On 08/02/2024 22:07, Ihor Radchenko wrote:
Max Nikulin writes:
Max Nikulin writes:
Browsers
have concept of same origin for applying security and privacy measures.
Consider a file opened as /ssh:host:org/test.org that has
#+setupfile: /ssh:host:org/include.org
Formally it is a remote file, actually it resides on the same host as
the current document. Perhaps user consent is redundant.
`org--safe-remote-resource-p' checks the containing Org file as well, in
addition to #+included URL.
If my reading of the code is correct then it considers
/ssh:host:org/include.org as safe if file:///ssh:host:org/test.org is
added to `org-safe-remote-resources'. I was considering a case when
there is no matching entry in `org-safe-remote-resources'. The user
opens (C-x C-f) /ssh:host:org/test.org and likely it is enough to
consider /ssh:host:org/include.org safe as well due to the same origin
"/ssh:host:".
I am not confident in proper policy though. When some URI matches a
pattern in the safe list, likely it is suitable for files created by the
user and it is not really safe to allow it for a mail message attachment.
May you elaborate?
Consider a user that has "#+include:" loaded from their own public
repository and used for some babel computations. It is safe when
included into user's files. I am not sure that it is safe for an org
file opened through a link in the browser. Perhaps it is better to avoid
included files in `org-safe-remote-resources' and add local directories
there.
