> On 16 Jun 2019, at 10:09, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 7:53:34 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Jun 15, 2019 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > >> it is quite clear that serious metaphysics is not very serious. Bozo > >> metaphysics would be a better term. > > > That shows how much you take metaphysics seriously. > > I give metaphysics all the respect it deserves. > > The fact is that you seem to assume Mechanism and Materialism, and that is > inconsistent. > > If I knew what you mean by Mechanism and Materialism I'd know if I assume > them or not, but, although you've given me 6.02*10^23 definitions of both you > are unable to provide a single specific example of either, so it's all just > words and I don't know what you mean. > > I have to agree with Clark here. I think Bruno should just define some of his > terms, like mechanism,
We discuss this since long. I have used Mechanism since long to describe the thesis that we can survive with a digital brain transplant, coming from the copy of the Brian made at some level of description. I call that level the substitution level, and mechanist is the weak statement that such a level exist. (Note that Darwin did assume mechanism in hist theory of evolution, confirmed by genetics, relatively to the laws of chemistry/quantum mechanics). Put differently it says that the brain is Turing emulable (at some description level). Brain can be used in a general sense of the portion of the physical universe you need to emulate (digitally) to survive. It is a rather weak hypothesis. Non mechanism is often defined by invoking some magic events in the brain which would not be Turing emulable. Mechanism can be seen as the Digital version of Descartes Mechanism. It does not claim that the physical universe is itself Turing emulable, quite the contrary: the consequence is that the physical universe does not exist, and the appearance of the physical universe must be derived from elementary arithmetic + definitions (which can be motivated by thought experience and/or by reading neoplatonic philosophy/theology). I use the fact, well known by all mathematical logicians and computer scientists, that the notion of computation is mathematical. I have illustrates my theorems on divers formalism, in this list and in may papers and books. > materialism, I used that term in a slightly different sense than in philosophy in mind (where materialism is the belief in primary matter and in nothing else, ontologically). I use materialism in the more general sense of “believer in primary matter”. All dualist, who believes in both matter and mind are still materialist with that definition. When I want this made precise, I use the label “weak materialism”. It is just the belief that matter exists ontologically. With mechanism, matter exists phenomenologically only. I don’t claim that this is obvious, but I defend this in my PhD thesis (in Computer Science/mathematical logic department). > computable or Turing computable, Those are standard term. To make them precise, I have given precise definition. You are already there when I have given the definition of the combinators, and I have proved with all details how and why we can say that they computable computable functions from N to N. You just need to ask question just when you don’t understand. Not month later. But it is never late. The phi_i is the ABC of Recursion Theory (aka theory of computability). > and maybe we can have a useful discussion. You, Bruno, can't just rely on > some very post not easily found as sufficient. Play it again Sam! AG Ask a specific question. If you study my work, you will see that I have no new theory at all. Not only I give precise definition, but I explain how to translate them in any language comprehensible by a universal machine, and basically, what I explain in the answer provided by those machines. It is pure theoretical computer science, which is itself embeddable in arithmetic, or combinatorr theory. It is mathematics. Then the link with consciousness is made through an axiomatic of consciousness which I have given, mainly True, indubitable, Immediate, Yet non provable, Non definable (without invoking “truth”) And (Mechanism) Invariant for some digital functional substitution made at some level. Ask any question, it is always a pleasure for me to explain, Bruno > > >>> you can search for my posts where I have explained this already, perhaps > >>> before you were participating on this list. > > >> Oh we're back to that are we. For at least 5 years and probably closer to > >> 10 you've been telling me about this wonderful post of yours written a > >> long time ago in a galaxy far far away that brilliantly answers all my > >> objections to your philosophy. The trouble is I've never seen that post > >> and I don't know anybody who has even claimed to have seen it. I do > >> however know somebody who has claimed to have seen Bigfoot. > > > Well, the post are there, but not easy to find. > > That is one of the great understatements of all time! Yes that wonderful post > is indeed not easy to find, I think it must be in a safe deposit box at the > First National Bank Of Atlantas. You've been singing the same song about the > glory of that magical mystical post for the better part of a decade but > nobody has ever actually seen it. > > > But we know that you have a problem with the most easy part of the theory, > > (UDA step 3) > > Step 3 is not easy it's simple, but not simple in a good way. > > Work out the step 3, and we can continue. > > Make step 3 less simple (aka less stupid) and we can continue. > > > The fact that you invoke a physical existing universe to rebute some of the > > consequence of mechanism is enough to deduce that you believe in > > physicalism. > > I have no idea if I believe in what you call "physicalism" or not because I > don't know what you mean by mechanism. You did give an example of a machine > (which may or may not be the same as an example of mechanism you seem > unsure), your example was SKK, or perhaps it was "SKK" you seem unsure, but I > don't find either example to be particularly enlightening . > > > to say that a computation has to be primarily physical to “exist” > > illustrate well enough that you believe in some sort of physicalism. > > I don't know what you mean by computation either. The example you gave was > > SKKK > KK(KK) > K > > But you seem unsure and say maybe instead it should be: > > "SKKK > KK(KK) > K" > > but I don't find either example to be particularly enlightening. And meaning > no ad hominem but just stating a conclusion based on facts, that is why I > think you quite literally don't know what you are talking about. > > > I think you play dumb. > > I think you don't think. > >> You confuse register and "register". One is an electronic or mechanical > >> device that obeys the laws of physics and the other is an ASCII sequence. > > > I have explained how a register machine can be implemented in arithmetic. I > > have not given all details, > > You haven't given ANY details about how an ASCII sequence by itself can make > a calculation because you don't know any details, if you did you'd be the > richest most powerful man who ever lived. In fact you wouldn't be a man you'd > be a God. > > > because it is long an hideous, and well done in all textbook in theoretical > > computer science or mathematical logic. > > And those theoretical computer science and mathematical textbooks would be > Gods too. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/160772c2-4364-4435-9def-b5bec0879c5c%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/160772c2-4364-4435-9def-b5bec0879c5c%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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