On Wed, Sep 09, 2015 at 08:12:41PM +0200, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> Yes, we are waiting exactly for the cfrg to finish the signature schemas.
> But the rest can get a review early. f.e. it's evident now, we have to
> add more material about motivation to add new curves into the draft(s).
Great. My other concern is that at this point, perhaps every time
we consider adding more algorithm ids to DNSSEC we should consider
retiring some old ones, we are starting to have too many:
Id Description Mnemonic ZSIG TSIG Reference
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 RSA/MD5 (deprecated) RSAMD5 N Y [RFC3110][RFC4034]
2 Diffie-Hellman DH N Y [RFC2539]
4 Reserved [RFC6725]
9 Reserved [RFC6725]
11 Reserved [RFC6725]
--
3 DSA/SHA1 DSA Y Y [RFC3755]
5 RSA/SHA-1 RSASHA1 Y Y [RFC3110][RFC4034]
6 DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 Y Y [RFC5155]
7 RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 Y Y [RFC5155]
8 RSA/SHA-256 RSASHA256 Y * [RFC5702]
10 RSA/SHA-512 RSASHA512 Y * [RFC5702]
12 GOST R 34.10-2001 ECC-GOST Y * [RFC5933]
13 P-256 with SHA-256 ECDSAP256SHA256 Y * [RFC6605]
14 P-384 with SHA-384 ECDSAP384SHA384 Y * [RFC6605]
I'd like to propose that with the introduction of the CFRG algorithms,
we should deprecate:
3 DSA/SHA1 DSA Y Y [RFC3755]
6 DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 Y Y [RFC5155]
12 GOST R 34.10-2001 ECC-GOST Y * [RFC5933]
and as ideally also announce a sunset date for:
5 RSA/SHA-1 RSASHA1 Y Y [RFC3110][RFC4034]
7 RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 Y Y [RFC5155]
though of course these are rather widely used at present, it is
time to start encouraging folks to move on.
Once the CFRG algorithms are done, I would also publish an updated
list of MTI algorithms for DNSSEC that would consist of:
8, 12 and both of the CFRG algorithms.
The more secure of the two CFRG algorithms should be supported by
clients, but should not yet be used by servers, concerns about
post-QC crypto don't really apply to short-term signatures, we can
switch to the Goldilocks curve if/when necessary, provided the
client support is there all along.
--
Viktor.
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