On Friday, March 21, 2014 2:11:17 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: > > > > On Friday, March 21, 2014 12:42:13 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> I'm not so much interested in defining CTM, as in exploding the >> assumptions from which CTM and other mechanistic, information-theoretical >> models of consciousness arise. >> > > OK. Would you mind defining which assumptions you're thinking of? >
The assumptions that forms and functions can exist independently of perception and participation. > > >> >> >>> >>> >>>> They don't reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM. >>>> >>> >>> That is not a prediction of CTM. Here's a relevant quote from the >>> Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Turing himself seems to have been of >>> the opinion that a machine operating in this way would literally be doing >>> the same things that the human performing computations is doing—that it >>> would be 'duplicating' what the human computer does. But other writers have >>> suggested that what the computer does is merely a 'simulation' of what the >>> human computer does: a reproduction of human-level performance, perhaps >>> through a set of steps that is [at] some level isomorphic to those the >>> human undertakes, but not in such a fashion as to constitute doing the same >>> thing in all relevant respects." >>> >> >> Again, either way the development of modality-dependence in non-humans >> and modality-independence in humans does not support the idea that >> consciousness is driven by logic and computation. >> > > Right, modality (in)dependent communication neither supports nor opposes > the idea that consciousness is computation. > No, the fact that modality independent communication does not appear until human experience does oppose the idea that consciousness is computation, since computation is by definition modality independent. > In CTM, brains doing modality-dependent computations would have minds > experiencing sense-data qualia, and brains doing modality-independent > computations would have minds experiencing abstract qualia. > > Argh, CTM has nothing to do with brains. That would be a BTM. Craig > -Gabe > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
