On 13 February 2014 19:19, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 9:30:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > >> On 12 February 2014 23:47, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> > I don't think that my experience can be replaced with a copy though. >> >> >> >> So how would you know you were a copy? >> > >> > >> > It has nothing to do with whether or not I would know, it's because in >> my >> > understanding, copying is not primitively real, but rather is a >> consequence >> > of low level insensitivity. As awareness approaches the limits of its >> > sensitivity, everything seems more and more the same. From an absolute >> > perspective, awareness cannot be substituted, because substitution is >> the >> > antithesis of awareness. >> >> That's your theory of why you don't think your experience could be >> replaced with a copy, but you haven't explained what you think would >> happen. >> > > It depends on what method was being used to try to copy my experience. The > common theme would be that the copy would fall short aesthetically and > functionally from the outside view, and that it would have no inside view. > > >> >> >> Here you are today, incredulous >> >> about the story of your destruction last night, but we produce >> >> witnesses and videotapes and whatever other proof you need. What are >> >> you going to say to that? >> > >> > >> > Your question is "If you were wrong about awareness being >> non-transferable, >> > would you still think you were right?". I'm not even sure what that >> fallacy >> > is called...a loaded non-question? >> >> No, it's a simple question. You could answer something like, "If I >> were replaced by a copy last night then my copy would tell you today >> that he is not Craig Weinberg". >> > > I don't have a problem with the logic that once you accept the false > premise of copyable experience, then the copy would be unable to detect > that they were a copy (although even that makes unscientific assumptions > about the limits of sense). The problem is that being replaced by a copy is > like a circle and square becoming the same thing. > Reject the premise of a copyable experience: the copy then does not have the experience of the original, but it has the delusional belief that it has a continuation of the experience of the original. Given that a person with a delusion by definition lacks insight into the fact that he is deluded, how do you know that you are not a copy? > >> > The physical differences are only encoded as software if there is a >> human >> > user who is interpreting it as meaningful. Without the user who cares >> about >> > the difference, and for whom the software is designed to interface >> with, >> > there is only unencoded physical differences in the computer. The same >> goes >> > for the brain. Without us, the brain is just a complex piece of coral, >> > storing and repeating meaningless configurations of electrical, >> molecular, >> > and cellular interactions that have nothing to do with human >> consciousness. >> >> If the "meaningless configurations of of electrical, molecular and >> cellular interactions" occur then consciousness also occurs, and they >> aren't meaningless any more. That is, we know that these physical >> processes are *sufficient* for consciousness, since we know that (a) >> we are conscious, and (b) as far as we know there is no additional >> ingredient other than these physical processes. > > <http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/telicdynamic.jpg> > > That's circular. We do not know that the physical processes are > sufficient, because we can describe them exhaustively without having to > describe consciousness at all. Consciousness, therefore, to paraphrase > Chalmers, must be a further fact about the world. > If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still being *sufficient* to produce consciousness. It would only not be sufficient if some further ingredient were necessary beyond the matter in the right configuration. > You are only looking at it from the Retrospective view of consciousness, > the modus tollens view where consciousness is assumed to be attached to > physics instead of the other way around. When we use the modus ponens view > instead, and recognize that just because our personal phenomenal access is > limited (just as our body's physical access is limited) does not mean that > phenomenology itself is limited, and could not, in fact contain physics as > phenomenal local appearances instead. We are the additional ingredient. It > is the physical processes which rely on deeper phenomenal self-evident > affective texts to generate local participatory effects. As organisms, and > vertebrates, and homo sapiens, we re nested again and again, so that the > alphabets of our affective texts, our personal level phenomenology, builds > on both sub-personal (microphenomenology) and super-personal > (metaphenomenology), so that our embeddedness within is mirrored in an > anomalous and unexpected way to the sub-impersonal (microphysical) and > super-impersonal (metaphysical-theoretical). > > >> This does not mean >> that these physical processes are *necessary* for consciousness, and I >> believe that consciousness can occur in different substrates. These >> processes are meaningful to external observers and they are also >> meaningful to the internal observer, the conscious self, to whom they >> give rise. >> >> >> >> There are drugs >> >> >> which have the same effect on species as far apart as humans and >> >> >> bacteria. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Which is why I say that it should be the same case for language if >> it >> >> > was a >> >> > product of brain change. There should be words with mean the same >> thing >> >> > on >> >> > species as far apart as humans and bacteria, or at least as far >> apart as >> >> > humans on the other side of the continent. >> >> >> >> Not at all. >> > >> > >> > Because? >> >> Because it's a non sequitur. >> > > Why would it be a non sequitur? We embed firmware in hardware all the > time. We could have an OS or whatever software we want hard coded. Why not > language also? > > Craig > > >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
