Hi Bruno, With components I mean a neutral enumeration of entities. perhaps lebnitzian monads would be more appropriate.
Besides numbers + and * I think that is necessary machines or any kind of instruction set + an execution unit? . It isn't? 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > > On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > This is my schema. > > Can you complete/ammend it? > > Things in themselves (noumena) -> - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : > few components: numbers, + * > > > OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and > multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete ontology. > I would not described the numbers has components, though, because this > could lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might be made of > numbers, and that is a physicalist non correct view of how what exist > epistemologically emerges (through complex number relations and their > epistemological content which can be shown to exists once we assume > computationalism). > Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature (addition > and multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not, as arithmetical > truth is not computable at all, and will play an important role in the > emergence of the epistemological reality. In particular, the internal > epistemological realities will have many non computable features, like > machines and programs have too). > > > > > - Is just a > mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations > - Are Monadic > (Roger). many components > - Are phisical: > includes the "phisical world" with: space, time persons, cars. > (physicalists) > > Things perceived (phenomena) -> - Relies on the architecture of the mind, > the activity of the brain (a local arangement that > keep entropy > constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection > Therefore, > existence is selected (Me) > > > Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can understand > "relies on the architecture of the mind" (the dreams of the universal > number), but what is a brain? what is time, space, nature? > > > - The mind is a > robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) > > > The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of > computation among an infinity of computations. > > > > - Are created by > the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) > - Does not matter > (physicalists) > > > > Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe that the > mind is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to justify this, or > to pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp, they are inconsistent > (as shown normally by the UD Argument). > > I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person indeterminacy > into account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ? > > Bruno > > (*) > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > > > > > 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > >> >> On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: >> >> >> With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and >> their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or >> []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc. >> >> >> Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence >> contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human >> whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. >> >> >> Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does >> not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is >> contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we >> work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with >> standard comp (we would not say "yes" to a doctor if he propose a non >> standard cording of our brain). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains >> the physics as a subpart). >> >> >> Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow >> from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this >> task. >> >> >> First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And >> the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows >> pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical >> content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private >> life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all >> religion). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > > > -- > Alberto. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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