Hi Pierz, Your writings remind me very much of the work of Gilles Deleuze, a philosopher who similarly shifted ontology from *identity* to *relation, *and explored many interesting consequences of making that shift. My exposure to him came from the excellent Philosophize This podcast, which dedicated 5 episodes to Deleuze. If you're interested, check out the first episode here <http://philosophizethis.org/deleuze-pt-1/>.
Terren On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 10:15 PM Pierz <[email protected]> wrote: > > I've been thinking and writing a lot recently about a conception of > reality which avoids the debates about what is fundamental in reality. It > seems to me that with regards to materialism, we find it very difficult to > escape the evolutionarily evolved, inbuilt notion of "things" and "stuff" > that our brains need in order to manipulate the world. Yet QM and > importantly the expected dissolution of time and space as fundamental > entities in physics have made any such simple mechanistic notion of matter > obsolete - what is left of matter except mathematics and some strange thing > we can only call "instantiation" - the fact that things have specific > values rather than (seeming to be) pure abstractions? What does a > sophisticated materialist today place his or her faith in exactly? > Something along the lines of the idea that the world is fundamentally > describable by mathematics, impersonal and reducible to the operation of > its simplest components. With regards to the last part - reductionism - > that also seems to be hitting a limit in the sense that, while we have some > supposed candidates for fundamental entities (whether quantum fields, > branes or whatever), there is always a problem with anything considered > "fundamental" - namely the old turtle stack problem. If the world is really > made of any fundamental entity, then *fundamentally* it is made of magic > - since the properties of that fundamental thing must simply be given > rather than depending on some other set of relations. While physicists on > the one hand continually search for such an entity, on the other they > immediately reject any candidate as soon as it is found, since the question > naturally arises, why this way and not that? What do these properties > depend on? Furthermore, the fine tuning problem, unless it can be solved by > proof that the world *has* to be the way it is – a forlorn hope it seems to > me – suggests that the idea that we can explain all of reality in terms of > the analysis of parts (emergent relationships) is likely to collapse – we > will need to invoke a cosmological context in order to explain the > behaviour of the parts. It's no wonder so many physicists hate that idea, > since it runs against the deep reductionist grain. And after all, analysis > of emergent relationships (the parts of a thing) is always so much easier > than analysis of contextual relationships (what a thing is part of). > > To get to the point then, I am considering the idea of a purely relational > ontology, one in which all that exists are relationships. There are no > entities with intrinsic properties, but only a web of relational > properties. Entities with intrinsic properties are necessary components of > any finite, bounded theory, and in fact such entities form the boundaries > of the theory, the "approximations" it necessarily invokes in order to draw > a line somewhere in the potentially unbounded phenomenological field. In > economic theory for instance, we have “rational, self-interested” agents > invoked as fundamental entities with rationality and self-interest deemed > intrinsic, even though clearly such properties are, in reality, relational > properties that depend on evolutionary and psychological factors, that, > when analysed, reveal the inaccuracies and approximations of that theory. I > am claiming that all properties imagined as intrinsic are approximations of > this sort - ultimately to be revealed as derived from relations either > external or internal to that entity. > > Of course, a purely relational ontology necessarily involves an infinite > regress of relationships, but it seems to me that we must choose our poison > here - the magic of intrinsic properties, or the infinite regress of only > relational ones. I prefer the latter. (Note that I am using a definition of > relational properties that includes emergent properties as relational, > though the traditional philosophical use of those terms probably would not. > The reason is that I am interested in what is *ontologically* intrinsic, > not *semantically* intrinsic.) > > What would such a conception imply in the philosophy of mind? > Traditionally, the “qualiophiles” have defined qualia as intrinsic > properties, yet (while I am no fan of eliminativism) I think Dennett has > made a strong case against this idea. Qualia appear to me to be properties > of relationships between organisms and their environments. They are not > fundamental, but then neither is the “stuff” of which organisms and > environments are made. We simply cannot ask about fundamental properties, > but must confine ourselves to the networks of relationships we find > ourselves embedded in, and from which we, as observer-participants, cannot > be extricated. “Third person” accounts, including physics, are abstractions > from aggregations of first person accounts, and none can rise so high above > the field of observation as to entirely transcend their origins in the > first person. Thus there are certainly objective truths, but not Objective > Truths, that is truths that are entirely unbound to any observer and which > nominate the absolute properties of real objective things. > > Note that the “relationalism” I am proposing does not in any way imply > *relativism*, which flattens out truth claims at the level of culture. Nor > does it make consciousness “primary”, or mathematics. I cannot personally > reconcile the interior views (qualia, if you like, though I think that > terms places an unwarranted emphasis on “what experiences are like” rather > than the mere fact of experience) with a purely mathematical ontology. > > One obvious objection to this whole idea is the counter-intuitiveness of > the idea of relationships without “things” being related. Yet I think the > fault lies with intuition here. Western thinking is deeply intellectually > addicted to the notion of “things”. David Mermin has interpreted QM in > terms of “correlations only” – correlations without correlata as he puts it > – an application of similar ideas to quantum theory. Part of the objection > I think lies in the semantics of the word “relationship”, which > automatically causes us to imagine two things on either side of the > relation. It would be better to think in terms of a web, then, than > individual, related entities. Or simply say that the related entities are > themselves sets of relationships. Mathematics provides a good example of > such a purely relational domain – a number exists solely by virtue of its > relationships with other numbers. It has no intrinsic properties. > > Yet what then of the problem of specific values – the instantiation aspect > of materialism? To quote Hedda Mørch: “… physical structure must be > realized or implemented by some stuff or substance that is itself not > purely structural. Otherwise, there would be no clear difference between > physical and mere mathematical structure, or between the concrete universe > and a mere abstraction.” > > We can overcome such an objection by invoking the first person > perspective. Mørch credits the specific values of entities in our > environment (some specific electron having this position, that momentum and > so on) to some property of “being instantiated in something intrinsic”, > harking back to Kant’s *Ding an Sich*. Yet there is an alternative way of > viewing the situation. Let us imagine that each integer was conscious and > able to survey its context in the field of all numbers. Take some number, > let us say 7965. When number 7965 looks around, it sees the number 7964 > right behind it, and the number 7966 right ahead. Trying to understand > itself and the nature of its world, it starts doing arithmetic and finds > that everything around it can be understood purely in terms of relational > properties. Yet it says to itself, how can this be? Why do the numbers > around me have the specific values they do? What “breathes fire” into those > arithmetical relations to instantiate the specific world I see? Yet 7965 is > wrong. It is ignoring the significance of the first-person relation that > places it within a specific context that defines both it and the world it > sees. > > Note that I am not, like Bruno, actually suggesting that numbers are > conscious. The point of the thought experiment is merely to show how > specific values can exist within a first person account, without us needing > to invoke some unknowable thing-in-itself or substrate of intrinsic > properties. > > Grateful for any comments/critiques. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/868bd041-299a-4618-9586-4b6362755cd7%40googlegroups.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/868bd041-299a-4618-9586-4b6362755cd7%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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