> On 13 Jun 2019, at 16:19, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 7:07 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >> Instead of yet another long winded vague metaphysical definition give me > >> some examples of mechanism so I know what the hell you're talking about. > >> Start by answering my simple clear yes or no questions. > > > I use “mechanism” as a short cut for “YD + CT” (yes doctor and the > > Church-Turing hypothesis). > I use “digital machine” or “program” or “number” or “word” for what you might > mean by Mechanism. > > That's nice I'm happy for you; but how about answering my original questions > with simple yes or no answers? > > Is a cuckoo clock a mechanism?
In (serious) metaphysics, a word like “cuckoo clock” is not well defined. You don’t answer my question. If by cuckoo clock you mean the physical object, then my answer is NO. The cuckoo clock is not “a mechanism” (by which I mean anything emulbale by a Turing machine. If you define a cuckoo clock by its function (measuring time), then we can argue that it is Turing emulable, and in that case we can call it a mechanism. > Is a roulette wheel a mechanism? > Is a Tritium atom with a half life of 12.32 years a mechanism? Same answer as above, except that it is more obvious that you mean the physical object. > Is the multiplication table a mechanism? No. That is not a mechanism. It might be part of a mechanism, but a multiplication table is not a digital machine per se. > > And if you're going to dodge the questions again at least have the common > curtesy to think of a better excuse than "I din't know what a cuckoo clock > is”. The physical object “cuckoo clock” is not a being, with Digital Mechanism. It is a map on the infinitely many accessible computational histories, which are realised in arithmetic. It is not an object at all, but a locally sharable first person plural experience. This can be said to be confirmed by physics. If we look at the physical object close enough, we detect the electronically orbital which map the histories where we can detect where the electron are present, and some physicists already talk about measure on possible findings. The mathematics of accessible computational histories (the logics S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*) is coherent with the findings of the natural scientists. > > > A physical cuckoo clock is an informal poorly defined notion. > > Oh for christ sake, then EVERYTHING is a informal poorly defined notion. And > actually that would be OK because fundamentally definitions are not important > in language, examples are. For practical application you are right. But when we assume mechanism and sinus metaphysics, the “obvious” is no more obvious. > > > Or do you define a cuckoo clock by [,,,] > > That is the problem right there! You are always and forever talking about > definitions as if they are somehow fundamental but they NEVER are. In any > language including mathematics the parent of definition is ALWAYS example. > Where do you think Euclid got the knowledge to white his definitions? Where > do you think lexicographers got the knowledge to white their dictionaries? Exemples are good, but when we do metaphysics, the metaphysical or ontological nature behind the examples should not be taken for granted. > > If you can't answer specific clear questions about what is and what is not a > mechanism with either a yes or a no answer then you lack the tools to > communicate deep philosophical ideas to your fellow human beings, you can't > even tell them how to tie their shoes. > > > You will not find the expression “a mechanism” in any of my post. > > I know and that is exactly precisely the problem. You talk about mechanism > constantly, and I mean CONSTANTLY, But I made clear that “Mechanism” is the act of faith of saying yes to a doctor who propose a digital physical body/brain. Then I use the term machine for your substantive “mechanism”, especially to avoid any confusion here. And by digital machine, I mean any number/program i in the enumeration phi_i of the partial computable function. I define “emulable” in this way: a number x emulate a number y if phi_x(y, z) = phi_y(z). A universal digital-machine or number is a number u which emulates all numbers: i.e. for all x phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y). I can explain more on this, or you can search for my posts where I have explained this already, perhaps before you were participating on this list. > and yet you are unable to provide a single specific example of something that > has that quality or single specific example of something that does not. And > that means you literally don't know what you're talking about. Avoid those ad hominem comment. Ask specific question. > > > A perfect definition of digital machine is [...] > > God damn it! I don't want yet another definition, perfect or otherwise, I > want an EXAMPLE! But I have given an example. You don’t quote it. That’s all. I gave the example of what you call a mechanism: SKK And I have given an example of computation SKKK KK(KK) K This is in the phi_i given by the theory of combinator. I could use any Turing-complete instead. All programs are examples, all physical computers are example too, but the programs are not physical object, and they are implemented in all initial segment of all models of arithmetic, as we know since the work of Emil Post, Stephen Kleene, Alonzo Church and Alan Turing, and many others. > The fact that you are unable to provide even one tells me that your ideas are > so bad they're not even wrong. >> >>> Is a roulette wheel a mechanism? Is a Tritium atom with a half life of >> >>> 12.32 years a mechanism? Is the multiplication table a mechanism? >> >> >> If you define them in such a way that they are Turing emulable, then they >> >> are “mechanism”, > > With Mechanism, I have already ex^plained why no piece of matter is ever > > Turing emulable. > > A roulette wheel is a piece of matter and so is a Tritium atom, so if "no > piece of matter is ever Turing emulable" why did you say in the above they > are Turing emulable? You've gotten so confused you've forgotten what you're > confused about. The program associated to the cuckoo clock is Turing emulable, but the physical cuckoo clock is not. > > > I talk on “Mechanism”, the assumption that we can survive through a > > physical digital body, with a generalised sense of body, > > You talk at great length about “Mechanism” in your posts and papers but in > all that verbiage you admit you have never once talked about "a Mechanism”, Because I use the term “machine” instead. To keep “Mechanism” for the hypothesis. I was using “comp” before, but you were not glad with that expression, and that is why I use “Indexical Digital Mechanism” instead, or more shortly “Mechanism”. It is the YD+CT. Your tone seems to indicate you have a prejudice, which could be normal as you have exemplify that you are a believer in primary matter or physicalism, like some philosophers who indeed dislike my findings for that reason. But they have not find any mistake capable of convincing any scientific jury. > you can't supply even one specific example of what the hell you're talking > about, you claim it's because you don't know what a cuckoo clock is but I > think it's because you literally don't know what you're talking about. > > >> your definitions are useless > > > ? > > ! > > > Here is a machine > SKK > Here is a computation > SKKK > KK(KK) > K > > I see. So 3 squiggles is called a "machine" and 11 squiggles is called a > "computation”. Here you confuse SKK with “SKK”. It is the same mistake than confusing the truth that 2+2=4, and the sequence of symbol in “2+2=4”. Please, read at least the first thread on the combinator. But if you ask, I can (re)introduce the “coffee-bar” machines, as their are more like programs on a von Neuman type of computer. In that case we have a set of numbered register (or table in a coffee bar) and “a mechanism” is a program which is finite enumeration of instructions, among Z(n) = make empty the table/register numbered by n S(n) = add one to the register n T(n, m) = transfer the content of register n in register m J(n, m, q) = if the content of register n is equal to the content of register m, go to instruction q, if not, proceed on the next instruction. We implement a function from N to N by putting the input in the register 1, and we ask that the output is put also in register 1. If the function has more than one argument, we put the argument in the register 1, and 2, etc. “A mechanism” to compute the addition function x + y is given, for example by: 1) J(3, 2, 5) 2) S(1) 3) S(3) 4) J(1, 1, 1) A computation is for example what that program will do if you put 2 and 3 in register 1 and 2, and it can be described by the sequence of the value in the register: R1 = 2; R2 = 3, R3 = 0, R4 = 0, … R1 = 3; R2 = 3; R3 = 0; R4 = 0, … R1= 3; R2 = 3; R3 = 1; R4 = 0, … R1= 3; R2 = 3; R3 = 1; R4 = 0, … R1 = 4; R2 = 3; R3 = 1; R4 = 0, … R1 = 4; R2 = 3; R3 = 2; R4 = 0, … R1 = 5; R2 = 3; R3 = 2; R4 = 0, … R1 = 5; R2 = 3; R3 = 3; R4 = 0 And the program stop, because the content of R2 and R3 are equal, and we have to jump on the 5th instruction, which does not exist in this program. R1 = 5 is the output of that computation. > That's nice I'm happy for you; but how about answering my original questions > with simple yes or no answers? > > Is a cuckoo clock a mechanism? With the precision I have added above, the answer is NO. > Is a roulette wheel a mechanism? NO. > Is a Tritium atom with a half life of 12.32 years a mechanism? NO. > Is the multiplication table a mechanism? NO. > > > I don’t know what a cuckoo clock is. > > If the hole in your mental data base is really that huge then there is no way > you can say anything of substance about science or philosophy. On the contrary, all progress have come, in the fundamental science, when we understand that something obvious, is not obvious. To believe that mundane term have simple interpretation that we can take as granted would have impeach any discovery like atoms, wave, etc. > The first deep philosophical question you need to answer before you can have > any hope of delving further into the realms of thought is "What is a cuckoo > clock and is it a mechanism or is it not?”. With the precision that the cuckoo clock is defined by a material object, the answer is NO. The cuckoo clock is not a mechanism, it is a relative (to an observer) map of the accessible computational histories, like quantum mechanics confirms. With mechanism, you are not allow to invoke an ontological commitment to solve a problem, and if you believe in mechanism, you cannot use a term like “real matter” to select a computation in arithmetic. Indeed, in that case you would need to ask the doctor to emulate the matter of your brain at some infinitely low substitution level. Read old posts on this or my papers for more. Ask any question. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0CKtDSHKnZdW9ujS017yvQ9M8O03ayfBNMiMSYjKhwvQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0CKtDSHKnZdW9ujS017yvQ9M8O03ayfBNMiMSYjKhwvQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09EE9E1E-B31D-4493-9C14-F9D3DA195478%40ulb.ac.be.
