justifying the appearance of physical reality might be, and probably is > an ultimate goal, but one should be able to determine which possible > physical laws correspond to our universe without it. I don't believe this > is possible solely via logic and the postulates of arithmetic, and I see > nothing in your comments to convince me otherwise. AG * > > > That has been proved (I would say). With mechanism, the laws of physics > are given by the statistics on the first person experiences, and eventually > we are saved from solipsism by the math, as we get a notion of first person > plural, sharable, physical reality. > That is is needed, of course (like any thesis on any reality assumed to be > “out there”) of continual testing. It could be refuted tomorrow, or in 2 > billions years. We never know the truth-for-sure (except for > consciousness), but all our beliefs can be corrected sometimes, or not. > Today all the evidences favours mechanism. There are simply no evidence for > a physical universe “in-necessary-need-to-be-assumed" (a primitive physical > universe). > > I don’t expect this to be understood in few posts. This requires a lot of > works, and some familiarity with mathematical logic. > > Bruno > > > > > >> Physics is just not metaphysics, nor theology, unless you assume >> physicalism, and in that case you will need some form of non-mechanist >> theory of mind, and you are out of the scope of my working hypothesis. You >> will have to present a non computational theory of mind, or just not doing >> metaphysics/theology. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> With Mechanism, the first option is just not available, and you have to >>> recover the *appearance* of the physical universe from some statistic on >>> all computations going through your actual brain or body relative >>> representation/incarnation/implementation. Without Mechanism you need a non >>> mechanist theory of mind, which does not yet exist. >>> >>> As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt >>> that numbers can observe anything. AG >>> >>> A number cannot think, or make observation, per se. Nor can a physical >>> body. Nor can anything purely third person describable. >>> >>> Nor can a number be universal per se. >>> >>> So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) >>> universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some >>> “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring >>> perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, >>> as related to its brain. >>> >>> So, either you were mislead by my short way to express myself, or you >>> are just asserting that you believe that the Mechanist philosophy is wrong. >>> I am agnostic on all this. My point is that mechanism can be tested, and >>> that the currently available evidences favour Mechanism, and quasi-disprove >>> physicalism. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or >>>>> that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of >>>>> source >>>>> and recipient. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> I got my answer, by default. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4313005b-46dd-40dc-af15-743643cee643o%40googlegroups.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4313005b-46dd-40dc-af15-743643cee643o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7398f81b-ad38-4bae-b08c-55486abc0712o%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7398f81b-ad38-4bae-b08c-55486abc0712o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6df13501-6c2d-49f8-9b88-9a468bde571eo%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6df13501-6c2d-49f8-9b88-9a468bde571eo%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5dbcee8e-1813-404f-bd7f-d8550a123a0ao%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5dbcee8e-1813-404f-bd7f-d8550a123a0ao%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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