On Thu, Jun 13, 2019, at 14:39, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 11 Jun 2019, at 11:09, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jun 7, 2019, at 20:22, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Friday, June 7, 2019 at 11:54:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 6 Jun 2019, at 19:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> [... *stuff on libertarianism*] >>>>> >>>>> I'm reminded of Bruno's theory that everything is computation… >>>> >>>> Just to be exact. My working hypothesis is “Indexical Digital Mechanism”. >>>> It is “YD + CT” to sum it all. >>>> >>>> My contribution is a theorem: which says that if we assume Mechanism, it >>>> is undecidable if there is more than the additive and multiplicative >>>> structure of the natural numbers, or Turing equivalent. >>>> >>>> But most things are not computation. The mixing of the codes of the total >>>> computable functions and the strictly partial one IS NOT computable, yet >>>> “arithmetically real” and this will have a role in the “first person >>>> indeterminacy” measure problem. >>>> >>>> If Mechanism is true, very few things are computable, or even deducible in >>>> powerful theory. Both consciousness and matter are typically not >>>> computable, yet absolutely real, for all Lôbian machines, from their >>>> phenomenological perspective. >>>> >>>> Every is numbers, or computations, which means we can limit the >>>> arithmetical reality to the sigma_1 sentences eventually, but that means >>>> only that the fundamental ontology is very simple. The interesting things, >>>> including god, consciousness and matter all get their meaning and laws >>>> from the phenomenological perspective. >>>> >>>> So, to say that with mechanism, that 'everything is computation’ is a bit >>>> misleading, as the phenomenologically apprehensible things will all be non >>>> computable, and yet are *real*, as we all know. >>>> >>>> For consciousness you need only to agree that it is >>>> >>>> True, >>>> Knowable, >>>> Indubitable, >>>> (Immediate), >>>> >>>> And >>>> >>>> Non-definable, >>>> Non Rationally believable >> >> Wait, this last one is new! > > I use sometimes “non rationally believable” for non provable. Usually I use > “non believable”, but I am usually in a context where I made clear I talk > about self-referentially correct machine, which are rational in the sense > that their believability is close for the usual first order logical rules, > and that they have few simple beliefs, like 2+2=4 or KKK = K, etc.
Ok. Couldn't you then say that consciousness is definable as the thing that has all the above properties (removing non-definable)? > > > >> What do you mean by "non rationally believable"? Isn't this contradictory >> with "indubitable”? > > Not for consciousness. The indubitability is a first person person experience. > > Believable is modelled by Gödel’s bewesibar (the one modality which obeys to > G and G*), but the indubitability is on the first person level: it is > modelled by ([]p & p)’s logic, i.e. S4Grz. That one find its self-consistency > obvious. > > OK? Ok, but wouldn't it then be more clear to say "non-provable" in all contexts? Telmo. > > Bruno > > > >> >> Telmo. >> >>>> >>>> Together with the invariance for some digital transformation at some >>>> description level. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> and so everything must be explainable in terms of computation. >>>> >>>> In terms of addition and multiplication, you can understand where >>>> consciousness come from, why it differentiates, and the transfinite paths >>>> it get involved into, and why Reality is beyond the computable, yet >>>> partially computable, partially and locally manageable, partially >>>> observable, partially and locally inductively inferable. Etc. >>>> >>>> Even just the arithmetical reality is far beyond the computable, but from >>>> inside, the sigma_1 (ultra-mini-tniy part of that reality) is already >>>> bigger than we could hope to formalise in ZF or ZF + Large cardinal. >>>> >>>> Digital mechanism, well understood (meaning with understand the quasi >>>> direct link between the Church-Turing thesis and incompleteness, (which I >>>> have explained many times, but I can do it again), is constructively >>>> antireductionist theory. The Löb-Gödelian machines, those who obeys to the >>>> probability/consistency laws of Solovays (cf G and G*) can defeat any >>>> complete theory anyone could conceive about them. >>>> >>>> Only numbers at the ontological level, OK, but the crazily interesting >>>> things appears at the phenomenological levels, where things are no more >>>> very computable at all. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>> >>> Today is the last day of *UCNC 2019*. >>> >>> Program: http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/program.html >>> >>> What the conference is about can be summed up as >>> >>> *What is computing* >>> if the CT thesis [ >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis ] is *false*? >>> >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71fdd53d-c433-4c6d-9c9a-347ee44103da%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71fdd53d-c433-4c6d-9c9a-347ee44103da%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/82f78bd7-a03a-4560-acec-002ccd5c95af%40www.fastmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/82f78bd7-a03a-4560-acec-002ccd5c95af%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3D81BF3F-B599-40B0-BD35-CC03839BEE8D%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3D81BF3F-B599-40B0-BD35-CC03839BEE8D%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/365a2149-c1e8-4bcb-9546-5d8ad1fb8041%40www.fastmail.com.
