> On 15 Jun 2020, at 16:48, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 15, 2020 at 5:43:43 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 14 Jun 2020, at 14:01, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 4:55:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 03:06, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 2:52:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with >>>>>>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG >>>>>> >>>>>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. >>>>>> Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need >>>>>> of randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true >>>>>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is >>>>>> shown to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay >>>>>> theorem in the mathematics iff self-reference. >>>>>> >>>>>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a >>>>>> year ago. >>>>>> >>>>>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) >>>>>> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without >>>>>> using more than the two axioms above. >>>>>> >>>>>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. >>>>>> >>>>>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics: >>>>>> >>>>>> Bohr: >>>>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis) >>>>>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind. >>>>>> >>>>>> Everett >>>>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis) >>>>>> - Mechanism >>>>>> >>>>>> Your servitor: >>>>>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic) >>>>>> - Mechanism. >>>>>> >>>>>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is >>>>>> the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories >>>>>> predict everything. >>>>>> >>>>>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is >>>>>> not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from >>>>>> mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be >>>>>> done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise >>>>>> a lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of >>>>>> the machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if >>>>>> you want to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are >>>>>> possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a >>>>>> possible Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to >>>>>> our universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field >>>>>> approximation of GR. AG >>>>>> >>>>>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of >>>>>> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another, >>>>> >>>>> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is >>>>> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to >>>>> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all >>>>> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in >>>>> the theory of mind (implicitly). >>>>> >>>>> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the >>>>> physical universe. >>>> >>>> OK. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not >>>>> have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of >>>>> physical theories, >>>> >>>> I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition >>>> and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when >>>> taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing >>>> universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the >>>> existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, >>>> so to make any physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into >>>> account to make any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work >>>> without invoking an ontological primary physical “computation selection” >>>> which can be shown incompatible with mechanism. >>>> >>>> I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical >>>> universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG >>> >>> No problem. But whatever the physics you are assuming, eventually, if you >>> want to get the qualia, you need to explain the physical laws from >>> arithmetic (and its internal meta-arithmetic-aka-computer science). >>> >>> Maybe you're trying to do too much? If all computations are possible >>> (Turing complete?), which allows you to compute all possible physical laws, >>> but you can't determine which laws correspond to our universe, there's no >>> way to discover anything. AG >> >> >> You misinterpret what I said. The laws of physics arise from relative but >> global statistics on all computations (which are arithmetical object). >> >> What does this mean? AG > > > To answer this, you need to understand that all computations are run in the > standard model of arithmetic (actually, in *all* models of arithmetic, but I > do not use this here). > > It is not more or less astonishing that the fact that some computation are > run by the physical reality, even when seen as a static 4D space-time > “bloc-universe”. The arithmetical reality is a sort of bloc-mindscape. We can > come back on this, as indeed not so much people are aware of this, despite > this is “well known” since the 1930s. > > Then, as I explained usually with the Universal Dovetailer Argument, it is > easy to understand that to predict any first person experience, you need to > take into account the infinitely many computations going through your state > right “now”. Not only arithmetic run all the computation (made by your brain > at the relevant level), but it does it infinitely many “often”, that is in > different number relations. > > > >> >> The laws of physics are unique, and entirely determined by the arithmetical >> reality of the computations. >> >> Can't there be a universe where gravity acts as 1/r^3? AG > > Most plausibly not. The computation where there is an apparent gravity acting > as 1/r^3 will not be stable/relatively-numerous enough to allow the > consciousness flux to remain stable “in there”. > > Of course, there is no universe at all, as only 0, 1, 2, 3 … are said to > exist. But in the phenomenological physics, all the laws are well determined, > and unique. The unicity is easy to prove given that the physical laws are > given by a unique measure on the set of all computations, structured by the > precise laws of the mathematics of self-reference. > > Bruno > > IMO, your theory, or theorem, is self contradictory.
“My” theory is the old idea, rediscovered and developed by Descartes, Mechanism, and revised through the “digital” version made possible by Turing’s discovery of the universal machine. I discovered the main idea in books of Molecular Biology, and then in arithmetic, when reading Gödel’s 1931 paper. I published to get the reaction of my peer, and made it into a PhD thesis. Since then, I found only one important error, but it was not a fatal error, the contrary: after correction, the theology of the Turing machine was both closer to Plotinus and quantum mechanics. I did have problem with materialist philosophers though, but that was to be expected. > You apparently use the CT theorem If CT is for Church-Turing, it is an hypothesis (also called a thesis). It is a thesis which overlap mathematics and philosophy. > to calculate all possible laws of physics, … to execute all computations. At no point I “calculate” any law of physics. Only the computations, which is a notion which is not related to physics. Tell me if you have understand the phi_i (the enumeration of all partial computable function), and I can explain you how to write a simple program which generate and execute all programs. Then, it is a matter of a bit of work to understand that such a program is implemented “naturally” in Arithmetic. The physical laws are never calculate by that program, or in arithmetic. By the “padding theorem”, for all number i there is an infinity of number j such that phi_j = phi_i, so that our computational state are accessed by an infinity of computations, and If you have understood the first person indeterminacy, you can understand that it is that infinite set of computations which gives the range of that indeterminacy, which can be shown to be structure by the mathematics of self-reference, and indeed that gives some quantum logic with the many-histories “interpretation” (made by the universal machines in arithmetic). The laws of physics are unique. The same for all universal numbers.The reason is that they emerge from the indeterminacy on *all* relative computations. > but to determine which laws of physics correspond to our “universe" … to “our” universe, I would write. “Us” = the universal number (believing in enough induction axioms, like PA, ZF, etc.). > (to actually discover anything), you must do measurements in THIS particular > universe, which you claim doesn't exist. AG There is only one physical reality, but it is not a “physical universe”. What we call “physical universe” becomes the first person plural unavoidable appearance of the region of Arithmetic where the consciousness flux can stabilise. It is how the arithmetical reality is seen from inside by self-referentially correct machine. It is more like a giant “video game”, but where the histories multiplies when we look closely to our environment. Not only this explains why “nature” looks quantum, but this explains also why quanta are just the sharable qualia in that first person plural reality. >From a physicist view, mechanism imposes a new strong invariant. The laws of >physics are the same for all universal machines, and is invariant for the >choice of the phi_i. This extends the idea of Darwin, that life has evolved to an evolution of the physical laws, although this “solution” occurs in the mind of the universal numbers/machines. This reduces physics to a theory of mind/consciousness, and then we can observe nature and see if it complies to the consequence of mechanism, and indeed, quantum mechanics confirms all this, up to now. Bruno > > > >> >> “Our universe” has no meaning. There is just no “universe” at all. The >> empirical physical reality is a psychological or theological phenomenon, and >> it is the same for (almost) all universal machine (all, but a finite number >> of exceptions). >> >> >> >> >> >>>> With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more >>>> tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a >>>> confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely >>>> many relative “bodies”. >>>>> where validity means predictability. >>>> >>>> Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means >>>> non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, >>>> unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* >>>> invalid). >>>> >>>> The physical universe manifests some level of existence, even if it's not >>>> the ultimate reality, and there's nothing absurd in testing physics with >>>> reference to this reality. AG >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories, >>>> OK. >>>>> and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical >>>>> universe. >>>> >>>> It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either a >>>> physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the >>>> physical universe comes from. >>>> >>>> One can verify a physical theory without having a theory of the origin of >>>> the physical universe. Just do some measuring! AG >>> >>> Absolutely, but to get the qualia, you need to justify the appearance of >>> the physical reality without invoking it. >>> >>> Justifying the appearance of physical reality might be, and probably is an >>> ultimate goal, but one should be able to determine which possible physical >>> laws correspond to our universe without it. I don't believe this is >>> possible solely via logic and the postulates of arithmetic, and I see >>> nothing in your comments to convince me otherwise. AG >> >> That has been proved (I would say). With mechanism, the laws of physics are >> given by the statistics on the first person experiences, and eventually we >> are saved from solipsism by the math, as we get a notion of first person >> plural, sharable, physical reality. >> That is is needed, of course (like any thesis on any reality assumed to be >> “out there”) of continual testing. It could be refuted tomorrow, or in 2 >> billions years. We never know the truth-for-sure (except for consciousness), >> but all our beliefs can be corrected sometimes, or not. Today all the >> evidences favours mechanism. There are simply no evidence for a physical >> universe “in-necessary-need-to-be-assumed" (a primitive physical universe). >> >> I don’t expect this to be understood in few posts. This requires a lot of >> works, and some familiarity with mathematical logic. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Physics is just not metaphysics, nor theology, unless you assume >>> physicalism, and in that case you will need some form of non-mechanist >>> theory of mind, and you are out of the scope of my working hypothesis. You >>> will have to present a non computational theory of mind, or just not doing >>> metaphysics/theology. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> With Mechanism, the first option is just not available, and you have to >>>> recover the *appearance* of the physical universe from some statistic on >>>> all computations going through your actual brain or body relative >>>> representation/incarnation/implementation. Without Mechanism you need a >>>> non mechanist theory of mind, which does not yet exist. >>>>> As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt >>>>> that numbers can observe anything. AG >>>> A number cannot think, or make observation, per se. Nor can a physical >>>> body. Nor can anything purely third person describable. >>>> >>>> Nor can a number be universal per se. >>>> >>>> So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) >>>> universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some >>>> “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring >>>> perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, >>>> as related to its brain. >>>> >>>> So, either you were mislead by my short way to express myself, or you are >>>> just asserting that you believe that the Mechanist philosophy is wrong. I >>>> am agnostic on all this. My point is that mechanism can be tested, and >>>> that the currently available evidences favour Mechanism, and >>>> quasi-disprove physicalism. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>>>> to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or >>>>>> that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of >>>>>> source and recipient. AG >>>>>> >>>>>> I got my answer, by default. AG >>>>> >>>>> ? >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>> an email to [email protected] <>. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4313005b-46dd-40dc-af15-743643cee643o%40googlegroups.com >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4313005b-46dd-40dc-af15-743643cee643o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] <>. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7398f81b-ad38-4bae-b08c-55486abc0712o%40googlegroups.com >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7398f81b-ad38-4bae-b08c-55486abc0712o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] <>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6df13501-6c2d-49f8-9b88-9a468bde571eo%40googlegroups.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6df13501-6c2d-49f8-9b88-9a468bde571eo%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5dbcee8e-1813-404f-bd7f-d8550a123a0ao%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5dbcee8e-1813-404f-bd7f-d8550a123a0ao%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b320c578-3217-44d1-aa31-0a4eb79f3d20o%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b320c578-3217-44d1-aa31-0a4eb79f3d20o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2fb7a018-c2ad-48c0-87e8-0c141f9e3b66o%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2fb7a018-c2ad-48c0-87e8-0c141f9e3b66o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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