On Friday, March 21, 2014 12:42:13 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > I'm not so much interested in defining CTM, as in exploding the > assumptions from which CTM and other mechanistic, information-theoretical > models of consciousness arise. >
OK. Would you mind defining which assumptions you're thinking of? > > >> >> >>> They don't reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM. >>> >> >> That is not a prediction of CTM. Here's a relevant quote from the >> Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Turing himself seems to have been of >> the opinion that a machine operating in this way would literally be doing >> the same things that the human performing computations is doing—that it >> would be 'duplicating' what the human computer does. But other writers have >> suggested that what the computer does is merely a 'simulation' of what the >> human computer does: a reproduction of human-level performance, perhaps >> through a set of steps that is [at] some level isomorphic to those the >> human undertakes, but not in such a fashion as to constitute doing the same >> thing in all relevant respects." >> > > Again, either way the development of modality-dependence in non-humans and > modality-independence in humans does not support the idea that > consciousness is driven by logic and computation. > Right, modality (in)dependent communication neither supports nor opposes the idea that consciousness is computation. In CTM, brains doing modality-dependent computations would have minds experiencing sense-data qualia, and brains doing modality-independent computations would have minds experiencing abstract qualia. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
