> On 14 Jun 2019, at 11:58, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jun 13, 2019, at 14:39, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 11 Jun 2019, at 11:09, Telmo Menezes <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jun 7, 2019, at 20:22, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, June 7, 2019 at 11:54:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 6 Jun 2019, at 19:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@ >>>>> <>googlegroups. <http://googlegroups.com/>com <http://googlegroups.com/>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> [... stuff on libertarianism] >>>>> >>>>> I'm reminded of Bruno's theory that everything is computation… >>>> >>>> Just to be exact. My working hypothesis is “Indexical Digital Mechanism”. >>>> It is “YD + CT” to sum it all. >>>> >>>> My contribution is a theorem: which says that if we assume Mechanism, it >>>> is undecidable if there is more than the additive and multiplicative >>>> structure of the natural numbers, or Turing equivalent. >>>> >>>> But most things are not computation. The mixing of the codes of the total >>>> computable functions and the strictly partial one IS NOT computable, yet >>>> “arithmetically real” and this will have a role in the “first person >>>> indeterminacy” measure problem. >>>> >>>> If Mechanism is true, very few things are computable, or even deducible in >>>> powerful theory. Both consciousness and matter are typically not >>>> computable, yet absolutely real, for all Lôbian machines, from their >>>> phenomenological perspective. >>>> >>>> Every is numbers, or computations, which means we can limit the >>>> arithmetical reality to the sigma_1 sentences eventually, but that means >>>> only that the fundamental ontology is very simple. The interesting things, >>>> including god, consciousness and matter all get their meaning and laws >>>> from the phenomenological perspective. >>>> >>>> So, to say that with mechanism, that 'everything is computation’ is a bit >>>> misleading, as the phenomenologically apprehensible things will all be non >>>> computable, and yet are *real*, as we all know. >>>> >>>> For consciousness you need only to agree that it is >>>> >>>> True, >>>> Knowable, >>>> Indubitable, >>>> (Immediate), >>>> >>>> And >>>> >>>> Non-definable, >>>> Non Rationally believable >>> >>> Wait, this last one is new! >> >> I use sometimes “non rationally believable” for non provable. Usually I use >> “non believable”, but I am usually in a context where I made clear I talk >> about self-referentially correct machine, which are rational in the sense >> that their believability is close for the usual first order logical rules, >> and that they have few simple beliefs, like 2+2=4 or KKK = K, etc. > > Ok. > Couldn't you then say that consciousness is definable as the thing that has > all the above properties (removing non-definable)?
Not really, because this definition use the notion of arithmetical truth, or of knowledge, which cannot be defined internally. The definition are necessarily “meta-definition” and belongs to those attribute which cannot be internalised by any machine. But a rich machine can define it for a simpler machine than itself, like we can defined the notion of arithmetical truth in analysis, of course we cannot define “analytical truth” in analysis, but we have to trust it anyway. That is the main lesson of incompleteness. Our trust in arithmetic relies on our non definable intuition of it. We can build transfinite approximation of those notion, but some of them can only be internally understood by experiencing them. Consciousness is among them, but the arithmetical truth also, when assuming mechanism. > >> >> >> >>> What do you mean by "non rationally believable"? Isn't this contradictory >>> with "indubitable”? >> >> Not for consciousness. The indubitability is a first person person >> experience. >> >> Believable is modelled by Gödel’s bewesibar (the one modality which obeys to >> G and G*), but the indubitability is on the first person level: it is >> modelled by ([]p & p)’s logic, i.e. S4Grz. That one find its >> self-consistency obvious. >> >> OK? > > Ok, but wouldn't it then be more clear to say "non-provable" in all contexts? Maybe. I am not sure. The problem is that most people believe that “provable(p) implies p”, which makes it into a knowledge notion. To avoid repeating Gödel’s incompleteness all the time, I prefer to use “rational belief” instead of “proof”, because most people have not swallow completely that provability has a logic of belief, and not of knowledge. It is incompleteness which enforce the “belief” interpretation of the provability predicate. It forces us to keep in mind that our theories might be inconsistent. Bruno > > Telmo. > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Telmo. >>> >>>> >>>> Together with the invariance for some digital transformation at some >>>> description level. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> and so everything must be explainable in terms of computation. >>>> >>>> In terms of addition and multiplication, you can understand where >>>> consciousness come from, why it differentiates, and the transfinite paths >>>> it get involved into, and why Reality is beyond the computable, yet >>>> partially computable, partially and locally manageable, partially >>>> observable, partially and locally inductively inferable. Etc. >>>> >>>> Even just the arithmetical reality is far beyond the computable, but from >>>> inside, the sigma_1 (ultra-mini-tniy part of that reality) is already >>>> bigger than we could hope to formalise in ZF or ZF + Large cardinal. >>>> >>>> Digital mechanism, well understood (meaning with understand the quasi >>>> direct link between the Church-Turing thesis and incompleteness, (which I >>>> have explained many times, but I can do it again), is constructively >>>> antireductionist theory. The Löb-Gödelian machines, those who obeys to the >>>> probability/consistency laws of Solovays (cf G and G*) can defeat any >>>> complete theory anyone could conceive about them. >>>> >>>> Only numbers at the ontological level, OK, but the crazily interesting >>>> things appears at the phenomenological levels, where things are no more >>>> very computable at all. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Today is the last day of UCNC 2019. >>>> >>>> Program: http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/program.html >>>> <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/program.html> >>>> >>>> What the conference is about can be summed up as >>>> >>>> What is computing >>>> if the CT thesis [ >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis> ] is false? >>>> >>>> >>>> @philipthrift >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71fdd53d-c433-4c6d-9c9a-347ee44103da%40googlegroups.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71fdd53d-c433-4c6d-9c9a-347ee44103da%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/82f78bd7-a03a-4560-acec-002ccd5c95af%40www.fastmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/82f78bd7-a03a-4560-acec-002ccd5c95af%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3D81BF3F-B599-40B0-BD35-CC03839BEE8D%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3D81BF3F-B599-40B0-BD35-CC03839BEE8D%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/365a2149-c1e8-4bcb-9546-5d8ad1fb8041%40www.fastmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/365a2149-c1e8-4bcb-9546-5d8ad1fb8041%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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