On Thu, Jun 20, 2019, at 13:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 20 Jun 2019, at 02:41, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 8:58:49 PM UTC+10, telmo wrote: >>> Hi Pierz, >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 18, 2019, at 04:15, Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>> I've been thinking and writing a lot recently about a conception of >>>> reality which avoids the debates about what is fundamental in reality. It >>>> seems to me that with regards to materialism, we find it very difficult to >>>> escape the evolutionarily evolved, inbuilt notion of "things" and "stuff" >>>> that our brains need in order to manipulate the world. >>> >>> Right. I think this points to a fundamental fact that is overlooked in the >>> dominant scientific paradigm of our age: that we are embedded in reality. >>> We are participants, looking at it from the inside. The contemporary >>> paradigm gives the utmost importance to the "third-person view" of reality, >>> which is nothing more than a model, if not a fantasy. >>> >>> The edifice collapses once you try to explain consciousness, because this >>> third person view model forces us to explain consciousness as an emergent >>> property of matter, and that doesn't work. An overlooked simple possibility >>> is that separating the notions of "consciousness" and "reality" is >>> nonsensical. There is no evidence of any "reality" outside of conscious >>> experience, nor can there be. >> >> But then you risk reification of consciousness itself > > I agree that is the problem for those who want consciousness being > fundamental. It is also a way to avoid searching a theory/explanation of it. > It is not better than the reification of matter into primary matter. It is > good as a simplifying assumption, but excessively bad as an hypothesis in > metaphysics. > > > > >> - something I have fallen into myself, but now am less sure about. Is >> consciousness a "thing" in which experiences occur? Do we need such an >> "ether" for experiences to propagate through? I totally agree with you that >> a purely third person account of mind fails (any kind of "property dualism" >> solution is nasty and ad hoc). > > I disagree. With mechanism, there is no dualism, but a through explanation > why there has to be first person account by machines, and why it is not > definable, not provable, yet indubitable and immediately know, and then that > consciousness theory explains the “illusion of matter” in a completely > precise way, and thus testable. Mathematical logic provides the tools to do > this, but very few philosophers or physicists know it. > > > > >> But do we need to find some new fundamental substrate? > > With mechanism, there is no substrate at all. Numbers or programs are not > substrate. They are purely definable in the axiomatic relational way, and the > apparent substrates are explained in term of the first person (plural) > experience of the person supported by the number relation in arithmetic. > > > > >> Perhaps there is one, but "the Tao that you can name is not the Tao”. > > Which is very similar to Gödel’s second incompleteness: <>t -> ~[]<>t. > > No machine at all can give a name or description of a reality enough rich to > encompass itself. That explains why consciousness is necessary puzzling. > > > >> Even the Buddhists don't really believe in consciousness - the >> manifestations of it are part of the veil of Maya and nirvana is a state of >> non-being. > > I am not sure of this. I think they say that for the awake-consciousness, > which is always undecidable. Maybe you can give a reference here, so I can > confirm. > > > > >> Consciousness is an abstraction of our experiences, as matter is. What >> certainly exists is the phenomenological field we share, a network of >> relationships of which qualia and what we call matter are a part. > > Yes. And that follows from the relation between numbers, or combinators, etc. > Any universal machinery will do. Physics is independent of the choice of the > (immaterial) ontology. > > > > >> >>> >>> >>> I am not saying that there is no value in the third-person view, on the >>> contrary, it leads to myriad interesting things, namely the computer I am >>> using to type this email. But we have to be able to see models for what >>> they are. >>> >>> Consider a camera lens. I want to take a photo of something, which is to >>> say, I want to compress a 3D object into some 2D representation. Different >>> lenses provide different mappings, but there is no way to avoid the fact >>> that, no matter what lens you choose, something is lost. At the same time, >>> there is no "correct lens". They just produce different mapping, that may >>> be more or less useful depending on the situation. >>> >>> There are no cells, hearts, stars, atoms, people, societies, markets, ants, >>> music or any other such category outside of human language. These are words >>> that point to human mental models. These models please us, and we keep >>> playing the game. Sometimes we find even better models, but we are doing >>> nothing but coming up with new, perhaps better lenses. Ultimately, I think >>> this is an infinite game. >> >> Yep. David Deutsch says the same in The Beginning of Infinity. > > If the game is Turing emulable, that would be like the universal dovetailer > (aka sigma-1 arithmetic), but the physics which emerges is provably NON > Turing emulable. The first person indeterminacy domain is highly NOT > computable, and note that consciousness itself is also far beyond the > computable, as it is basically only definable by reference to truth (the top > of all degrees of unsolvability). > > > >> >>> >>> >>>> Yet QM and importantly the expected dissolution of time and space as >>>> fundamental entities in physics have made any such simple mechanistic >>>> notion of matter obsolete - what is left of matter except mathematics and >>>> some strange thing we can only call "instantiation" - the fact that things >>>> have specific values rather than (seeming to be) pure abstractions? What >>>> does a sophisticated materialist today place his or her faith in exactly? >>>> Something along the lines of the idea that the world is fundamentally >>>> describable by mathematics, impersonal and reducible to the operation of >>>> its simplest components. With regards to the last part - reductionism - >>>> that also seems to be hitting a limit in the sense that, while we have >>>> some supposed candidates for fundamental entities (whether quantum fields, >>>> branes or whatever), there is always a problem with anything considered >>>> "fundamental" - namely the old turtle stack problem. If the world is >>>> really made of any fundamental entity, then *fundamentally* it is made of >>>> magic - since the properties of that fundamental thing must simply be >>>> given rather than depending on some other set of relations. While >>>> physicists on the one hand continually search for such an entity, on the >>>> other they immediately reject any candidate as soon as it is found, since >>>> the question naturally arises, why this way and not that? What do these >>>> properties depend on? Furthermore, the fine tuning problem, unless it can >>>> be solved by proof that the world *has* to be the way it is – a forlorn >>>> hope it seems to me – suggests that the idea that we can explain all of >>>> reality in terms of the analysis of parts (emergent relationships) is >>>> likely to collapse – we will need to invoke a cosmological context in >>>> order to explain the behaviour of the parts. It's no wonder so many >>>> physicists hate that idea, since it runs against the deep reductionist >>>> grain. And after all, analysis of emergent relationships (the parts of a >>>> thing) is always so much easier than analysis of contextual relationships >>>> (what a thing is part of). >>> >>> I have the utmost respect and interest in Physics, but I think that >>> contemporary physicists suffer from the problem of having convinced >>> themselves that their field, and their filed alone, can produce "the >>> correct lens". Most scientific fields have a lot to learn from Physics when >>> it comes to rigor, but at the same time physicists underestimate how much >>> easier it is to achieve rigor when you are dealing with very low levels of >>> complexity (as compared to Biology, Psychology, Sociology and so on). >> >> Yes exactly. It really needs to be pointed out that we can only barely >> calculate the states of the simplest atoms, using all the supercomputers >> available to us! > > All material things, including a minute portion of the vacuum, needs the > entire sigma_1 truth as an oracle to be emulated. No computer at all will > ever been able to simulate this. > > The mystery is in the explanability of the physical reality. At first sight, > mechanism entails an explosion of continuations. It is the very subtle > consequence of incompleteness which saves the physical realm, in the > Mechanist setting. > > > >> Yet the successful analysis of these isolated, microscopic physical systems >> is supposed to convince us that we understand all of physical reality "in >> principle"? This laughable idea that we live in a computer simulation of >> some advanced civilization - when we can't even simulate a single fucking >> oxygen atom?! We sure are clever apes, but it's even more impressive how >> impressed we are with ourselves. > > Yes, that is how I have proven that we can test if we are in an emulation of > not. And thanks to the quantum, we have evidence that we are not in > simulation. We are in the infinitely one which are run in the tiny segment of > the arithmetical reality, which is a segment of all models of arithmetic. > > > >> >>> >>> >>> I think it would be good if Physics found its way back to a more humble and >>> wise position, being proud of the great lenses it creates, but >>> understanding that we also need other lenses in our toolkit. >>> >>> >>> Another thing I think is that the epistemic boundaries of current >>> scientific fields have reached a point of diminishing returns, and we >>> really should take seriously the project of crossing these boundaries >>> without sacrificing rigor -- the elusive dream of interdisciplinarity >>> without bullshit. >> >> You have to sacrifice some rigour. Psychology is an example of a field where >> rigour has been applied, and the effect has been the sterilisation of >> imagination. > > I agree, but that was fake rigour, based on reductionist metaphysics. That > happens because rigorous in theology is still forbidden in many circles. > > It is easy to reintroduce rigour in the human science, by adding > interrogation marks. The problem are the fake certainties that people are > trained to believe, when theology is in the hand of authoritarian societies. > > > > >> Psychology as a discipline has a giant chip on is shoulder about its status >> as a "soft" science. So they inject more and more rigour in the form of >> statistical analysis, and what have we been left with? Cognitive Behavioural >> Therapy. CBT is fine and good, helpful in many cases, but it's a terribly >> limited approach to human beings, and it reduces therapists to technicians >> and patients to something like faulty machines. > > The universal machine already know better. That is not rigour. Only > appearance of face rigour. > > > >> People are far richer than that, but the problem is that statistical methods >> are very blunt instruments that require a high degree of standardisation of >> technique and the levelling out of as much other variation as possible, with >> the result that all the richness of what actually occurs in therapy is lost, >> and you end up with lowest-common-denominator therapy as the *only* >> sanctioned therapeutic modality. We certainly do need quantitative analyses >> to keep us honest in psychology as in other areas, but rigour is not the >> only consideration, and quantitative methods come with their own costs. In >> some areas, what we need is not necessarily more rigour, but more tolerance >> of uncertainty, more imagination, more experimentation, combined with >> corrective critical analysis which may or may not include a quantitative >> component. > > > Or better hypothesis. Mechanism explains why we need both the qualitative, > well analysed through the communicable and incommunicable self-referential > statements, and the quantitative. > > > >>> >>> >>>> >>>> To get to the point then, I am considering the idea of a purely relational >>>> ontology, one in which all that exists are relationships. There are no >>>> entities with intrinsic properties, but only a web of relational >>>> properties. Entities with intrinsic properties are necessary components of >>>> any finite, bounded theory, and in fact such entities form the boundaries >>>> of the theory, the "approximations" it necessarily invokes in order to >>>> draw a line somewhere in the potentially unbounded phenomenological field. >>>> In economic theory for instance, we have “rational, self-interested” >>>> agents invoked as fundamental entities with rationality and self-interest >>>> deemed intrinsic, even though clearly such properties are, in reality, >>>> relational properties that depend on evolutionary and psychological >>>> factors, that, when analysed, reveal the inaccuracies and approximations >>>> of that theory. I am claiming that all properties imagined as intrinsic >>>> are approximations of this sort - ultimately to be revealed as derived >>>> from relations either external or internal to that entity. >>> >>> I agree. >>> >>>> >>>> Of course, a purely relational ontology necessarily involves an infinite >>>> regress of relationships, but it seems to me that we must choose our >>>> poison here - the magic of intrinsic properties, or the infinite regress >>>> of only relational ones. >>> >>> I am not sure that a relational ontology must suffer from infinite regress, >>> it can instead be self-referential. The ontology of "strange loops", as >>> proposed by Hofstadter. >> >> Gotta read Hofstadter some day. I have thought of the possibility of >> circular set of relationships, but then the circular system itself would be >> a brute fact. Infinite regress is not necessarily something "suffered", >> unless what we are hoping for is some intrinsic property, some solid ground >> somewhere. > > It is not an exaggeration to say that theoretical computer scienc, if not the > whole mathematical logic field, is based on how Gödel and Kleene have solved > the “infinite regress problem” of all circular definition. > > Hofstadter’s “Gödel, Escher, Bach” is excellent. He is the only physicist > that I know who is not wrong on Gödel and its relation with Mechanism. > > > > >> >>> I think this is the only way out of the fact that we are observing an >>> object from the inside, so self-referentiality is unavoidable. This is also >>> why I claim that computer science might be more fundamental than Physics, >>> because computer science is the field with the tools to tackle >>> self-referentiality / recursion. But again, I am being silly. Perhaps it is >>> just another lens. >>> >>>> I prefer the latter. (Note that I am using a definition of relational >>>> properties that includes emergent properties as relational, though the >>>> traditional philosophical use of those terms probably would not. The >>>> reason is that I am interested in what is *ontologically* intrinsic, not >>>> *semantically* intrinsic.) >>>> >>>> What would such a conception imply in the philosophy of mind? >>>> Traditionally, the “qualiophiles” have defined qualia as intrinsic >>>> properties, yet (while I am no fan of eliminativism) I think Dennett has >>>> made a strong case against this idea. Qualia appear to me to be properties >>>> of relationships between organisms and their environments. >>> >>> My only problem with this idea is how quickly it goes over "relationships >>> between organisms and their environments", as if there is some clear >>> distinction or boundary between the two categories. Right now I am looking >>> at this text, in my computer screen, and I am me looking at my computer >>> screen. This is true of all objects we know. When we say apple, we mean "a >>> human being's experience of an apple", even if we are not consciously aware >>> of that. But we say "apple" for short. >> >> And I am saying "organisms and their environments" for short. It is hard to >> talk at all without such shortcuts. I do not believe that organisms are >> fundamentally separate from their environments. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> They are not fundamental, but then neither is the “stuff” of which >>>> organisms and environments are made. We simply cannot ask about >>>> fundamental properties, but must confine ourselves to the networks of >>>> relationships we find ourselves embedded in, and from which we, as >>>> observer-participants, cannot be extricated. >>> >>> Exactly. >>> >>>> “Third person” accounts, including physics, are abstractions from >>>> aggregations of first person accounts, and none can rise so high above the >>>> field of observation as to entirely transcend their origins in the first >>>> person. Thus there are certainly objective truths, but not Objective >>>> Truths, that is truths that are entirely unbound to any observer and which >>>> nominate the absolute properties of real objective things. >>> >>> I think so too. >>> >>>> >>>> Note that the “relationalism” I am proposing does not in any way imply >>>> *relativism*, which flattens out truth claims at the level of culture. Nor >>>> does it make consciousness “primary”, or mathematics. I cannot personally >>>> reconcile the interior views (qualia, if you like, though I think that >>>> terms places an unwarranted emphasis on “what experiences are like” rather >>>> than the mere fact of experience) with a purely mathematical ontology. >>>> >>>> One obvious objection to this whole idea is the counter-intuitiveness of >>>> the idea of relationships without “things” being related. Yet I think the >>>> fault lies with intuition here. Western thinking is deeply intellectually >>>> addicted to the notion of “things”. David Mermin has interpreted QM in >>>> terms of “correlations only” – correlations without correlata as he puts >>>> it – an application of similar ideas to quantum theory. Part of the >>>> objection I think lies in the semantics of the word “relationship”, which >>>> automatically causes us to imagine two things on either side of the >>>> relation. It would be better to think in terms of a web, then, than >>>> individual, related entities. Or simply say that the related entities are >>>> themselves sets of relationships. Mathematics provides a good example of >>>> such a purely relational domain – a number exists solely by virtue of its >>>> relationships with other numbers. It has no intrinsic properties. >>>> >>>> Yet what then of the problem of specific values – the instantiation aspect >>>> of materialism? To quote Hedda Mørch: “… physical structure must be >>>> realized or implemented by some stuff or substance that is itself not >>>> purely structural. Otherwise, there would be no clear difference between >>>> physical and mere mathematical structure, or between the concrete universe >>>> and a mere abstraction.” >>>> >>>> We can overcome such an objection by invoking the first person >>>> perspective. Mørch credits the specific values of entities in our >>>> environment (some specific electron having this position, that momentum >>>> and so on) to some property of “being instantiated in something >>>> intrinsic”, harking back to Kant’s *Ding an Sich*. Yet there is an >>>> alternative way of viewing the situation. Let us imagine that each integer >>>> was conscious and able to survey its context in the field of all numbers. >>>> Take some number, let us say 7965. When number 7965 looks around, it sees >>>> the number 7964 right behind it, and the number 7966 right ahead. Trying >>>> to understand itself and the nature of its world, it starts doing >>>> arithmetic and finds that everything around it can be understood purely in >>>> terms of relational properties. Yet it says to itself, how can this be? >>>> Why do the numbers around me have the specific values they do? What >>>> “breathes fire” into those arithmetical relations to instantiate the >>>> specific world I see? Yet 7965 is wrong. It is ignoring the significance >>>> of the first-person relation that places it within a specific context that >>>> defines both it and the world it sees. >>>> >>>> Note that I am not, like Bruno, actually suggesting that numbers are >>>> conscious. >>> >>> I do not think that this is what Bruno claims. In fact, most of what you >>> write seems compatible with what Bruno says, but he will correct me if I am >>> wrong. >> >> Yes, I know Bruno doesn't believe 7965 can reason, but he thinks mathematics >> implements reasoning. > > It follows from “yes doctor”. > > This seems to be not known: but the existence of all computations in the > arithmetical reality (the models, standard or not, of any known theory of > arithmetic) is a fact. Even provable in Peano arithmetic. > > > > > >> I like Bruno's ideas, > > I have no ideas. I have just shows the theory obtained by any universal > computationalist machine introspectiog itself. Every statement I make is > either a theorem in Peano arithmetic, or in very limited extensions of > arithmetic, like in Torkel Franzen’s book “Inexhaustibility”. > > > >> but his is a mathematical ontology that starts with arithmetic, whereas mine >> is a relational ontology that starts with the phenomenological field. > > But then, Telmo, you put the mystery in the ontology, and this in a way which > makes you condemning all machines into zombie. I just listen to the machine, > and explain what they already tell us.
Bruno, it wasn't me who wrote the above. > > I don’t think that PA is a zombie, especially by its silence on the > fundamental question, and then the use of G*, with the interrogation marks. > > > >> Maybe they are compatible views, maybe they aren't. I remain unconvinced >> about qualia arising in arithmetical structures, but these are deep >> questions. I may be wrong. > > I am still not sure if what many miss here is not just some knowledge of > mathematical logic. I do miss some knowledge of mathematical logic, but again this wasn't me. I will reply to the other things soon. I apologize for being inconsistent in my participation in discussions. Life gets in the way... Telmo. > > I would be please if people tell me if they do understand that incompleteness > makes all nuance of provability obligatory, and why the non definable one > would not explain the qualia, including why that is necessarily felt as > mysterious (which is eventually related to the fact that the first person > *is* not a machine from its own point of view. Indeed it is anon definable > abstract type distributed on the whole arithmetical reality: that is not a > machine! > > (I have commented both Pierz and Telmo, here, sorry for that). > > Bruno > > > > > >>> >>> >>> Telmo. >>> >>>> The point of the thought experiment is merely to show how specific values >>>> can exist within a first person account, without us needing to invoke some >>>> unknowable thing-in-itself or substrate of intrinsic properties. >>>> >>>> Grateful for any comments/critiques. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected]. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/868bd041-299a-4618-9586-4b6362755cd7%40googlegroups.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/868bd041-299a-4618-9586-4b6362755cd7%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5ae9eebe-46c8-4bf0-b022-dba89c63e9bf%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5ae9eebe-46c8-4bf0-b022-dba89c63e9bf%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3AED6905-EBD6-4C56-BBA2-D1217A99E908%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3AED6905-EBD6-4C56-BBA2-D1217A99E908%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fddd7496-ac10-4cbe-8543-d7493ea5b67b%40www.fastmail.com.
