Hi Bruno Marchal
Potential definitions :
To Exist = to have objective being, to physically be, to be within spacetime,
having spacial location and extension at time t - a thing such as a brain or
object
To Inhere = to have subjective being, to mentally or nonphysically be, that
is, to be outside of spacetime, inextended (without spacial location at time
t), such as thoughts, numbers, quanta, qualia, etc.
Thus brain exists, mind inheres.
An agent = An inherent control and observation center.
A self = an agent
Actual = to exist
Real = either to exist or to inhere even without a self or agent to observe or
control it.
Roger Clough, [email protected]
9/24/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-23, 11:16:38
Subject: Re: What is 'Existence'?
==============================================================
On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
This is my schema.
Can you complete/ammend it?
Things in themselves (noumena) -> - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few
components: numbers, + *
OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and
multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete ontology.
I would not described the numbers has components, though, because this could
lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might be made of numbers, and
that is a physicalist non correct view of how what exist epistemologically
emerges (through complex number relations and their epistemological content
which can be shown to exists once we assume computationalism).
Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature (addition and
multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not, as arithmetical truth is
not computable at all, and will play an important role in the emergence of the
epistemological reality. In particular, the internal epistemological realities
will have many non computable features, like machines and programs have too).
- Is just a
mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations
- Are Monadic (Roger).
many components
- Are phisical:
includes the "phisical world" with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists)
Things perceived (phenomena) -> - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the
activity of the brain (a local arangement that
keep entropy constant
along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection
Therefore, existence is
selected (Me)
Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can understand
"relies on the architecture of the mind" (the dreams of the universal number),
but what is a brain? what is time, space, nature?
- The mind is a robust
computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno)
The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of computation
among an infinity of computations.
- Are created by the
activity of the supreme monad (Roger)
- Does not matter
(physicalists)
Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe that the mind
is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to justify this, or to
pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp, they are inconsistent (as
shown normally by the UD Argument).
I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person indeterminacy into
account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ?
Bruno
(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal
On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their
arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.
Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent
upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the
tool-maker and user that is talking through you here.
Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not
makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not
its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard
model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not
say "yes" to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain).
That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the
physics as a subpart).
Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from
pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task.
First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA
illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure
necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content
for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of
individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
--
Alberto.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
