Max Nikulin <maniku...@gmail.com> writes: > On 08/02/2024 22:07, Ihor Radchenko wrote: >> >> `org--safe-remote-resource-p' checks the containing Org file as well, in >> addition to #+included URL. > > If my reading of the code is correct then it considers > /ssh:host:org/include.org as safe if file:///ssh:host:org/test.org is > added to `org-safe-remote-resources'. I was considering a case when > there is no matching entry in `org-safe-remote-resources'. The user > opens (C-x C-f) /ssh:host:org/test.org and likely it is enough to > consider /ssh:host:org/include.org safe as well due to the same origin > "/ssh:host:".
I don't think so. And even if it is safe, I do not view it as a major obstacle that will annoy users. There is an option to add the current host to safe resources. No reason to layer complicated logic here - simpler is more reliable. >>> I am not confident in proper policy though. When some URI matches a >>> pattern in the safe list, likely it is suitable for files created by the >>> user and it is not really safe to allow it for a mail message attachment. >> >> May you elaborate? > > Consider a user that has "#+include:" loaded from their own public > repository and used for some babel computations. It is safe when > included into user's files. I am not sure that it is safe for an org > file opened through a link in the browser. Perhaps it is better to avoid > included files in `org-safe-remote-resources' and add local directories > there. What we may do is to add #+include + current file combination as safe when user answers "!". -- Ihor Radchenko // yantar92, Org mode contributor, Learn more about Org mode at <https://orgmode.org/>. Support Org development at <https://liberapay.com/org-mode>, or support my work at <https://liberapay.com/yantar92>
